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A Stone of Hope:
Legal and Empirical Analysis of California
Juvenile Lifer Parole Decisions
Kristen Bell1
“With this faith, we will be able to hew out of the mountain of
despair a stone of hope.”
—Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
In a recent line of cases, the Supreme Court held that sentencing juveniles
to life in prison without the possibility of release on parole violates the Eighth
Amendment in all but the rarest cases. Many states have responded by extending
the possibility of release on parole to individuals serving juvenile life sentences.
Whether the possibility of parole can render juvenile life sentences constitu-
tional is a topic of ongoing debate among courts, litigants, and scholars. Thus
far, that debate has not engaged with one of the most longstanding critiques of
parole systems: that parole-release decision-making can be arbitrary and capri-
cious. This Article develops this critique as applied to an original empirical
study of 426 California parole decisions among people sentenced to life with the
possibility of parole for crimes committed as juveniles. The study uses regression
analysis and other quantitative techniques to assess the extent to which parole is
consistently granted to those who demonstrate comparable levels of rehabilita-
tion. When combined with qualitative analysis of decision-making procedures,
the evidence suggests that parole decisions are as arbitrary and capricious with
respect to a measure of rehabilitation as death penalty decisions were to a mea-
sure of culpability when the Supreme Court struck down the death penalty as
arbitrary and capricious in 1972. The Article argues that, as applied during the
time period of this study, California’s system of parole-release decision-making
for people sentenced to life as juveniles may be unconstitutional on three
grounds:  it may violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against arbitrary
and capricious punishment, it may be void for vagueness, or it may deny ade-
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quate procedural due process. The Article proposes reforms that are designed to
improve fairness and equity in parole decision-making by restricting the parole
board’s discretion, improving the exercise of that discretion, and providing ef-
fective oversight and accountability over parole-release decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has held that, except in rare cases, it
is cruel and unusual punishment to sentence a juvenile to life in prison un-
less the juvenile is afforded a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”2 Many states have re-
sponded to this holding by passing legislation that makes individuals who
are serving life sentences for juvenile convictions (“juvenile lifers”) eligible
to be reviewed for release by a state parole board.3 The task of providing the
constitutionally required “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” has
thus been passed into the hands of parole boards, state administrative agen-
cies that traditionally act with nearly unfettered discretion.4 An estimated
6,000 juvenile lifers are incarcerated in ten states alone; half of those indi-
viduals are incarcerated in the state of California.5 Parole boards have been
charged with the discretion to choose whether these men and women will die
behind bars or will at some point live in society as adults.
Courts are currently facing the question of whether state parole boards
provide juvenile lifers with a constitutionally adequate opportunity to obtain
release. Litigation has occurred in multiple federal district courts,6 and state
courts in New York and Florida have held that juvenile lifer parole hearings
failed to comply with the Eighth Amendment.7 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court has held that heightened procedural protections are required at
juvenile lifer parole hearings in order for life with the possibility of parole
sentences to comply with the Massachusetts Constitution.8 The California
Supreme Court has held that providing juvenile lifers with parole hearings
renders their sentences constitutional under the Eighth Amendment, but only
if the parole hearings provide “a meaningful opportunity for release.”9 The
2 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010); accord Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,
479–80 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).
3 See Sarah French Russell & Tracy L. Denholtz, Procedures for Proportionate Sentences:
The Next Wave of Eighth Amendment Noncapital Litigation, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1121, 1132
(2016).
4 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1,
13 (1979); Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 384 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Kimberly
A. Thomas & Paul D. Reingold, From Grace to Grids: Rethinking Due Process Protections for
Parole, 107 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 213, 218 (2017); Sarah French Russell, Review for
Release: Juvenile Offenders, State Parole Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L.J.
373, 396 (2014).
5 See SARAH MEHTA, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FALSE HOPE: HOW PAROLE SYS-
TEMS FAIL YOUTH SERVING EXTREME SENTENCES 35 (2016), www.aclu.org/feature/false-hope-
how-parole-systems-fail-youth-serving-extreme-sentences, archived at https://perma.cc/5CF3-
BC3W.
6 See, e.g., Hayden v. Keller, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1009 (E.D.N.C. 2015); Greiman v.
Hodges, 79 F. Supp. 3d 933, 940, 944 (S.D. Iowa 2015); see also Russell & Denholtz, supra
note 3. R
7 See Hawkins v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 30 N.Y.S. 3d 397,
400–01 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); Atwell v. State of Florida, 197 So. 3d 1040, 1050 (Fla. 2016).
8 See Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 27 N.E.3d 349, 361 (Mass. 2015).
9 See People v. Franklin, 370 P.3d 1053, 1066–67 (Cal. 2016).
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California court explicitly reserved the question of whether parole hearings
live up to that requirement in practice.10
The litigation and scholarship in this area has questioned the fairness of
procedural protections at parole hearings, but it has yet to engage with one
of the most longstanding critiques of parole boards: that their decision-mak-
ing can be arbitrary and capricious in practice. Scholars, advocates, and poli-
ticians of the 1970s criticized the wide discretion that parole boards
exercised, and argued that idiosyncratic judgment and racial bias led to un-
justifiable disparities in release decisions.11 This critique of parole-release
decisions as arbitrary exercises of discretion, alongside skepticism about the
effectiveness of rehabilitation and a rise in tough-on-crime rhetoric, led
many states and the federal government to abolish parole systems in the
1970s through the 1990s.12
This Article brings the critique of arbitrariness to bear in the context of
juvenile lifer parole decisions.  It presents an original empirical study of 426
juvenile lifer parole decisions in California, which is designed to evaluate
the extent to which these decisions consistently grant release to individuals
who demonstrate comparable levels of rehabilitation. The analysis focuses
on California for several reasons. First, the relative transparency of Califor-
nia’s parole process and its large population of juvenile lifers make quantita-
tive and qualitative analysis possible. More importantly, California is a
national leader in juvenile lifer parole reform.13 It was one of the first states
to pass legislation designed to reform the parole process specifically for ju-
venile lifers, and, according to the ACLU’s national survey of juvenile lifer
parole systems, California has done more than any other state to create a
meaningful opportunity for release among juvenile lifers.14 If California’s
juvenile parole system, which has been recognized as among the best in the
10 See id.
11 See, e.g., Jon O. Newman, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process,
84 YALE L.J. 810, 816 n.14, 847 (1975) (citing such scholarship); Robert M. Garber and
Christina Maslach, The Parole Hearing: Decision or Justification?, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3,
263 (1977); John A. Conley & Sherwood E. Zimmerman, Decision-Making by a Part-Time
Parole Board: An Observational and Empirical Study, 9 CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAV. 396, 396–97
(Dec. 1982); PIERCE O’DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM:
AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 12 (1977); Anne M. Heinz, John P. Heinz, Stephen J.
Senderowitz, & Mary Anne Vance, Sentencing by Parole Board: An Evaluation, 67 J. OF
CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1976).
12 See, e.g., Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 227–29 (1993);
Edward E. Rhine, Alexis Watts, Kevin R. Reitz, Parole Boards within Indeterminate and De-
terminate Sentencing Structures, ROBINA INSTITUTE (Apr. 3, 2018), https://robinainstitute.umn
.edu/news-views/parole-boards-within-indeterminate-and-determinate-sentencing-structures
(listing sixteen states that abolished parole systems), archived at https://perma.cc/8Q6Y-
K2DY.
13 See MEHTA, supra note 5, at 227–29. R
14 Id. at 49–50.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\54-2\HLC202.txt unknown Seq: 6 28-JUN-19 13:22
460 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 54
country, is arbitrary and capricious to some extent in practice, then it is
likely that other state parole systems are arbitrary and capricious as well.15
The Article is structured as follows. Part I describes the Supreme
Court’s developing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on juvenile sentencing
in Roper v. Simmons,16 Graham v. Florida,17 Miller v. Alabama,18 and Mont-
gomery v. Louisiana,19 and how this relates to jurisprudence on parole-re-
lease decision-making. Parts II, III, and IV set forth the empirical study of
California’s parole-release system for juvenile lifers. The study analyzes
transcripts from all contested juvenile lifer parole hearings conducted in the
eighteen-month period beginning January 1, 2014, the effective date of a
state statute designed to improve the parole process for juvenile offenders.
Part II provides an overview of the study and how California’s parole system
operates for juvenile lifers. Part III uses quantitative analysis to identify the
extent to which factors pertaining to rehabilitation explain why 176 parole
candidates in the sample were granted parole, and the remaining 250 parole
candidates were denied parole. The study finds that California juvenile lifer
parole decisions show a high degree of inconsistency with respect to a mea-
sure of rehabilitation. The study also finds that a considerable degree of vari-
ability in this set of decisions is explained by race and other factors that are
illegitimate criteria for these decisions.  The quantitative evidence shows a
risk, but not conclusive proof, that the parole system is not treating rele-
vantly like cases alike. Part IV provides a qualitative analysis of the struc-
tural process of decision-making in California juvenile lifer cases. The
analysis shows that the process of decision-making does not seem to abate,
but rather affirms, the risk that the parole board is failing to treat relevantly
like cases alike.
Based on the evidence of arbitrariness uncovered in the study, Part V
outlines the following three arguments that the California juvenile lifer pa-
role system may be unconstitutional: the system may be arbitrary and capri-
15 The scope of this paper is focused on arbitrariness in parole decision-making, and it
does not include a review of all problematic features of juvenile life sentencing and parole
decision-making in California or elsewhere. That broader topic has been periodically covered
in scholarly literature as the applicable law has continued to develop. See, e.g., Megan Annitto,
Graham’s Gatekeeper and Beyond: Juvenile Sentencing and Release Reform in the Wake of
Graham and Miller, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 119 (2014); Brianna H. Boone, Treating Adults Like
Children: Re-Sentencing Adult Juvenile Lifers After Miller v. Alabama, 99 MINN. L. REV.
1159, 1161 (2015); Beth Caldwell, Creating Meaningful Opportunities for Release: Graham,
Miller, and California’s Youth Offender Parole Hearings, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
245 (2016); Laura Cohen, Freedom’s Road: Youth, Parole, and the Promise of Miller v. Ala-
bama and Graham v. Florida, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1031, 1048–69 (2014); Marsha L. Levick
& Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of Miller v. Jackson: Obtaining Relief in Court
and Before the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INFO. 369, 405 (2013); Russell, supra note 4; Sarah R
Sloan, Why Parole Eligibility Isn’t Enough: What Roper, Graham, and Miller Mean for Juve-
nile Offenders and Parole, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 243 (2015).
16 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
17 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
18 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
19 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
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cious as applied under the Eighth Amendment, or void for vagueness, or
inadequate on procedural due process grounds. Part VI then proposes three
types of reforms to reduce the inconsistency of decision-making observed in
California’s system. The reforms include cabining discretion, improving the
exercise of discretion, and developing systematic oversight of parole-release
decision-making. Importantly, the policies and strategies suggested here are
designed to promote greater consistency in parole decision-making, but they
are not designed to address a number of other problems that the author ob-
served in reviewing parole hearing transcripts, and which are beyond the
scope of this single Article. The reform to the parole system offered in Part
VI is thus proposed not as a comprehensive fix, but as what Dr. King re-
ferred to as a “stone of hope.”20
I. JUVENILE SENTENCING, PAROLE, AND THE PROMISE OF A MEANINGFUL
OPPORTUNITY FOR RELEASE
The Supreme Court’s developing jurisprudence on juvenile sentencing
is driven by the principle that children are “constitutionally different from
adults for purposes of sentencing.”21 The Court has explained that
juveniles—defined as individuals under eighteen years old—have dimin-
ished culpability compared to adults by virtue of several distinct features of
youth. Neuroscience shows that juvenile brains are underdeveloped, which
makes juveniles more susceptible to environmental and peer influence, in-
creases their propensity for risk-taking, and diminishes their ability to con-
sider the consequences of their actions.22 Juveniles have also had less
opportunity to distance themselves from negative influences and crimi-
nogenic environments, making it unfair to hold them wholly responsible for
actions that are influenced by those environmental factors.23 Further,
juveniles have enhanced capacity for rehabilitation; not only are their brains
still developing, but their habits of thought and action have had less time to
20 “I Have a Dream” speech by Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. at Lincoln Memorial, Wash-
ington, D.C. (Aug. 28, 1963) (“With this faith we will be able to hew out of the mountain of
despair a stone of hope.”).
21 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471–72.
22 See id. at n.5 (citing Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Cu-
riae) (“It is increasingly clear that adolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions and
systems related to higher-order executive functions such as impulse control, planning ahead,
and risk avoidance.”); Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (citing Brief for American Medical Association
et al. 16–24; Brief for American Psychological Association et al. 22–27) (“[D]evelopments in
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and
adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature
through late adolescence.”).
23 See, e.g., Miller, 567 U.S. at 471; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (citing
Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Dimin-
ished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014
(2003)) (“[A]s legal minors, [juveniles] lack the freedom that adults have to extricate them-
selves from a criminogenic setting.”).
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become fixed.24 These distinctive features of youth underlie the Court’s rea-
soning in its recent juvenile sentencing cases, summarized below.
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits imposing the death penalty on a person for a crime committed as a
juvenile.25 The Court reasoned that children’s diminished culpability and in-
creased impulsivity vitiated two of the legally accepted justifications for
punishment—retribution and deterrence—and left no sufficient justification
for the death penalty.26 The Court next held in Graham v. Florida that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole as a punishment for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses.27
The Court reiterated that the rationales of retribution and deterrence were
vitiated with respect to juveniles, and that if incarceration until death could
be justified for juveniles, it had to be on the basis of some other rationale.28
The Court considered the rationales of incapacitation and rehabilitation, and
found that these rationales are similar in that their ability to justify punish-
ment depends on whether an individual demonstrates change over time.29 If a
juvenile convicted of a non-homicide offense demonstrates maturity and re-
habilitation as an adult, then incarceration can no longer be justified in the
name of incapacitation or rehabilitation.30 Continued incarceration lacks jus-
tification and becomes cruel and unusual punishment.31 If a juvenile never
demonstrates maturity and rehabilitation, however, the Eighth Amendment
does not prohibit incarceration until natural death.32 The Court therefore held
that in sentencing juveniles convicted of a non-homicide offense, the Eighth
Amendment requires that states provide a “meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”33 The Court was
silent on whether life with the possibility of parole sentences met this consti-
tutional requirement, but it was explicit that life sentences with eligibility for
release through clemency did not meet the requirement.34 Clemency could
not provide a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demon-
24 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (citing Steinberg, 58 AM. PSYCHOL-
OGIST at 1014 (“For most teens, [risky or antisocial] behaviors are fleeting; they cease with
maturity as individual identity becomes settled. Only a relatively small proportion of adoles-
cents who experiment in risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem
behavior that persist into adulthood.”).
25 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005).
26 See id. at 571.
27 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
28 See id. at 71–72.
29 See id. at 72–73.
30 See id.; accord Chad Flanders, The Supreme Court and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 49 GA.
L. REV. 383, 414 (2015)
31 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 75; accord Miller, 567 U.S. at 472–73; Martin Gardner,
Youthful Offenders and the Eighth Amendment Right to Rehabilitation: Limitations on the Pun-
ishment of Juveniles, 83 TENN. L. REV. 455, 527 (2016).
32 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 73–74.
33 Id. at 75.
34 See id. at 70 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 301 (1983)).
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strated maturity and rehabilitation” because the prospects of release through
clemency were both too remote and ad hoc.35
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court considered juveniles convicted of
homicide offenses and held that mandatory sentencing of juveniles to life
without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth Amendment.36 A court
may sentence a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense to life without the
possibility of parole on a discretionary basis after considering the mitigating
factors of youth and finding that the juvenile shows “irreparable corrup-
tion.”37 The Court was clear that the irreparably corrupt juvenile was a rare
case, and that all other juveniles cannot be sentenced to life in prison unless
the sentence includes a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”38
Most recently, in Montgomery, the Court held that the rule it announced
in Miller applied retroactively because it imposed a substantive limit on pun-
ishment—specifically, that life without the possibility of parole for a convic-
tion as a juvenile is excessive under the Eighth Amendment “for all but ‘the
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’” 39 As ar-
ticulated in Graham, the penological justification for punishment collapses
if, by demonstrating rehabilitation over time, juveniles show that they are
not in fact irreparably corrupt. In Montgomery, however, the Court did not
use the phrase “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demon-
strated maturity and rehabilitation.”40 It stated that “[a] State may remedy
a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be consid-
ered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.”41  The Court explained
that “[a]llowing those offenders to be considered for parole ensures that
juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity—and who have
since matured—will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.”42
The statement that allowing a person to be considered for release “en-
sures” release to those who have since matured is in deep tension with the
Court’s decades-old jurisprudence on parole. In the 1979 case of Greenholtz
v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Corrections Complex,43 the Court
made clear that eligibility for release on parole does not ensure release: the
“possibility of parole provides no more than a mere hope that the benefit
35 Graham, 560 U.S. at 75; see also Solem, 463 U.S. at 301 (“A Governor may commute a
sentence at any time for any reason without reference to any standards.”).
36 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.
37 Id. at 479–80.
38 See id.
39 See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (applying Teague doctrine
and holding that Miller applied retroactively because it was a substantive limit on punishment).
40 Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
41 See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736 (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6–10–301(c) (2013)).
42 Id. (emphasis added).
43 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
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will be obtained.”44 States are free to operate systems in which parole boards
make release decisions on a wholly discretionary basis without any stated
standards and without any scrutiny under the Due Process Clause.45 In such
wholly discretionary systems, parole boards can grant or deny release in a
way that is no less ad hoc or remote than clemency.46
Not all states, however, opt for such a wholly discretionary system.47 If
a state statute requires that parole “shall” be granted unless the parole board
makes certain findings, then there is a presumption in favor of parole and the
Due Process Clause applies.48 The Court required only the minimal procedu-
ral protections of an in-person hearing at the initial consideration and a state-
ment of reasons for the decision.49 In this way, presumptive parole systems
are distinct from clemency systems.50
Nevertheless, presumptive parole systems remain a far cry from provid-
ing legal assurance of release to those who demonstrate rehabilitation. Al-
though presumptive systems direct parole boards to release parole candidates
unless the parole board finds some factor or set of factors, the factors can be
so broad and vague that they provide no functional restraint on discretion.51
As the Court made clear in Greenholtz, the Nebraska parole board retained
“very broad” discretion in finding factors that can defeat the presumption of
parole in a given case, and that their inquiry is “necessarily subjective.”52
Following Greenholtz, the Court held in Board of Pardons v. Allen that the
Montana parole statute created a presumption of parole, but notably one of
the factors that could defeat the presumption was whether parole was “in the
best interest of society.”53 As the dissent clearly stated, “[e]ven a cursory
examination of the Montana statute reveals that the [parole board] is subject
44 Id. at 11.
45 Id. at 7.
46 See id.; Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981) (holding that
Connecticut administrative agency’s (The Board of Pardons and Board of Parole) petitions for
release were “nothing more than an appeal for clemency” despite the agency’s operating sys-
tem which released approximately seventy-five percent of prisoners serving life sentences,
because the system was not governed by a statute with written standards or mandatory
language).
47 See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11; id. at 29 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[P]arole stat-
utes of 47 States establish particular standards, criteria or factors to be applied in parole release
determinations.”); see also Steve Disharoon, California’s Broken Parole System: Flawed Stan-
dards and Insufficient Oversight Threaten the Rights of Prisoners, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 177,
206–09 (2009) (listing state parole statutes that create a liberty interest in parole).
48 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12.
49 Id. at 14–15.
50 See Conn. Bd. of Pardons, 452 U.S. at 466; Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 227, 300 (1983).
51 Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 384 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
52 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13 (“[T]he Parole Board’s decision as defined by Nebraska’s
statue is necessarily subjective in part and predictive in part. Like most parole statutes, it vests
very broad discretion in the Board. No ideal, error-free way to make parole-release decisions
has been developed; the whole question has been and will continue to be the subject of experi-
mentation involving analysis of psychological factors combined with fact evaluation guided by
the practical experience of the actual parole decisionmakers in predicting future behavior.”)
53 Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. at 384 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\54-2\HLC202.txt unknown Seq: 11 28-JUN-19 13:22
2019] A Stone of Hope 465
to no real restraint.”54 In such systems, when presented with two people who
demonstrate the same amount of rehabilitation, the board may grant release
to one and deny release to the other without any accountability for that deci-
sion under law.55
In the decade leading up to Greenholtz, research on a variety of differ-
ent parole systems highlighted that parole boards often wielded their discre-
tion in an arbitrary manner that was influenced, at best, by idiosyncratic
judgment and, at worst, by racial bias.56 In addition, some decisions relied on
patently erroneous facts;57 for example, a researcher reported having seen
parole files in which “black men [are] listed as white and Harvard graduates
[are] listed with borderline IQ’s.”58 In addition to research showing that pa-
role boards were operating in an ad hoc manner, more recent research has
shown periods in which the prospect of release through a presumptive parole
system has been more remote than the prospect of release though a clemency
system.  For example, no more than ten percent of people sentenced to life
with the possibility of parole in California were granted parole in any year
from 1981 to 2008 despite a presumption favoring parole, whereas seventy-
five percent of people serving life without the possibility of parole were
granted release through a wholly discretionary clemency system in Connect-
icut in 1981.59 Under the Florida clemency system, the system at issue in
Graham, five people received commutations from 1999 to 2002, and, during
the same time period, only two people received release through California’s
presumptive parole system.60 It should come as no surprise that parole
boards can, and sometimes do, grant release in as arbitrary and sparse a
manner as clemency. The historic roots of parole-release systems lie in the
54 Id.
55 Id. at 384–85 (citing Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process
Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482, 550 (1984))
(“A parole statute providing that parole shall be granted unless the prospective parolee ‘poses
a danger to society’ is not significantly different from one under which the parole board’s
decisions are nonreviewable, since a court would be unlikely to reverse a parole board decision
made under such a discretionary standard.”).
56 See Conley, supra note 11. R
57 See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 33 n.15 (Marshall, J., dissenting), and cases cited.
58 Id. (citing Hearings on H.R. 13118 et al. before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House
Judiciary Committee, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. VII-A, p. 451 (1972) (testimony of Dr. Willard
Gaylin)).
59 Compare Kathryne M. Young, Debbie A. Mukamal, & Thomas Favre-Bulle, Predicting
Parole Grants: An Analysis of Suitability Hearings for California’s Lifer Inmates, 28 FED.
SENT’G REP. 268, 271 (2016), with Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465
(1981).
60 Compare Commutation of Sentence Cases Granted 1980 through January 1, 2018, FLA.
COMM’N ON OFFENDER REVIEW, https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/docs/clemency/Commutationof-
Sentences.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/KM47-B8PS, with W. David Ball, Heinous, Atro-
cious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 893, 918 (2009).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\54-2\HLC202.txt unknown Seq: 12 28-JUN-19 13:22
466 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 54
executive clemency power, and state governors still exercise considerable
control over parole boards.61
Given the reality of the structure and practice of parole-release systems,
federal district courts and state supreme courts have held that several parole
systems fail to provide people convicted as juveniles with a “meaningful
opportunity for release based on maturity and rehabilitation.”62 The general
response to these holdings has been to require additional procedural protec-
tions at parole hearings for those who were convicted of crimes as juveniles,
and to explicitly require that parole boards consider an individual’s youth at
the time of the crime.63 Parole boards, however, have retained broad discre-
tion to decide who leaves prison and who dies in prison, and courts have
been reluctant to impose a meaningful check on the substantive quality of
their decisions. This approach effectively trusts that the parole board will
make good enough decisions so long as modest procedural protections are in
place and they are required to give at least lip service to the features of
youth. Research in other contexts of administrative law has shown, however
that “procedural due process has failed miserably in its mission to rational-
ize frontline decisionmaking.”64 It would be naı¨ve to expect procedural pro-
tections to do better here, in the context of agencies with such a checkered
history of arbitrary decision-making.
When an administrative agency is determining whether a person will
ever step foot in society as an adult, we ought to do more than trust in
procedural protections and the good judgment of a parole board to release
those who demonstrate rehabilitation. The law should provide some substan-
tive check on whether the parole board is getting it right, but this task is
easier said than done.  How can the law provide such a check?  Rehabilita-
tion is a markedly amorphous concept; neither statutes nor common law set
forth an objective threshold of rehabilitation, such that if a juvenile were to
demonstrate rehabilitation above that threshold, a decision to withhold re-
lease would violate the Eighth Amendment.65 A central argument of this
Article is that lawmakers should decide upon and set forth an objective
threshold.66  Such a decision is undoubtedly difficult, but deciding not to
61 See, e.g., Sheldon L. Messinger et al., The Foundations of Parole in California, 19 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 69, 100–01 (1985) (discussing how in California, governors moved for the
establishment of parole boards to relieve them of the work, and political risk, entailed in re-
viewing growing numbers of clemency petitions).
62 See, e.g., Hayden v. Keller, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1009 (E.D.N.C. 2015).
63 See Russell & Denholtz, supra note 3, at 1132–34. R
64 See Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An Experiment of Experimentalism, 69
STAN. L. REV. 1, 81 (2017) (citing Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process:
Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness
in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 776–91 (1974)).
65 See, e.g., Chad Flanders, The Supreme Court and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 49 GA. L.
REV. 383, 386 (2015) (citing FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL
2 (1981) (discussing inconsistency in how the Supreme Court has interpreted “rehabilitation”
and noting that it is “an inherently complex term, filled with ambiguities”)).
66 See infra at Part VI.A.
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decide and leaving the parole board to navigate the question on a discretion-
ary case-by-case basis is potentially worse.  Such a system can flout one of
the most basic principles of justice under law: that like cases be treated alike.
It gives the parole board freedom to adopt a sense of rehabilitation that is a
moving target from one case to the next, and leaves open the door to arbi-
trary and discriminatory decision-making.
The study below brings into focus the actual consequences of operating
a juvenile lifer parole system that lacks an objective standard for release.
The study evaluates the extent to which a parole board is actually treating
like cases alike on the basis of factors that should matter—factors that are
related to rehabilitation—and the extent to which decisions appear to be in-
fluenced by characteristics that should not matter—such as race/ethnicity,
poverty, and other factors that are orthogonal to rehabilitation or otherwise
illegitimate. In other words, the study seeks to assess the extent to which
parole candidates who demonstrate a comparable measure of rehabilitation
receive consistent decisions from the parole board.
To be clear, this Article argues simply that one of the ways for a parole
system to fail is for the system to render release decisions that are inconsis-
tent with respect to levels of rehabilitation.  The Article’s focus on evaluating
consistency in parole decisions with respect to rehabilitation should not be
understood as implying that this consistency is sufficient for a parole system
to provide the constitutionally required “meaningful opportunity to obtain
release” to people serving life sentences for juvenile convictions. Far from
it. Consistency is only one necessary, but not sufficient, condition in this
context. For example, a parole system that denies release to all (or almost
all) juvenile lifers who demonstrate rehabilitation renders consistent deci-
sions, but does not provide a meaningful opportunity for release based on
rehabilitation.67 A system would also be constitutionally defective if the
prison fails to provide adequate rehabilitation programs and if the parole
board consistently denies parole to people who have not engaged in rehabili-
tation programs due to the lack of an adequate opportunity to do so.68  As
scholars and litigants have argued, juvenile lifers may rightfully be entitled
access to rehabilitation programs that are needed to demonstrate rehabilita-
tion and gain parole.69
67 See generally MEHTA, supra note 5. R
68 The U.S. Supreme Court has noted the possibility of this problem, recognizing that
“[i]n some prisons, moreover, the system itself becomes complicit in the lack of development
. . . . [I]t is the policy in some prisons to withhold counseling, education, and rehabilitation
programs.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010).
69 See, e.g., Russell & Denholtz, supra note 3, at 1146–47 (citing Greiman v. Hodges, 79 R
F. Supp. 3d 933, 938 (S.D. Iowa 2015)) (describing litigation in which juvenile serving life
sentence sought an order requiring the Department of Corrections to permit him to enroll in the
necessary prison programs to become parole eligible); Martin Gardner, Youthful Offenders and
the Eighth Amendment Right to Rehabilitation: Limitations on the Punishment of Juveniles, 83
TENN. L. REV. 455, 486 (2016) (“Various commentators have viewed Graham as establishing,
in some sense, a constitutional ‘right to rehabilitation.’”); Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the
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Additionally, the presence of a constitutionally adequate mechanism for
release is not sufficient in order for a life with the possibility of release
sentence to be just or constitutional. A system may be unjust or unconstitu-
tional if it requires juvenile lifers to serve an excessive period of time before
becoming eligible for parole70 or before being released on parole.71 Further,
regardless of the quality of the release mechanism, a sentence that permits
incarceration until death for a juvenile may be disproportionate to that indi-
vidual’s culpability and the circumstances of that particular case. For exam-
ple, decades before the Miller decision, the California Supreme Court held
that under the California Constitution, a sentence of life with the possibility
of parole after seven years was disproportionate for a seventeen-year-old
convicted of first-degree felony murder and robbery.72 The constitutionality
of imposing a life with the possibility of parole sentence upon any given
juvenile in the first place is, however, beyond the scope of this Article.
II. CASE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA PAROLE HEARINGS: DESCRIPTION
This case study of California parole hearings for individuals serving life
with the possibility of parole sentences is organized into three parts. First,
Part II summarizes the design of these parole hearings, as well as the sources
and methods used to analyze how those hearings function in practice. The
study then follows a two-step process for evaluating consistency in decisions
with respect to rehabilitation.73 The first step, undertaken in Part III, quan-
titatively analyzes a set of decisions and measures (i) the extent to which
legitimate factors pertaining to rehabilitation explain differences in deci-
sions, and (ii) the extent to which the remaining variability is attributable to
illegitimate factors, such as race/ethnicity or poverty. The second step, un-
dertaken in Part IV, qualitatively analyzes the underlying process by which
decisions are made. Qualitative information obtained from the parole hear-
ing transcripts is used to evaluate whether procedures are designed in a way
that sufficiently abates the risk that like cases are not being treated alike.
Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51, 78 (2012) (Graham demands that states provide a “meaningful
opportunity to rehabilitate themselves prior to and in preparation for that parole hearing.”).
70 See, e.g., Kallee Spooner & Michael S. Vaughn, Sentencing Juvenile Homicide Offend-
ers: A 50-State Survey, 5 VA. J. CRIM. L. 130, 165–66 (2017) (“The American Academy of
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (AACAP) recommended juvenile offenders be eligible for
parole after five years or reaching the age of twenty-five, and subsequent reviews should not
exceed three years.”).
71 See In re Palmer, 245 Cal. Rptr. 3d 708, 712, 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (sentence of life
with possibility of parole imposed upon a juvenile for a kidnapping offense became constitu-
tionally excessive after parole had been denied ten times and over thirty years of incarceration
had been served).
72 See People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 727 (Cal. 1983).
73 This two-step approach mirrors the basic framework that the Supreme Court has relied
upon in evaluating consistency in death penalty decisions. See infra Part V.A.
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A. Design of California Youth Offender Parole Hearings
In 2013, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill 260 [the Youth
Offender Parole Law] which creates specialized “youth offender parole
hearings” for people serving adult sentences longer than fifteen years on the
basis of offenses committed before the age of eighteen.74 Passed in the wake
of Miller v. Alabama, the statute provides that these parole hearings shall
provide a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”75 People serving life
with the possibility of parole sentences76 as well as people serving determi-
nate terms are potentially eligible77 for youth offender parole hearings in
their fifteenth, twentieth, or twenty-fifth year of incarceration.78 For some,
this means that the initial hearing will come several years or even several
decades earlier than they had anticipated based on the initial sentence.
Due to an amendment to the Youth Offender Parole Statute in 2017,
eligibility for youth offender parole hearings now extends to people serving
life with parole and long determinate terms for crimes committed while at
age twenty-five or under.79 This study considers only those parole hearings
for individuals serving life with the possibility of parole for crimes as
juveniles, and where relevant, refers to this subset of youth offender parole
hearings as “juvenile lifer parole hearings.”
Part V provides a full discussion of the decision-making process at ju-
venile lifer parole hearings, but a preliminary summary is provided here to
orient the reader. Throughout the remainder of the Article, the term “parole
74 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 312 (West) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3041 (West
2017), 3046 (West 2017), 4801 (West 2017), and enacting § 3051 (West 2017)).
75 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana,
136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016); People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 270 (Cal. 2014).
76 After the legislature enacted penal code section 3051 in 2013, it amended the statute in
2015 and 2017. Under the initial version of section 3051 that was in effect during the time
period of the study (January 2014 to June 2015), juveniles sentenced to life without the possi-
bility of parole were ineligible to receive parole hearings under section 3051. In 2017, how-
ever, the legislature amended section 3051 to extend eligibility to people who are serving life
sentences without the possibility of parole for convictions under the age of eighteen. See 2017
Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 684 (West).
77 A youth offender is ineligible under section 3051 if the controlling offense was a sec-
ond- or third-strike offense or a one-strike sex offense. But see People v. Edwards, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 40 (2019) (striking exclusion of one-strike sex offenders in 3051 as a facial violation
of the Equal Protection Clause). Further, a youth offender becomes disqualified under section
3051 if, after age twenty-five, he or she “commits an additional crime for which malice afore-
thought is a necessary element of the crime or for which the individual is sentenced to life in
prison.” See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051(h) (West 2017).
78 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051 (a), (b) (West 2017). The date of the youth offender’s
initial parole hearing depends on the “controlling offense,” defined as the offense or enhance-
ment for which a sentencing court imposed the longest period of incarceration. See CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 3051(b) (West 2017). If the controlling offense is a determinate term of years, the
youth offender is eligible for release during the fifteenth year of incarceration; if it is a life
term less than twenty-five-to-life, the youth offender is eligible for release during the twentieth
year; and if it is a life term of twenty-five-to-life or longer, the youth offender is eligible for
release during the twenty-fifth year. Id.
79 See 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 471 (West).
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candidate” is used to refer to a prisoner who is serving a life sentence and
has served enough time to be eligible for release at a parole hearing.
Aside from the following three provisions, youth offender parole hear-
ings are conducted in the same fashion and are governed by the same stat-
utes as parole hearings for adult offenders serving life sentences. First, at
youth offender parole hearings, the Board is required to give “great weight
to the diminished culpability of youth as compared to that of adults, the
hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased matur-
ity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.”80 Second, if the
Board relies on psychological evaluations and risk assessment instruments,
these must also consider the diminished culpability of youth, the hallmark
features of youth, and subsequent growth and maturity.81 Third, the Youth
Offender Parole Law also directs the Board to review and revise its existing
regulations governing parole hearings to ensure that youth offender parole
hearings provide a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”82 As of May
2019, six years after the effective date of the Youth Offender Parole Law,
regulations have been proposed by the Board but not yet finalized by the
state Office of Administrative Law.83
1. Summary of Legal Standard and Procedural Rights
The California parole statute directs that the Board “shall normally”
find parole candidates suitable for release on parole, which creates a rebutta-
ble presumption in favor of parole.84 The California Supreme Court has
made clear that the ultimate question for the Board is whether the parole
candidate poses “an unreasonable risk to public safety.”85 If the Board finds
that the candidate is not currently dangerous, parole must be granted.86 State
law provides the following procedural rights: the right to an in-person hear-
ing,87 to notice of that hearing, to review the prison file prior to the hearing,88
to legal counsel,89 to appointment of legal counsel if a parole candidate is
indigent,90 and to judicial review of the parole decision.91
80 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c) (West 2017).
81 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051(f) (West 2017). Section 4801 requires the Board to give
“great weight” to the diminished culpability of youth, the hallmark features of youth, and
subsequent growth and maturity, while Section 3051 requires any psychological evaluation or
risk assessment that the Board relies upon to “consider” these same factors. Compare CAL.
PENAL CODE § 4801(c) (West 2017) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051(f) (West 2017).
82 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051(e) (West 2017).
83 See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, §§ 2440–46 (filed with Office of Administrative Law
Dec. 24, 2018), https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/BOPH/reg_revisions.html, archived at https://perma
.cc/K52Z-EPTS.
84 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041 (a) (West 2017).
85 See In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 560 (Cal. 2008).
86 See id.; In re Shaputis, 190 P.3d 573, 585 (Cal. 2008).
87 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.5 (West 2017).
88 See id.
89 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.7 (West 2017).
90 See id.; CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, § 2256 (c).
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Both the public and the parole candidate have a right to transcripts of
hearings,92 and those transcripts are required to include everything that is
said in the hearing and a definitive statement of the reasons for the parole
decision.93 The transcripts are therefore a reliable source of both the underly-
ing evidence the Board draws upon and the stated justification for its
decisions.
2. Record of Evidence
The Board considers all relevant and reliable information available in
determining parole suitability.94 Information includes, but is not limited to:
records from the underlying conviction; records of misconduct in prison;
records of participation in education, vocation, and self-help groups in
prison; any essays or self-help book reports that a parole candidate has writ-
ten; transcripts from prior parole hearings; psychological evaluations (dis-
cussed further below); mental health records; written statements by the
candidate; letters of support from family, friends and community members;
written statements of commendation by prison staff (“laundry chromos”);
documentation of parole plans; letters of opposition; and statements by the
victim or the victim’s next-of-kin.95 In some cases, the Board also considers
information in the confidential portion of the prison file; this information is
not disclosed to anyone at the hearing other than the hearing panel.96
In addition, the Board considers a “Comprehensive Risk Assessment”
(CRA) report. Shortly before a prisoner’s initial parole hearing, a forensic
psychologist employed by the Board conducts an interview with the prisoner
and writes the CRA report.97 The psychologist reviews the prison file, which
includes, but is not limited to, all the information described above, except for
letters of opposition, statements from victims or the victim’s next-of-kin, and
parole plans if they have not yet been made.98 The psychologist reports a risk
91 See In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535 (Cal. 2008).
92 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.5 (West 2018); In re Bode, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536, 539
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
93 See In re Prather, 234 P.3d 541, 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (Moreno, J., concurring)
(“[T]he Board [is] required to issue a definitive written statement of reasons. The Board
cannot, after having its parole denial decision reversed, continue to deny parole based on
matters that could have been but were not raised in the original hearing.”).
94 See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, § 2402 (2015).
95 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3043 (West 2016) (referring only to “statements by the victim
or the victim’s next-of-kin”).
96 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3042 (West 2017); CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, § 2235 (2015).
97 See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, § 2240 (2015); Forensic Assessment Division, CAL. BD.
OF PAROLE HEARINGS, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/BOPH/fad.html, archived at https://perma.cc/
2GNW-ST2T.
98 Review of anonymous sample of Comprehensive Risk Assessments [CRAs] from
youth offender parole hearings on file with author. See also Jeremy Isard, Under the Cloak of
Brain Science: Risk Assessments, Parole, and the Powerful Guise of Objectivity, 105 CAL. L.
REV. 1223, 1243 (2017).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\54-2\HLC202.txt unknown Seq: 18 28-JUN-19 13:22
472 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 54
assessment score of low risk, low-moderate risk, moderate risk, moderate-
high risk, or high risk of future violence.99
3. Proceedings at Parole Hearings
The Board schedules a parole candidate’s first parole hearing approxi-
mately one year before the candidate has served the minimum amount of
time on the sentence.100 In many cases, the hearing does not occur on the
scheduled date due to waivers, continuances, and postponements.101 Further,
some candidates stipulate that they are not suitable for parole.102
Hearings are conducted in a room inside the prison where the parole
candidate is incarcerated. Generally, one commissioner from the Board and
one deputy commissioner (the “hearing panel”) are present to conduct the
hearing and make a finding about whether a person is suitable for release on
parole.103 The attorney representing the parole candidate is present,104 and a
district attorney from the office of the county of conviction may be present
in person or via video conference.105 Victims and victims’ next-of-kin are
notified about the hearing in advance; some do not participate, others con-
tribute statements but do not attend, and some attend the hearings in-
person.106
The vast majority of time at the hearing is devoted to questioning of the
parole candidate by the hearing panel. Questions are highly specific to the
facts of each case and generally fall into four categories: (i) the candidate’s
background prior to the conviction, (ii) the underlying offense, (iii) post-
conviction activities, and (iv) parole plans. After the questioning period, the
99 For discussion of risk assessments, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
100 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041 (West, 2018).
101 See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, § 2253 (2015).
102 See id.; see also ROBERT WEISBERG, DEBBIE MUKAMAL & JORDAN SEGALL, STANFORD
CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, LIFE IN LIMBO: AN EXAMINATION OF PAROLE RELEASE FOR PRIS-
ONERS SERVING LIFE SENTENCES WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA 11–12
(2011), https://law.stanford.edu/publications/life-in-limbo-an-examination-of-parole-release-
for-prisoners-serving-life-sentences-with-the-possibility-of-parole-in-california/, archived at
https://perma.cc/3WUL-SGCB. When a parole candidate waives a hearing, she decides to push
the hearing date back one, two, three, four, or five years later. CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15,
§ 2253. A parole attorney may advise a client to waive a hearing if, for example, there is a
very recent disciplinary infraction and a strong probability that the Board will deny parole and
impose a long setback period before the next hearing occurs. A candidate may enter up to three
consecutive waivers, and must do so forty-five days prior to the hearing. CAL. CODE REGS., tit.
15, § 2253. A stipulation differs from a waiver in three ways: first, a candidate who stipulates
agrees that she is unsuitable for release on parole, second, a candidate may stipulate at any
time, and third, when a stipulation occurs, there will be a setback period of fifteen, ten, seven,
five, or three years until the next hearing. Id. When a waiver is available and a candidate has
received timely advice from counsel, it is unclear why a candidate would stipulate to a denial.
103 See generally California Board of Parole Hearings, Parole Consideration Transcripts
(2014-2015) (on file with author); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041 (West 2018).
104 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.7 (West 2016).
105 See generally California Board of Parole Hearings, Parole Consideration Transcripts
(2014-2015) (on file with author).
106 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3043 (West 2016).
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district attorney and the parole-candidate’s attorney may ask clarifying ques-
tions and make closing statements. The parole candidate is then given the
opportunity for a closing statement, followed by the victim or the victim’s
next of kin.107
4. Hearing Decisions
At the end of the hearing, the Board deliberates and then announces its
decision and provides an exhaustive list of reasons for the decision. If parole
is denied, the panel determines when the next hearing will be scheduled.108
The presumptive period of time until the next hearing is fifteen years; the
Board may set the time for a shorter period of ten, seven, five, or three years
if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that considerations of public
safety do not require a longer period of time.109
5. Decision Review
After the hearing, the case is referred to the Board’s decision review
unit, which may recommend a modification to the decision. If so, the case is
reviewed by the full Board, which may rescind or overturn the decision.
After this internal review by the Board, the decision is referred to the Gover-
nor who is authorized to review and reverse parole decisions in only murder
cases.110 In non-murder cases, the Governor is not authorized to reverse pa-
role decisions, but is authorized to review them and request that the Board
re-consider its decision. As discussed further infra in Part III.B, the Gover-
nor makes the decision without conducting a hearing, and is required to ap-
ply the same factors which the parole board must consider.
B. Juvenile Lifer Parole Decisions in Practice:
Description of Case Study
This study considers all contested111 parole hearings in California for all
individuals sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for juvenile con-
victions from the date the Youth Offender Parole Law took effect (January 1,
2014) until June 5, 2015.112 There were 465 such hearings.113 Thirty-eight
107 See generally California Board of Parole Hearings, Parole Consideration Transcripts
(2014-2015) (on file with author); see also Kathryne M. Young, Parole Hearings and Victims’
Rights: Implementation, Ambiguity, and Reform, 49 CONN. L. REV. 431, 445–46 (2016)
(describing general hearing procedures with attention to role of victims).
108 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.5 (West 2016).
109 Id.
110 See CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8.
111 This study does not consider hearings during this period that were postponed, waived,
or in which the parole candidate stipulated to a denial of parole. Future research would be
beneficial in this regard.
112 Via public record requests, the author received transcripts from all youth offender pa-
role hearings in this time period. This study does not analyze parole hearings for candidates
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percent of candidates at these hearings were granted parole; notably, the
grant-rate is significantly lower when the numbers include all youth offender
parole proceedings, including stipulations.114 For the purpose of the Article,
the term “granted” is used when the hearing panel found a candidate suita-
ble for parole at the parole hearing. Being granted parole does not mean the
candidate was ultimately released. As discussed above, the hearing decision
may be rescinded or overturned by the Board en banc, and, in murder cases,
it may be reversed by the Governor. In this study-set, the full Board reversed
an estimated 5% of decisions to grant parole,115 and the Governor reversed
11% of decisions to grant parole.116
None of the candidates in this study set who were released have re-
turned to prison, according to data received by the author from the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in October 2016. Ac-
cording to data obtained by Human Rights Watch, that has remained true as
of July 31, 2017.
who were convicted for crimes under the age of 18 and are serving a determinate term of years
(“juvenile long-termers”) rather than an indeterminate sentence of life with the possibility of
parole. Review of the full set of transcripts showed that the Board conducted 127 hearings for
juvenile long-termers during the time period of the study. Analysis of juvenile long-termer
parole hearings is reserved for future research. Long-termers are not further investigated here
because they are differently situated compared to juvenile lifers. Long-termers are serving
determinate sentences, meaning that they have a pre-determined release date, and they had no
expectation that they would ever appear before the Board until the Youth Offender Parole Law
was passed in 2013. See 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 312 (West) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 3041 (West 2017), 3046 (West 2017), 4801 (West 2017), and enacting § 3051 (West 2017)).
Review of data in transcripts showed that the demographics of juvenile long-termers are sub-
stantially different than those of juvenile lifers. For example, during the time period of the
study, 11% of juvenile long-termers were granted parole (as compared to 38% of juvenile
lifers), 48% of youth offenders with determinate sentences were in maximum-security prisons
(as compared to 23% of juvenile lifers), and 56% were Latinx (as compared to 32% of juvenile
lifers). See Appendix, Table A.
113 Excluded from the sample are one decision in which no decision was made at the
hearing, and one decision for a parole candidate who was incarcerated in Ohio due to convic-
tions in both Ohio and California.
114 From January 1, 2014 through December 31, 2016, the Board conducted 2,250 youth
offender parole hearings. See Defendant’s January 2017 Status Report filed in Coleman v.
Brown and Plata v. Brown, on file with author. The Board granted parole at 26% of these
hearings (585 hearings), and denied parole at the remaining 74% of the hearings (1,665 hear-
ings, 280 of these were cases in which the youth offender stipulated to the denial). Id.
115 Calculation based on review of the Board’s en banc decisions in 2014 and 2015. See En
Banc Decisions, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS, https://www.cdcr.ca
.gov/BOPH/enbanc.html, archived at https://perma.cc/MTP7-L8QP.
116 Calculation based on review of Governor’s decisions to reverse parole decisions in
2014 and 2015. See Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., “Executive Report on Parole Review
Decisions; Decisions for the Period January 1, 2014 through December 31, 2014,” https://
www.ca.gov/archive/gov39/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2014_Executive_Report_on_Parole_
Review_Decisions.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/K4MU-2QXU; Governor Edmund G.
Brown Jr., “Executive Report on Parole Review Decisions; Decisions for the Period January 1,
2015 through December 31, 2015,” https://www.ca.gov/archive/gov39/wp-content/uploads/
2017/09/2015_Executive_Report_on_Parole_Review_Decisions.pdf, archived at https://perma
.cc/4TJU-LMQ2.
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1. Sources and Methods
The primary sources of information about these hearings are hearing
transcripts produced by the Board, which are public records. Transcripts
from these hearings averaged 116 pages; the shortest was less than fifty
pages (a seventy-five-minute hearing) and the longest exceeded 300 pages (a
hearing lasting over seven hours). The author requested data from CDCR
that was not consistently included in the transcripts: the race/ethnicity of
each parole candidate, the level of security at which each candidate was
incarcerated, and whether those released from prison subsequently returned.
The author also drew on personal experience providing legal assistance
and in-prison education to juvenile lifers in California from 2014 to 2017.
During this period, the author represented a juvenile lifer at a parole hearing
and the subsequent judicial review of that hearing. Knowledge about the
parole process was further informed by conversations and correspondence
with California attorneys who regularly represent candidates at lifer parole
hearings. The author also participated in workshops at five different state
prisons to educate prisoners about the youth offender parole process. Last,
the author regularly facilitated a group of twenty-five men serving life
sentences for juvenile convictions who wanted to support one another in
rehabilitation and prepare for parole hearings.
As described further below, the general method of the quantitative por-
tion of the study was to obtain data about variables that were hypothesized to
impact the parole decision, and to apply statistical techniques, primarily re-
gression analysis,117 to assess the extent to which parole decisions were con-
sistent with a measure of rehabilitation.
The focus of the inquiry is on assessing consistency in decision-making,
which stands in contrast to other research on parole decision-making that
117 Regression analysis is a statistical technique used to understand the relationship be-
tween independent variables which are “thought to produce or be associated with changes in
[a] dependent variable.” For example, suppose one is trying to determine how a house’s price
is impacted by various factors such as the number of rooms in the house and the number of
windows. In such an example, the price of the house would be the dependent variable and the
number of rooms and the number of windows would be independent variables. A regression
analysis allows the relationship between these variables to be expressed as an equation of the
following form: price of house = (the effect-on-price due to the number of rooms) * (the
number of rooms) + (the effect-on-price due to the number of windows) * (the number of
windows) + a constant term.  The regression analysis calculates the respective values for the
effect-on-price for each of the variables. The resulting equation is not a perfect predictor of
price, but it is the “best-fit” in statistical terms based on the number of rooms and number of
windows. In most of the regression analyses done in this paper, the parole decision is the
dependent variable, and the various variables that are hypothesized to influence the parole
decision are independent variables. Because the dependent variable here is not a continuous
measure but is instead a binary measure—that is, either granted or denied parole—the regres-
sion analysis is termed a logistic regression analysis. For a more detailed explanation of regres-
sion analysis, see Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 303–57 (3d ed. 2011); see
also ATA Airlines, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 665 F.3d 882, 889 (7th Cir. 2011) (providing
explanation of regression analysis in “plain English”).
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focuses on recidivism. The basic normative assumption behind this approach
is that a decision to grant parole is “correct” if the person who is released
successfully completes parole and it is “incorrect” if the person violates
parole and/or commits a new crime. The approach is to essentially evaluate
parole board decisions in the same way one might assess the skill of a for-
tune-teller or a stockbroker; how frequently does the prediction of the future
match what actually happens?  This method is problematic for several rea-
sons, not least of which is that it scrutinizes decisions to grant parole but
essentially insulates from scrutiny decisions to deny parole.  There is no way
to say a decision to deny parole is “correct” or “incorrect” because we do
not know whether people who were denied parole would have actually suc-
ceeded if they were released.  This asymmetry means that a foolproof way to
get only “correct” decisions would be to release zero people on parole, and
thereby guarantee zero recidivism among parolees.
This method is furthermore ill-suited to the present context of juvenile
lifers because, for starters, none of the people released in this sample have
returned to prison. Most importantly, people serving life sentences for juve-
nile convictions are entitled to release if they demonstrate rehabilitation—
and demonstrated rehabilitation is distinct from, although related to, a pre-
diction about what a person will do upon release from prison. A person who
clearly demonstrates rehabilitation—a “model inmate” who shows improve-
ments in every way reasonably attainable within prison—may nevertheless
commit a crime when released from prison. However, the commission of
that crime would not change the conclusion that the person had demon-
strated rehabilitation during their time in prison. One person may demon-
strate more improvement than anyone else in a state’s prison system, and
return to an environment in which they commit another crime. Another per-
son may have demonstrated very little rehabilitation in prison, but return to
an environment in which they never commit crime. The commission of the
crime may provide reason to improve the conditions of release into the com-
munity, or perhaps the quality of programs in the prison, but it does not
justify concluding that the judgment of rehabilitation at the time of the re-
lease decision was incorrect.
2. Coding Process
The author and nine research assistants coded transcripts according to a
detailed coding manual, answering forty-two questions for each transcript.118
To ensure reliability across coders, research assistants periodically coded the
same transcripts.119 To verify accuracy of coding, a second group of research
118 The coding manual drew heavily upon the manual used by the Stanford Criminal Jus-
tice Center’s study of lifer parole hearings. See Weisburg, et al., supra note 102; see also R
Young et al., supra note 59. R
119 The author checked samples of coding and met with researchers regularly to discuss
and refine coding. A standard measure of reliability, the Cohen’s Kappa, was used to determine
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assistants coded the same set of parole hearing transcripts for seventeen vari-
ables hypothesized to be significant after regression analysis on the initial
data set.120 The author checked any discrepancies found between the data
entered in the first- and second-rounds of coding, and made corrections
based on additional review of the transcripts.
3. Variable Selection
Two types of variables were collected: outcome measures and factors
hypothesized to influence whether parole is granted or denied. The outcome
measures included whether parole was denied, and if so, the length of the
setback period (the number of years until the next parole hearing) and the
types of reasons the Board used to justify the decision. Hypotheses about
what influenced decisions to grant or deny parole were drawn from three
sources: considerations identified by law (including those listed in the
Board’s regulations,121 as well as those given great weight under the Youth
Offender Parole Statute122), factors that attorneys hypothesize influence pa-
role decisions, and factors that have been identified as significant to parole
decisions in prior studies.123 Appendix Table A details how these variables
were defined and measured.
reliability across coders. See generally Mary L. McHugh, Interrater Reliability: The Kappa
Statistic, 22 BIOCHEMIA MEDICA 3 (2012).
120 The variables that were double-coded include: Prog_gen, Prog_sub, Prog_gang, Edu,
Clean_time, Total_disc, Hx_mental_ill, Initial, Time_over, Initial, Da_opp, Vic_opp,
Youth_drugal, Youth_priorv, Crime_max, Crime_mur1, Crime_sex, and CRA. See Appendix,
Table A.
121 See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, § 2402 (2015).
122 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c) (West 2018). The hallmark features of youth include
mitigating factors regarding youth that are identified in state and federal case law. Variables
that are indicators of the presence of such factors include (a) childhood trauma or acute disad-
vantage (other than victim of sexual abuse) (Youth_unstable), (b) childhood sexual abuse
(Youth_sex), (c) peer pressure or other influence involved in the commission of the crime
(Crime_peer), (d) age at the time of the crime (Agecrime), (e) drug or alcohol abuse as a youth
(Youth_drugal), (f) violent behavior as a youth prior to the crime (Youth_priorv), and (g) par-
ticipation in a street gang as a youth (Youth_gang).
123 The most relevant studies are those done on parole hearings for candidates serving life
sentences with the possibility of parole in California. See Caldwell, supra note 15 (finding that R
the following variables increase the likelihood of being granted parole: lower score on forensic
risk assessment, fewer total disciplinary infractions, more time since last disciplinary infrac-
tion, and younger age at time of crime); Young et al., supra note 59 (finding that the following R
variables increase the likelihood of being granted parole: younger age at the time of the crime,
older age at hearing, only “low” risk scores, fewer disciplinary infractions, confirmed job
offer, participation in substance abuse program, and violent prior criminal history; and that the
following variables decrease the likelihood of being granted parole: failing to answer a ques-
tion about the Twelve Steps of Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous, opposition from the district
attorney, and attempting to lie or evade law enforcement officers after the crime); David R.
Friedman & Jackie M. Robinson, Rebutting the Presumption: An Empirical Analysis of Parole
Deferrals Under Marsy’s Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 173 (2014); see also Joel M. Caplan, What
Factors Affect Parole: A Review of Empirical Research, 71 FED. PROBATION 16 (2007) (re-
viewing literature to date and finding that institutional behavior, crime severity, criminal his-
tory, and mental illness are among the most influential factors affecting parole release
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Absent from Appendix Table A are several variables that are hypothe-
sized to influence whether parole is granted, but which were not used in
regression analysis for a variety of reasons. First, several variables could not
be used because they applied to less than 5% of the population. These in-
cluded gender, use of a translator at the hearing, reliance on an expert report
from a private psychologist, and assertion of factual innocence for the crime.
Second, “insight,” the lack of which may be the basis for denial of
parole, was not included due to the absence of a reliable operationalized
measure. Insight is a term the Board uses to refer to a candidate’s acceptance
of responsibility for the crime and understanding of the factors that causally
contributed to the crime.124 Despite repeated discussions among coders, an
evaluation of insight could not be reliably coded. For similar reasons, the
degree of remorse was not used as a variable in the regression. Evaluations
of insight and remorse are markedly subjective; if they track measurable
features that can be reliably identified by a diverse group of people, these
features were undiscoverable by the author. It would be easy to identify
cases in which the candidate was wholly devoid of insight or remorse—
cases in which, for example, a candidate stated that he continued to stand by
what he did or that the victim deserved to die. Such cases were extremely
rare. The difficulty instead lay in demarcating reliable gradations along a
spectrum of more or less insight or remorse. Coding of insight and remorse
were further complicated by a high degree of variability in the questions that
the Board asked to assess insight.125
Third, variables pertaining to the underlying crime are somewhat lim-
ited. Three variables related to the crime are used: whether the underlying
conviction included a first-degree murder, whether the underlying conviction
included a sexual offense, and whether the offense was committed with the
influence of peers or adults. The number of victims within a conviction-type
was considered, but there was insufficient variability in the sample to in-
clude this in the analysis.126 Subjective measures of heinousness listed in the
Board’s regulations, such as the extent to which the victim suffered or the
triviality of the motive, were not included due to difficulty in reliable cod-
ing. Notably, a prior study on lifer parole in California found that relative
degrees of heinousness of the crime did not have a statistically significant
impact on the parole decision.127
decisions; education, gender, and age may also have a significant influence on parole release
dispositions).
124 See In re Shaputis, 190 P.3d 573, 581 (Cal. 2008).
125 An indirect measure for insight might be the Psych_resid variable, which is the foren-
sic psychologist’s judgment of a person holding all other case factors constant. This variable is
not a direct measure of insight, however, because the psychologist’s ultimate question is a
prediction about future conduct. Further research would be beneficial to test this hypothesis.
126 Fewer than 5% of candidates were convicted of more than one count of first-degree
murder.
127 See Young et al., supra note 59. A significant difference in the method of this Article R
as compared to the prior study of California parole hearings is that all variables used in the
regression analysis in this Article were independently coded by two different individuals.
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A fourth variable which is not included in regression analysis, but
which was hypothesized to influence the parole decision, is whether a candi-
date is validated by the prison as an active member or associate of a prison
gang. The hypothesis—strongly supported by both attorney opinions and the
governing legal standard128—is that active gang validation essentially guar-
antees denial of parole. Indeed, active gang validation was the only dichoto-
mous variable that was a perfect predictor of a denial of parole. Rather than
including this unique variable as one alongside many, the ten candidates
validated as active members of a prison gang were removed from the
sample.
Confidential information was a fifth variable that was hypothesized to
influence parole decisions but was not directly used as a variable in regres-
sion analysis. The Board is required to state when they rely on confidential
information to deny parole, and they did so in twenty-nine of the 465 hear-
ings (6%). There is no way to know the scope of the variability in the con-
tent, type, or materiality of this evidence. Information could range, for
example, from credible evidence that the candidate perpetrated a recent seri-
ous assault, to a notation that the candidate was the victim of an assault, to
hearsay that a suspected gang member mentioned the person’s name decades
ago. Given the absence of any meaningful indication of similarity between
the “confidential information” used from one case to the next, it does not
make sense to treat “confidential information” as an independent variable in
a regression analysis. Instead, the twenty-nine cases where parole was de-
nied on the basis of confidential information were removed from the sample.
After removal of validated, active gang members and those denied on
the basis of confidential information, the study sample includes parole hear-
ings for 426 juvenile lifer parole candidates.129
4. Descriptive Statistics
Appendix Table A provides descriptive statistics from the 426 hearings
about all independent variables that were hypothesized to influence the deci-
sion to grant or deny parole (aside from those described above). For each
variable, reported information includes the frequency at which the variable is
observed, the rates at which parole is granted, and whether there are statisti-
cally significant differences in the frequency at which the Board granted
parole.130
128 Parole is denied if a candidate is currently dangerous, and when the prison validates a
person as an active gang member, it is labeling these individuals as currently dangerous. See
CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, § 3378.2 (2015); In re Efstathiou, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34, 37–38 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2011).
129 Latinx candidates were significantly over-represented relative to other racial/ethnic
groups among the hearings removed from the sample due to denial based on gang validation or
confidential information. See infra Table 1.
130 None of the variables in Table A are collinear aside from current age (discussed among
interaction effects).
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III. CASE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA PAROLE HEARINGS:
EVALUATION OF OUTCOMES
This Part aims to assess the consistency of decisions with respect to
rehabilitation. That is, to what extent do candidates who demonstrate compa-
rable levels of rehabilitation get the same decision outcomes? The first step
is to construct an operationalized measure of rehabilitation. To do so, the
study adopts the following basic, working definition of rehabilitation: sub-
stantial, pro-social,131 and reasonably attainable132 improvement in behavior
after the conviction.133 With this working definition, variables can be catego-
rized into those which are legitimate in assessing demonstrated rehabilita-
tion, and those which are illegitimate. Variables that are legitimate are those
that measure post-conviction behavior over which parole candidates have
reasonable control—for example, participation in programs that are offered
at the prison and a pattern of compliance with prison rules. Factors that are
clearly illegitimate include race/ethnicity and class, as well as factors that
are orthogonal to parole candidates’ behavior in prison—such as whether the
victim attends the parole hearing. Part III.A assesses the extent to which
variables that are legitimate measures of rehabilitation can explain the deci-
sion outcomes. Part III.B then considers the extent to which illegitimate vari-
ables can explain the decision outcomes when the legitimate variables are
held constant. Part III.C turns to create a model that best accounts for all
factors that are hypothesized to influence the parole decision, and assesses
the comparative weight that legitimate and illegitimate variables play in that
model.
A. Distribution of Decisions Along an Index of
“Demonstrated Rehabilitation”
The first technique aims to measure the extent to which parole deci-
sions are explained by factors that are legitimate measures of rehabilitation.
131 Not every form of improvement in behavior is considered as rehabilitation; improve-
ment must be directed toward living a law-abiding life in the community outside of prison
(thus, improving job skills would count as demonstrated rehabilitation but improving knife-
fighting skills would not).
132 Rehabilitation is generally considered as the type of improvement that should be
achievable if a person puts forth sincere effort and engagement toward pro-social develop-
ment. For example, if a fifty-year-old incarcerated person has taken every education class that
the prison offers and is unable to pass a high-school equivalency exam due to a cognitive
deficit, it would be unreasonable to say that this person has failed to demonstrate
rehabilitation.
133 This definition roughly accords with the definition of rehabilitation as a kind of train-
ing designed to help a person become a more productive member of society. See generally
Flanders, supra note 65, at 396 (The goal of rehabilitation is to “become more fit to reenter R
society as a productive and contributing member. [A rehabilitated person] would be prepared
to find a job upon release, or be able to enter and maintain a stable relationship, or simply be
more equipped to cope with day-to-day life.”).
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Based on the working definition of rehabilitation above, the factors consid-
ered at the parole hearing that most directly measure rehabilitation are those
that assess post-conviction behavior over which parole candidates have rea-
sonable control. These variables include the number of years since the last
write-up for misconduct (Clean_time), the extent of participation in self-help
programs (Prog_all),134 and the degree of education attained in custody
(Edu).
Other factors provide important context for assessing these factors
(such as mental health history) and for establishing a baseline for improve-
ment (such as marked instability in childhood), but they are not direct mea-
sures of post-conviction behavior. The risk score that is calculated by a
forensic psychologist in a Comprehensive Risk Assessment (CRA) is also
not a direct measure of post-conviction behavior. As discussed further, infra
Part IV.A, the score is derived from a risk assessment tool that purports to
predict the likelihood of future violent conduct based on factors correlated
with violence in studies that were conducted primarily on mental health pa-
tients and adult offenders.135 Many of the factors are static, meaning that they
cannot change over time and a parole candidate has no control over them
once in prison. For example, factors include whether a person engaged in
violent or other antisocial behavior under the age of twelve, whether a per-
son engaged in violent or antisocial behavior from ages thirteen to seven-
teen, whether the person was a victim of crime or trauma, and whether the
person had adverse experiences as a child.136 Given reliance on these factors,
an individual with a stronger record of improvement in behavior since the
time of the crime may score no better, or perhaps worse, than an individual
with a weaker record of post-conviction behavior.
Programming, education, and clean time have been selected as legiti-
mate measures because they are the best available measures for post-convic-
tion behavior over which candidates have reasonable control—not because
they are perfect measures. With respect to participation in programs, tran-
scripts documented many instances in which parole candidates actively
sought to participate in programs but could not do so for reasons outside of
134 Instead of using proggen, which does not include gang or substance abuse programs, I
created a variable (prog_all) which does count participation in these programs toward the
cumulative programming score.
135 The risk assessment tool used in California youth offender parole hearings is called the
Historical-Clinical-Risk Management-20, Version 3 (HCR-20-V3). See juvenile lifer CRA re-
ports (on file with author); see also Kevin S. Douglas, et al., Historical-Clinical-Risk Manage-
ment-20, Version 3 (HCR-20V3): Development and Overview, 13 INT’L JOURNAL OF FORENSIC
MENTAL HEALTH 93, 93–108 (2014); Kevin S. Douglas, et al., HCR-20 Violence Risk Assess-
ment Scheme: Overview and Annotated Bibliography (Nov. 24, 2008), http://kdouglas.files
.wordpress.com/2006/04/annotate10-24nov2008.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/XE8P-
EVQA; see also Isard, supra note 98, at 1243. R
136 See Douglas et al., supra note 135, at 98; see also HCR-20-V3 Rating Sheet, Mental R
Health Law and Policy Institute, Simon Fraser University (2013), http://hcr-20.com/materials/,
archived at https://perma.cc/C3LG-AFFP.
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their control,137 including unavailability of programs, ineligibility for pro-
grams, long waiting lists, or frequent transfers from one prison to another.138
For this reason, a measure of participation in general programming is used
rather than a measure of participation in any particular program. It is unrea-
sonable to assume that every prisoner had access to specific programs like
vocational training or cognitive therapy, but it is reasonable to assume that
every prisoner had access to at least some programs over the course of many
years. Education is included here because it is the one program that appeared
to be available to all prisoners at some point during the course of their sen-
tence. Notably, however, earning a GED or higher education is not reasona-
bly attainable for every parole candidate; several transcripts indicated that a
person participated in education courses and took the GED test multiple
times but could not pass, perhaps due to cognitive deficits or learning disa-
bilities. With respect to clean time, this variable is used rather than the total
number of disciplinary write-ups in order to measure improvement in con-
duct as an adult; many juvenile lifers incur a large number of their total
write-ups upon initial entry into adult prison as teenagers and emerging
young adults. While clean time is a better measure of rehabilitation than total
write-ups, it is also imperfect because write-ups are not fully within the con-
trol of a parole candidate; write-ups are sometimes a product of being in the
wrong place at the wrong time, rather than purposefully violating the
rules.139 Race has also been hypothesized as a factor that can make a candi-
date more likely to receive disciplinary write-ups.140
Despite these caveats, the variables of clean time, general program-
ming, and education are the best available objective measures of behavior
that are reasonably within the control of the parole candidate. Using these
three factors, an index measuring “demonstrated rehabilitation” was con-
structed to assess the extent to which parole decisions were explained by
137 The difficulty in accessing programs has also been observed in other states. See
ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS FROM A
NATIONAL SURVEY 4, 24 (2012) (62% of juvenile lifers are not engaged in programming in
prison; of those, 82% wanted to take a program but could not access it).
138 Statements in transcripts indicate that this phenomenon may be more likely among
parole candidates incarcerated in a Level IV setting or in solitary confinement (over 95% of
the sample was in solitary confinement at some point during their incarceration; several for
multiple decades). Tests of statistical significance show that candidates incarcerated on Level
IV prison yards are more likely to have lower rates of self-help programming than other
candidates.
139 For example, several transcripts discussed instances in which a person was attacked by
another person in prison and responded with self-defense. See generally California Board of
Parole Hearings, Parole Consideration Transcripts (2014-2015) (on file with author).
140 See, e.g., Andrea C. Armstrong, Race, Prison Discipline, and the Law, 5 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 759, 761 (2015); Eric D. Poole & Robert M. Regoli, Race, Institutional Rule Breaking,
and Disciplinary Response: A Study of Discretionary Decision Making in Prison, 14 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 931, 933 (1980); Heinz et al., supra note 11, at 1, 17 (“The finding that black[ ]
[candidates] are more likely to have rule infractions on their records may be as much a result
of selective perception or discrimination on the part of prison officials as it is of actual differ-
ences in behavior.”).
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these factors. The index was constructed by running a logistic regression
with the hearing decision as the dependent variable and these three variables
as the independent variables.141 Next, for each candidate, the likelihood of
being granted parole was calculated based on these three variables. The like-
lihood was multiplied by ten, and this became the “rehabilitation level.” The
levels ranged from 0.1 (for a candidate with minimal programming, no
GED, and a write-up in the last three years) to 9.6 (for a candidate with
maximum programming, a college degree, and no write-ups in over eleven
years).
The graphs below visually depict the relationship between the rehabili-
tation level and the result of the parole hearing.142 First, Figure 1 depicts a
hypothetical system in which the decision to grant parole is perfectly respon-
sive to the rehabilitation level. Those with high rehabilitation levels are
granted parole, those with low rehabilitation levels are denied, and there are
no instances in which candidates of the same rehabilitation level are both
granted and denied. In contrast, Figure 2 depicts another hypothetical system
which is entirely irresponsive to rehabilitation. To create Figure 2, a random
number generator was used to determine which candidates were granted or
denied. There is no correlation between the rehabilitation level and the deci-
sion to grant or deny parole, and there are many instances in which those
with the same rehabilitation level are given opposite decisions. Figure 3 de-
picts the actual hearing results in the sample of 426 hearings considered in
this study.
FIGURE 1: HYPOTHETICAL “PERFECT” DISTRIBUTION OF DECISIONS ALONG
REHABILITATION INDEX
141 See Appendix, Table B.
142 As discussed supra at Part V.A, the technique used here mirrors a technique that John
Baldus used to assess the extent to which death penalty decisions were consistent with respect
to an index of culpability. See DAVID BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORK & CHARLES PULASKI,
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 80–83 (1990).
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FIGURE 2: HYPOTHETICAL RANDOM DISTRIBUTION OF DECISIONS ALONG
REHABILITATION INDEX
FIGURE 3: ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF DECISIONS ALONG
REHABILITATION INDEX
As the figures show, the actual parole system falls somewhere between
a system that is irresponsive to rehabilitation and one that is highly respon-
sive to rehabilitation. Parole candidates with rehabilitation levels at either
end of the spectrum can expect fairly consistent results: 95% (nineteen of
twenty) of candidates at the highest level of rehabilitation (level nine) were
granted parole, and 98% (ninety of ninety-two) of candidates with the lowest
rehabilitation level (level zero) were denied parole. Among candidates at
mid-range rehabilitation levels, however, decisions appear no more predict-
able than a coin-flip. Of those at rehabilitation level three, twenty-six were
granted and twenty-five were denied; of those at level four, six were granted
and ten denied; at level five, eighteen were granted and seventeen were de-
nied; and at level six, thirty-two were granted and twenty-four were denied.
One way to quantify the degree of variability in decisions along the
rehabilitation index is to consider the proportion of denied candidates who
have rehabilitation levels that are comparable to “normal” grantees. There
are a number of ways to define statistical normalcy here, but suppose for
these purposes that “normal” grantees are defined as a subset of grantees
that excludes those with irregularly high rehabilitation levels (levels in the
top 5%, which is 9.43) and those with irregularly low rehabilitation levels
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(levels in the bottom 5%, which is 1.64). If a system were highly responsive
to rehabilitation levels, very few candidates who had a rehabilitation level
greater than or equal to that of normal grantees would be denied. In the
actual juvenile lifer parole system depicted in Figure 3, about half of the
denials—48% (119 out of 250)—have rehabilitation levels that fall within
the range of normal grantees. In other words, about half the candidates who
were denied were roughly comparable with respect to the rehabilitation mea-
sure as candidates who were granted.
The distribution of decisions in Figure 3 is skewed by the large concen-
tration of candidates who have a rehabilitation level less than one (92 of 426
candidates). It is more informative, therefore, to consider the set of hearings
for those with a rehabilitation level of one or more. There were 334 candi-
dates within this set; 174 were granted and 160 candidates were denied. Of
the 160 who were denied, 74% have a rehabilitation level that is within the
range of normal grantees. These data indicate that once a candidate has
demonstrated enough rehabilitation to have a “fighting chance,” the deci-
sion distribution more closely approximates a system that is irresponsive to
rehabilitation than it does a system which is highly responsive with respect
to rehabilitation. In essence, candidates must pay to play, but then they roll
the dice.
B. Grant Rate Comparisons Among Legitimate
and Illegitimate Variables
The analysis above shows that while the rehabilitation index explains
differences in parole decisions among candidates with rehabilitation levels
on the ends of the spectrum, it leaves largely unexplained the parole deci-
sions for the majority of candidates who are in the mid-range of the rehabili-
tation spectrum. The mere existence of this unexplained variability is not
sufficient, however, to show that decisions are arbitrary and capricious. It is
possible that the variability is due to morally sensitive, individual tailoring in
each particular case. As Justice Brennan explained with respect to death pen-
alty decisions, “[s]ince such decisions are not reducible to mathematical
formulae, we are willing to assume that a certain degree of variation reflects
the fact that no two defendants are completely alike.”143 This section there-
fore aims to identify whether illegitimate factors explain the variability in
decisions that is not attributable to the rehabilitation index. The analysis be-
gins with tables listing the grant rates broken down by the most obviously
legitimate—and illegitimate—factors in the parole decision. In the next sec-
tion, multivariate regression allows for investigation across a larger number
of variables.
143 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 337 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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1. Race/Ethnicity
Considered first are tables of descriptive statistics that consider how the
parole grant rate varies with respect to racial/ethnic groups when variables
measuring rehabilitation are held constant.  Table 1 below shows significant
differences in the parole grant rate among different racial groups when clean
time is held constant.144 Table 2 shows significant differences in the parole
grant rate among different racial/ethnic groups when participation in pro-
grams is held constant, and Table 3 shows significant differences when edu-
cation level is held constant. In the majority of categories, the grant rate
among Black candidates is lower than that of candidates of other racial/eth-
nic groups.
TABLE 1: PAROLE GRANT RATE BY RACE/ETHNICITY AND CLEAN TIME
    Clean Time   
    
0 to 2 
years 
3 to 5 
years 
6 to 11 
years 
12+ 
years Total 
  Denied 36 32 27 9 104 
Black Granted 2 12 15 18 47 
  
Grant rate 5% 27% 36% 67% 31% 
  Denied 23 23 16 8 70 
Latinx* Granted 3 5 35 22 65 
  Grant rate 12% 18% 69% 73% 48% 
  Denied 10 8 6 5 29 
Other Granted 1 8 8 15 32 
  Grant rate 9% 50% 57% 75% 52% 
  Denied 15 11 14 7 47 
White Granted 0 4 10 18 32 
  
Grant rate 0% 27% 42% 72% 41% 
*Latinx candidates were significantly over-represented relative to other 
racial/ethnic groups among the hearings removed from the sample due to 
denial based on gang validation or confidential information. When these 
candidates are added back into the sample, the grant rate among Latinx 
candidates changes significantly, from 48% to 40%. There is no significant 
change in the grant rate among non-Latinx candidates.  
144 Descriptive statistics reported in Table A show that black candidates tend to have less
clean time than other racial/ethnic groups. This finding is consistent with prior research show-
ing racial disparities in prison disciplinary write-ups, see supra note 140, and with evidence of R
explicitly racist attitudes among correctional officers in at least one California state prison, see
ROBERT A. BARTON & ROY W. WESLEY, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 2015 SPECIAL
REVIEW: HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON, SUSANVILLE CA 11 (2015), https://www.oig.ca.gov/
media/reports/Reports/Reviews/2015_Special_Review_-_High_Desert_State_Prison.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/SN6W-S7CL.
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TABLE 2: PAROLE GRANT RATE BY RACE/ETHNICITY
AND PROGRAM PARTICIPATION
    Program Participation   
    Minimal Moderate Extensive Total 
  Denied 20 72 12 104 
Black Granted 0 31 16 47 
  Grant rate 0% 30% 57% 31% 
  Denied 23 35 12 70 
Latinx* Granted 0 42 23 65 
  Grant rate 0% 55% 66% 48% 
  Denied 3 24 2 29 
Other Granted 0 21 11 32 
  Grant rate 0% 47% 85% 52% 
  Denied 7 36 4 47 
White Granted 0 24 8 32 
  Grant rate 0% 40% 67% 41% 
*See note regarding Latinx candidates in Table 1.  
TABLE 3: PAROLE GRANT RATE BY RACE/ETHNICITY
AND EDUCATION LEVEL
    Education   
    
No  
GED/HS GED/HS 
Some 
College
College  
Degree Total 
  Denied 19 51 26 8 104 
Black Granted 1 21 14 11 47 
  Grant rate 5% 29% 35% 58% 31% 
  Denied 10 38 15 7 70 
Latinx* Granted 7 25 25 8 65 
  Grant rate 41% 40% 63% 53% 48% 
  Denied 3 20 6 0 29 
Other Granted 1 12 11 8 32 
  Grant rate 25% 38% 65% 100% 52% 
  Denied 4 19 21 3 47 
White Granted 0  10 10 12 32 
  Grant rate 0% 34% 32% 80% 41% 
*See note regarding Latinx candidates in Table 1.  
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2. Attorney
Another factor which is orthogonal to a measure of rehabilitation is
whether the candidate retains a private attorney, or is represented by a
Board-appointed attorney. Retaining a private attorney is the variable that
comes closest to acting as a proxy for social class, but it is an imperfect
one.145 Table 4 shows substantial differences in grant rates among candidates
who have retained an attorney and those who have a Board-appointed attor-
ney, when clean time, programming, and education are held constant. The
most substantial differences in grant rates are observed in the mid-range of
clean time, as well as in the mid-range of programming. For example, among
candidates who have three to five years clean time, 53% of those represented
by a private attorney were granted parole whereas only 23% of those repre-
sented by an appointed attorney were granted parole. With respect to educa-
tion, the difference in the grant rate is most substantial among those who do
not have a GED or other high school equivalency. This observation accords
with the experience of parole attorneys, who have described that candidates
with cognitive deficits often struggle more to navigate the parole process.
These candidates appear to gain more by retaining an attorney who can
spend considerably more time helping them understand and navigate the
process. For more discussion of the difference that attorneys can make at
parole hearings, see discussion infra at Part IV.A.
145 Retaining a private attorney is likely correlated with whether a parole candidate has
support from family members with funds to pay for the attorney (although some retained
attorneys were providing pro bono legal services). Prison wages are generally less than $1.00
per hour and candidates did not have a meaningful opportunity to work before their
incarceration.
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TABLE 4: PAROLE GRANT RATE BY ATTORNEY TYPE
Appointed Attorney Retained Attorney 
Col. A Col. B Col. C Col. D Col. E Col. F 
Clean time 
Denied Granted Grant Rate Denied Granted
Grant 
Rate 
Diff. in  
Grant Rate 
(C-F) 
0 to 2 years 74 4 5% 10 2 17% -12 
3 to 5 years 65 19 23% 9 10 53% -30 
6 to 11 years 54 51 49% 9 17 65% -17 
12+ years 25 49 66% 4 24 86% -19 
Programming               
Minimal 49 0  0% 4  0 0% 0 
Moderate 146 84 37% 21 34 62% -25 
Extensive 23 39 63% 7 19 73% -10 
Education               
No GED/HS 35 8 19% 1 1 50% -31 
GED/HS 115 54 32% 13 14 52% -20 
Some college 54 39 42% 14 21 60% -18 
College Degree 14 22 61% 4 17 81% -20 
Total 218 123 36% 32 53 62% -26 
3. Prior Experience
The third variable considered here is whether a candidate is appearing
at an initial or subsequent hearing. Unlike the variables of race/ethnicity and
attorney type (which imperfectly tracks indigency), whether a candidate has
prior experience with parole hearings does not describe any protected or
suspect classification upon which it would be illicit to discriminate per se.
Prior experience is nevertheless an illegitimate factor in a juvenile lifer pa-
role decision because it is orthogonal to a measure of rehabilitation. If parole
decisions are in fact based on a rubric of rehabilitation that is consistently
applied from one case to the next, then whether a candidate has had prior
experience at a parole hearing should not make a significant difference to
whether the candidate is granted parole or not. There is no good reason to
believe that someone appearing before the Board for the first time would,
solely on that basis, have demonstrated any more or less rehabilitation than
another parole candidate. Yet prior research and the experience of parole
attorneys strongly suggest that prior experience with the parole board signif-
icantly improves a candidate’s likelihood of being granted parole when other
variables are held constant. Several theories might explain this; perhaps prior
experience tends to help because it gives candidates a sense of what kinds of
words or phrases the Board likes to hear, or perhaps some Board members
simply prefer that candidates experience a denial before being granted pa-
role. Although the mechanism for why prior experience makes a significant
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difference to the likelihood of parole is unclear, what is clear is that prior
experience should not be expected to make a difference if the system is
treating like cases alike with respect to rehabilitation.
As shown in Table 5, the grant rate among those with prior experience
with the Board exceeds the grant rate among those attending their initial
hearing in almost every category of clean time, programming, and education.
The most marked disparity is among candidates with clean time in the range
of six to eleven years, where 58% of those with prior experience are granted
as compared to 27% of those without prior experience.
TABLE 5: PAROLE GRANT RATE BY PRIOR EXPERIENCE
WITH THE PAROLE BOARD
Subsequent Hearing Initial Hearing 
Col. A Col. B Col. C Col. D Col. E Col. F 
Clean time 
Denied Granted Grant Rate Denied Granted
Grant 
Rate 
Diff. in  
Grant Rate 
(C-F) 
0 to 2 years 61 4 6% 23 2 8% -2 
3 to 5 years 55 27 33% 19 2 10% 23 
6 to 11 years 44 61 58% 19 7 27% 31 
12+ years 24 64 73% 5 9 64% 8 
Programming               
Minimal 41  0 0% 12  0 0% 0 
Moderate 121 106 47% 46 12 21% 26 
Extensive 22 50 69% 8 8 50% 19 
Education               
No GED/HS 23 8 26% 13 1 7% 19 
GED/HS 93 62 40% 35 6 15% 25 
Some college 54 52 49% 14 8 36% 13 
College Degree 14 34 71% 4 5 56% 15 
Total 184 156 46% 66 20 23% 23 
Finally, combinations of the three legitimate variables and the three il-
legitimate variables are considered together. Table 6 compares grant rates
among only the 286 candidates who were average or above average with
respect to clean time, programming, and education. These candidates have
not had a disciplinary write-up in at least three years, have moderate to ex-
tensive participation in programs, and have earned a GED or more. Within
this set of 286 candidates, numbers were too small to meaningfully compare
grant rates for each individual racial/ethnic group. Table 6 reports only the
rate for Black candidates as compared to non-Black candidates; this catego-
rization was chosen because the largest racial disparities observed in Table 1
were among Black candidates, and Black candidates are also the largest
group in this sample. As shown below, among this set of 286 candidates, the
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grant rate for Black candidates is sixteen percentage points lower than non-
Black candidates; the grant rate for those with an appointed attorney is
twenty-two percentage points lower than those with a retained attorney; and
the grant rate is twenty-nine percentage points lower for those with no prior
experience appearing before the Board.
TABLE 6: PAROLE GRANT RATE AMONG CANDIDATES WITH 3+ YEARS
CLEAN TIME, MODERATE OR EXTENSIVE PROGRAMMING, AND A
GED OR HIGHER (N=286)
  Black Non-Black
Denied 51 72 
Granted 44 119 
Total number 95 191 
Grant rate 46% 62% 
Diff. in  
Grant Rate -16 
  Appointed Retained
Denied 105 18 
Granted 113 50 
Total number 218 68 
Grant rate 52% 74% 
Diff. in  
Grant Rate -22 
  Initial Subsequent
Denied 34 89 
Granted 17 146 
Total number 51 235 
Grant rate 33% 62% 
Diff. in  
Grant Rate -29 
Table 7 compares differences in grant rates when the illegitimate vari-
ables are considered together. Among Black parole candidates who have not
retained a private attorney and who have no prior experience with the board,
one of twenty-four candidates (4%) was granted parole.146 The grant rate was
eighteen times higher among non-Black parole candidates who have retained
an attorney and have prior experience with the board. Of those candidates,
thirty-four of forty-seven (72%) were granted parole. When clean time, pro-
gramming, and education are held constant, the disparity in these grant rates
remains.
The racial disparities observed here call for more sustained research
that is beyond the scope of this single Article. The research is particularly
critical given that people of color make up 91% of all people serving parole-
146 Ten of forty-five candidates (22%) were granted parole among those who are not
Black, who have not hired a private attorney, and who have no prior experience with the
board.
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TABLE 7: PAROLE GRANT RATE BY RACE/ETHNICITY, ATTORNEY,
AND BOARD EXPERIENCE
Black Candidate,  
Appointed Attorney, and 
Initial Hearing 
Non-Black Candidate, 
Retained Attorney, and 
Subsequent Hearing 
Col. A Col. B Col. C Col. D Col. E Col. F
Clean time Denied Granted 
Grant 
Rate Denied Granted
Grant 
Rate 
Diff. in  
Grant Rate  
(C-F) 
0 to 2 years 8 1 11% 4 0 0% 11 
3 to 5 years 8 0 0% 5 7 58% -58 
6 to 11 years 5 0 0% 2 12 86% -86 
12+ years 2 0 0% 2 15 88% -88 
Programming               
Minimal 2 0 0% 2 0 0% 0 
Moderate 19 0 0% 8 23 74% -74 
Extensive 2 1 33% 3 11 79% -45 
Education             
No GED/HS 7 0 0% 0 1 100% -100 
GED/HS 13 0 0% 7 9 56% -56 
Some college 2 1 33% 4 15 79% -46 
College degree 1 0 0% 2 9 82% -82 
Total 23 1 4% 13 34 72% -68 
eligible life sentences for juvenile convictions in California prisons.147 The
racial disparities observed here are unlikely to be unique to California; na-
tional data shows that Black juveniles are disproportionately sentenced to
life without the possibility of parole as compared to their white counter-
parts.148 In Texas, for example, 100% of juveniles who were sentenced to life
without parole were either Black or Latinx.149
147 See MEHTA, supra note 5, at 175. R
148 See John R. Mills et al., Juvenile Life Without Parole in Law and Practice: Chronicling
the Rapid Change Underway, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 579–80 (2016) (finding Black juveniles
arrested for murder are about twice as likely to receive juvenile life without parole [JLWOP]
sentences as white juveniles arrested for murder).
149 See id. (reporting highly disparate rates of JLWOP sentences on non-white individuals
in other states, “including Illinois (81.7% of the JLWOP population; 37.7% of the total popula-
tion), Louisiana (81.0% of the JLWOP population; 40.7% of the total population), Mississippi
(69.1% of the JLWOP population; 42.7% of the total population), North Carolina (88.5% of the
JLWOP population; 35.9% of the total population), Pennsylvania (79.5% of the JLWOP popu-
lation; 22.1% of the total population), and South Carolina (70.3% of the JLWOP population;
36.1% of the total population)”).
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C. Regression Analysis
Thus far, the analysis has considered only the variables that are most
obviously legitimate or illegitimate with respect to a measure of rehabilita-
tion. In this section, multivariate regression analysis is used to construct a
model that predicts whether parole is granted or denied on the basis of all
independent variables that that are hypothesized to have a significant influ-
ence on the parole decision. Presentation of the regression analysis proceeds
in three parts: explanation of interaction effects among independent vari-
ables, construction of the model and results of the regression, and discussion
of how the results inform arbitrary and capricious analysis.
Before presenting the analysis, it is important to clarify that its purpose
is to aid in assessing the fairness of decision-making, not to establish proof
that certain variables cause an outcome in any given case. In other contexts,
courts have accepted regression analysis as a powerful method for evaluat-
ing whether illegitimate factors are significant in explaining variability
alongside several different legitimate factors.150 For this purpose, the set of
independent variables used in the regression analysis should include all mea-
surable variables hypothesized to have a substantial influence on outcomes,
but need not include every measurable variable that could conceivably influ-
ence a decision.151 For example, in a case concerning whether employment
decisions were unfairly influenced by race, the Court considered a regression
analysis that considered race, education, tenure, experience, sex, and job ti-
tle.152 When a regression analysis has shown that an illegitimate factor is
significant in explaining variability in outcomes alongside these other vari-
ables, it has not established that an illegitimate factor caused an outcome in
any individual case. It has, however, established a risk that the illegitimate
factors play a causal role in influencing the decisions. The court’s inquiry is
then to consider other evidence and assess the degree of the risk, and decide
whether that degree of risk is acceptable in light of other reasons to trust (or
doubt) that decision-makers are exercising discretion fairly.
1. Interactions Among Variables
Psychologist’s Impression. A consistent finding in prior studies of Cali-
fornia lifer parole hearings is that a low risk score on the Comprehensive
Risk Assessment (CRA) strongly increases the likelihood of being granted
parole.153 As discussed above, that risk score is determined by a forensic
psychologist after an in-person interview and in consideration of the infor-
mation contained in the candidate’s file. At the parole hearing, the Board
150 See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986); ATA Airlines, Inc. v. Fed.
Express Corp., 665 F.3d 882, 889 (7th Cir. 2011).
151 See Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 400.
152 See id. at 398.
153 See Young, supra note 107, at 466; Caldwell, supra note 15, at 279. R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\54-2\HLC202.txt unknown Seq: 40 28-JUN-19 13:22
494 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 54
considers all the information that the psychologist had considered, as well as
information available only at the hearing (for example, whether the district
attorney or the victim opposes parole). A regression analysis on the parole
decision, which includes the CRA score as well as all the variables that went
into producing the CRA score, introduces multicollinearity154 with respect to
those variables that are considered by both the psychologist and the Board.
To avoid “double counting” information considered by both the psy-
chologist and the Board, this study created “Psych_resid,” a variable in-
tended to isolate the psychologist’s professional impression of the candidate
from the effect on the risk score due to the other variables considered by
both the psychologist and the Board. To do so, regression analysis was con-
ducted to estimate the CRA score on the basis of known objective informa-
tion. This regression is referred to as the “CRA model.” The dependent
variable in the CRA model is the CRA score, and the independent variables
are factors that are considered by, and hypothesized to be significant to, both
the psychologist and the Board. The difference between a candidate’s actual
CRA score and the estimated score from the CRA model is the Psych_resid
variable.155
A negative value for Psych_resid indicates that a candidate’s CRA
score was lower than one would expect based solely on the objective infor-
mation; the psychologist’s impression was that the candidate was a lower
risk than the average candidate who presents similar case factors. A positive
value for Psych_resid indicates that a candidate’s CRA score was higher
than one would expect based solely on the objective information; the psy-
chologist’s impression was that the candidate was a higher risk than the aver-
age candidate who presents similar case factors. The hypothesis is that a
higher positive value for Psych_resid would decrease the likelihood that the
Board would grant parole.
Substance Abuse Programming. More than three-quarters of the popu-
lation participated in a program focused on substance abuse, and in most
cases the program was Alcoholics or Narcotics Anonymous. The Board
asked a question about the Twelve Steps of Alcoholics or Narcotics Anony-
mous in half of the hearings. For example, at one hearing a commissioner
asked a candidate, “How do you work Step 6?”156 and another asked, “So
154 Multicollinearity means that several variables are collinear as a group. Collinearity is a
statistical term used to measure the extent to which two variables move together. For example,
consider LSAT scores and the number of hours a student spends studying for the LSAT. If
these variables are collinear, then one would expect that additional hours of studying would be
associated with higher LSAT scores. If two (or more) different independent variables are col-
linear, then it becomes difficult for a regression analysis to determine how much each of the
variables is impacting the dependent variable. The result may be that the regression analysis
would determine both independent variables to be not significant.
155 The CRA score is a five-level categorical variable, but the regression analysis assumes
it to be continuous in order to determine Psych_resid.
156 California Board of Parole Hearings, Parole Consideration Transcripts (April 2015) (on
file with author).
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[step] seven is humbly asking God to remove your shortcomings. . . . How
is it that you – that you implement that step?”157 Failure to give an answer
that the Board deemed adequate was found in a prior study to significantly
reduce the likelihood of being granted parole.158 In this study, the variable
“Prog_sub” was designed to account for an interaction effect between (i)
the variables for participation in substance abuse programming and (ii) fail-
ure to adequately answer a question about the Twelve Steps. Prog_sub
counts a candidate as having participated in substance abuse programming if
the candidate participated and did not fail to satisfactorily answer the Twelve
Steps question. The Twelve Steps question is thus built into the Prog_sub
variable and is not considered independently.
Crime, Age, and Time-Served. Given that each candidate in the sample
was fourteen to seventeen years old at the time of the crime, there is a strong
correlation between a candidate’s current age and the number of years the
candidate has served.
The number of years a candidate has served (and likewise a candidate’s
current age) also bears some relationship to the nature of the conviction due
to structural differences in sentences. The California Penal Code provides
that the minimum sentence for murder in the first degree is twenty-five years
to life,159 fifteen years to life for murder in the second degree,160 seven years
to life for attempted murder,161 and seven years to life for kidnapping for
robbery or rape.162 All else being equal, one would therefore expect that pa-
role candidates convicted of first-degree murder would serve more time
before release than other parole candidates. This correlation between convic-
tion and time-served makes it challenging to test two common hypotheses
about parole decisions: that candidates with convictions of increased gravity
are less likely to be granted parole, and that older candidates (who have
thereby served more time) are more likely to be granted parole.163 The hy-
potheses pull in opposing directions: a first-degree murder conviction would
be hypothesized to make a candidate less likely to be granted parole due to
157 California Board of Parole Hearings, Parole Consideration Transcripts (February 2015)
(on file with author).
158 See Young et al., supra note 59. R
159 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (West 2000).
160 Id.
161 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 664 (West 2011).
162 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 209(b) (West 2006). The minimum sentence for sexual of-
fenses varies depending on the type of offense. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (West 2010)
(punishment for rape is three to eight years in prison); CAL. PENAL CODE § 209(b) (punish-
ment for kidnapping for rape is seven years to life); CAL. PENAL CODE § 269 (West, 2019)
(punishment for aggravated sexual assault of a child is fifteen years to life). The punishment is
twenty-five years to life for a habitual sexual offender, but section 3051 of the youth offender
parole law does not apply to habitual sexual offenders. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.71(b)
(West 2019); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051(h) (West 2018).
163 See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 123. R
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the gravity of the crime, but also more likely to be granted parole because of
the correlative increase in age at the time of the first parole hearing.164
Given this issue, instead of considering age or time-served as variables,
descriptive statistics were calculated for the number of years that a candidate
has served by type of conviction. These data are discussed in detail in Part
III.D, infra. One important observation from these data is that candidates
who are granted parole tend to have served less time than candidates who are
denied. This observation led to a hypothesis that after a candidate has served
more time than the norm for the conviction, additional time served would
not improve the likelihood of parole and could even decrease the likelihood
of parole (if, for example, the Board sees older candidates as institutional-
ized to the prison environment). The variable “Time_over” was created to
test this hypothesis. The variable tracks whether a parole candidate who has
served less time than the norm for the conviction is more likely to be granted
parole than one who has served more time than the norm.165
Place of Incarceration. CDCR provided data to the author that specifies
the level of security in the part of the prison, or prison unit, where a candi-
date is incarcerated.166 The security levels of California prison facilities
range from minimum security at Level I to maximum security at Level IV.
The type of facility where a parole candidate is incarcerated depends largely
on their classification score assigned by CDCR; the higher the score, the
higher the level of security.167 Almost all the parole candidates considered in
the study began their sentences at maximum-security prisons because, at the
time they entered prison, the classification system mandatorily assigned high
classification scores on the basis of young age, a life sentence, and a violent
164 Where a candidate had multiple different convictions, the conviction-type was deemed
to be the conviction that carried the longest sentence, in accord with the structure of the Youth
Offender Parole Law. See Cal. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051 (a). For the purpose of analysis, it
was assumed that first-degree murder carries the longest sentence, then second-degree murder,
then attempted murder, then sexual offenses, then non-sexual, non-murder offenses. There are
exceptions to this general trend, particularly among those convicted for sexual offenses, and
those convicted with gun enhancements and gang enhancements, some of which may carry the
same sentence as murder in the first degree.
165 For the purpose of constructing the variable, the norm for a given conviction was the
average number of years served among those who were granted parole.
166 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation [CDCR] provided data on
both the “housing level” and the “security level” of each candidate. Housing level is a label
that CDCR assigns to the prison (or the part of a prison) depending on the security conditions
in the facility; ranging from minimum at Level I to maximum at Level IV. Security level refers
to the level of security that CDCR assigns to each incarcerated person; security level also
ranges from minimum at Level I to maximum at Level IV. For the most part, a person’s secur-
ity level and housing level are the same. That is, a person who has security Level IV is incar-
cerated in a part of the prison that is classified as Level IV. In some circumstances, such as a
need for particularized medical care or unavailability of bed space, however, a person may be
incarcerated at a prison with a housing level that differs from his or her security level. For the
purpose of constructing the variable, the housing level was used. There were some cases in
which the data from CDCR did not indicate the housing level. In these cases, a candidate was
deemed to be at Level IV if he was incarcerated in the Secure Housing Unit (SHU) and/or had
a security level of IV.
167 See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, §§ 3375.1, 3377.
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conviction.168 After preliminary classification, a person’s classification score
increases with disciplinary write-ups and decreases with clean time.169 A per-
son who accumulated a large number of points for write-ups early in the
period of incarceration could remain in a maximum-security prison setting
indefinitely, even after serving a decade of continuous clean time.170 In re-
cent years, CDCR has overhauled its classification scheme for youth offend-
ers, but those changes are not retroactive and did not affect the individuals
considered during the time period of this study.171
Prior studies of California lifer parole hearings have not considered
place of incarceration as an independent variable, but it was included here
because it was hypothesized that being incarcerated at a maximum-security
prison could have an independent effect on the parole decision. The hypothe-
sis was based on other evidence suggesting that people who live in high-
crime, highly policed neighborhoods tend to be perceived as more dangerous
due to where they live.172 Analogously, it was hypothesized that people in-
carcerated in maximum-security prisons are perceived as more dangerous
(relative to other prisoners) due to the environment in which they live.
Cognitive Deficit. Research suggests that people with cognitive deficits
are at a disadvantage at parole hearings for several reasons, especially be-
cause they may struggle to understand and articulate answers to the highly
specific questions asked in parole hearings.173 A variable “Cog_deficit” was
constructed that measures whether a person has any one of the following
indicators of cognitive deficit: history of special education, diagnosed learn-
ing disability, marked difficulty in comprehending questions at the hearing,
or a score of eighth grade or below on the test for adult basic education. This
variable is likely under-inclusive, given that learning disabilities often go
undiagnosed and the score on the test for adult basic education was not pro-
vided in 111 of the 426 transcripts. Further, there is overlap between cogni-
168 Until recent years, the points typically added to a youth lifer’s preliminary classifica-
tion score included: fifty-four points for a life sentence and violent crime; two points for being
under age twenty-six; two points for never being married; two points for not having a high
school degree or equivalent; two points for not having more than six months of employment
history; two points for no military service; and additional points for prior juvenile adjudica-
tions. See classification sheets on file with author.
169 See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, §§ 3375.1, 3377.
170 See id.
171 In 2014, the Legislature passed a statute requiring CDCR to adopt a new youth classifi-
cation process in which an individualized determination is made as to whether a youth of-
fender should be housed at a lower security institution that “permit[s] increased access to
programs and . . . encourage[s] the youth offender to commit to positive change and self-
improvement.” CAL. PENAL CODE §2905(b)(2). The law applies to youth offenders currently
under the age of twenty-five, and does not apply retroactively to those who are twenty-five or
older.
172 See, e.g., Carl Werthman & Irving Piliavin, Gang Members and the Police, in THE
POLICE: SIX SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS 56, 78–79 (D.J. Bordua ed., 1967); Jeffrey Fagan &
Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street Policing,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51 (2015).
173 See Amber Heron, An Impossible Standard: The California Parole Board Process for
Inmates with Cognitive Impairments, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 989, 999 (2018).
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tive deficit and education level; when Cog_deficit is included in models, it is
significant but renders “Edu” insignificant. Given that education level is a
more reliably measured variable, Cog_deficit is not included in the final re-
gression models, but it is included among the robustness checks in Table E. 
2. Regression Model
The regression results reported in this subsection show whether and
how independent variables influence the parole decision. Two regression
models were constructed: the CRA model to isolate the psychologist’s judg-
ment, and the Hearing Result model to determine the variables that have a
significant influence on the parole decision. The CRA model is a linear re-
gression with the dependent variable being the CRA score and the indepen-
dent variables being all the variables that are significant in the Hearing
Result model and which could have been considered by the psychologist. It
was initially hypothesized that all variables in Appendix Table A would be
significant in the Hearing Result model. Construction of the CRA model
thus began by including all these variables,174 aside from those that could not
have been considered by the psychologist.175 Residuals generated from the
CRA model were calculated to produce the Psych_resid variable. A logistic
regression was then run with the hearing result as the dependent variable and
all Table A variables,176 as well as Psych_resid, as independent variables.
Sixteen variables were significant at the 10% level in either the Hearing
Result model or the CRA model. Variables that were not significant at the
10% level were removed, and the regressions were run again. Nine outliers
were removed from the sample: observations in which parole was granted
but the model predicted that the likelihood of being granted parole was less
than 5%, observations in which parole was denied but the model predicted
that the likelihood of being granted parole was greater than 95%, and one
observation in which Psych_resid was more than three standard deviations
beyond the mean.
Table 8 below reports the final CRA model and Hearing Result model.
Listed are the coefficients and standard errors for each variable, with indica-
tion of whether each variable was statistically significant at the 5% level or
the 10% level. In addition, Table C in the Appendix reports the odds ratios
for each variable in the Hearing Result model.
174 Three variables in Table A were omitted: CRA (because it is used to determine
Psych_resid), Age_current (because of interaction effect with time-served and conviction
type), and Crime_max (because of collinearity with Crime_mur1 and Crime_sex).
175 Opposition from the district attorney or victim, and whether or not the candidate re-
tained an attorney, are facts that pertain only to the hearing and not to the psychologist, so
these were not considered in the CRA model. The CRA model also did not consider whether
the candidate had arranged for housing and employment if released because these plans are
often made after the CRA is conducted but before the parole hearing takes place.
176 As in note 174, CRA, Age_current, and Crime_max were omitted. R
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TABLE 8: CRA MODEL AND HEARING RESULT MODEL
 CRA_Model  
(Coeff.) 
Hearing_Result Model  
(Coeff.) 
Race_Black 0.180* -0.988** 
-0.1 -0.41 
Prog_gen -0.311** 1.841** 
-0.08 -0.4 
Prog_sub -0.535** 3.711** 
-0.12 -0.79 
Prog_gang -0.12 0.730* 
-0.09 -0.39 
Edu -0.093* 0.322 
-0.06 -0.23 
Clean_time -0.302** 2.360** 
-0.05 -0.3 
Total_disc 0.292** 0.155 
-0.05 -0.19 
Hx_mental_ill 0.178* -0.385 
-0.11 -0.49 
Initial 0.414** -1.932** 
-0.12 -0.56 
Pris_max  0.320** -1.561** 
-0.13 -0.59 
Time_over -0.103 -1.441** 
-0.1 -0.43 
Crime_sex 0.199 -2.393** 
-0.21 -1.13 
Retained 
 1.237** 
 -0.45 
Da_opp 
 -3.493** 
 -0.89 
Vic_opp 
 -1.713** 
 -0.52 
Psych_resid 
 -1.683** 
 -0.24 
Constant 2.088** -6.393** 
-0.19 -1.41 
R-square 0.4954  
Adj. R-square 0.4804  
Pseudo R-square 
 0.633 
*p<0.10,**p<0.05 
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The regression models identify sixteen variables that are significant to
either the CRA score or the hearing result: six variables are significant to
both the CRA score and the hearing result (Race_Black, Clean_time,
Prog_gen, Prog_sub, Pris_max, and Initial), three variables are significant
only to the CRA score (Total_disc, Edu, and Hx_mental_ill), and seven are
significant only to the hearing result (Prog_gang, Time_over, Crime_sex,
Retained, DA_opp, Vic_opp, and Psych_resid). The relative weight of all
variables significant to the hearing result is summarized in Table 9 below,
using the odds ratios that are reported in Appendix Table C.
TABLE 9: RELATIVE IMPACT OF VARIABLES SIGNIFICANT
TO PAROLE DECISION
Increases Likelihood of  
Parole Grant 
Decreases Likelihood of  
Parole Grant 
Very Strong Impact: Each changes odds of parole by 20x or more 
Rehabilitation program focused on 
substance abuse (Prog_sub**) 
More time since last disciplinary 
write-up (Clean_time**) 
Psychologist judges to be higher 
risk (Psych_resid**) 
District Attorney opposition 
(DA_opp**) 
Strong Impact: Each changes odds of parole by 6-15x 
More general participation in 
rehabilitation programming 
(Prog_gen**) 
Victim opposition (Vic_opp**) 
Convicted of sexual offense 
(Crime_sex**) 
Initial hearing (Initial**) 
Substantial Impact: Each changes odds of parole by 2-5x 
Retained attorney (Retained**) 
Rehabilitation program focused on 
gangs (Prog_gang*) 
Maximum-security prison 
(Pris_max**) 
Served more time than average for 
conviction (Time_over**) 
Race (Race_Black**) 
Several tests were conducted to test the robustness of this model, and
results of these tests are included in Appendix Tables D, E, F, and G. Table
D and Table E show that adding a variety of variables to the model does not
substantially change the significance of the sixteen independent variables
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identified as significant in the CRA model or Hearing Result model.177 Table
F shows that the significance of those sixteen variables is also largely insen-
sitive to changes in the way that various variables are constructed (for exam-
ple, when Clean_time is constructed as a continuous rather than a discrete
variable). Table G shows that the model is robust when the sample includes
outliers, when the sample includes only candidates convicted of murder, and
when the sample includes a randomly selected sample of 75% of the
population.
Notably, notwithstanding the legal mandate that the parole board shall
give “great weight” to the hallmark features of youth, none of the variables
pertaining to a parole candidate’s history as a youth have a statistically sig-
nificant impact on either the risk assessment score or the parole hearing re-
sult.178 As shown in Tables D and E, none of these variables is statistically
significant in the Hearing Result model when added to the model individu-
ally or collectively.
3. Implications of Regression Results
The regression models show two important findings for analysis of the
extent to which parole release decisions may be arbitrary with respect to a
measure of rehabilitation. First, the models indicate that variables which are
measures of rehabilitation do have a significant and substantial impact on
both the risk assessment score and the parole hearing result. As shown in
Table 9, two of the four variables with the strongest impact on the parole
decision are participation in a substance abuse program (Prog_sub) and time
since the last disciplinary write-up (Clean_time). Each of those variables can
increase the odds of parole for an average candidate by over 20 times, and
each is also significant in the CRA model. Participation in general rehabilita-
tion programs also has a significant and substantial impact on the hearing
result and the CRA model, and participation in gang programs is significant
to the hearing result. Increased education level also increases the likelihood
of a lower CRA score. The significance and strength of these variables pro-
vide some evidence that parole decisions are responsive to a measure of
rehabilitation.
177 Added variables include factors related to youth history, whether the crime was com-
mitted with others, whether the conviction was murder in the first degree, current age, cogni-
tive deficit, and a variable labeled Bump which indicates whether the Youth Offender Parole
Statute “bumped up” the expected date of the parole hearing by three years or more. The
hearing date had been bumped up in this way for 9% of the sample. The Bump variable over-
lapped considerably with whether it was a person’s initial or subsequent hearing (Initial);
Bump was significant in regressions that did not include the Initial variable, but it was not
significant in regressions that did include the Initial variable. The Initial variable was selected
for use in the final regression because it had more predictive power.
178 These variables include the candidate’s age at the time of the crime, and whether the
candidate, as a juvenile, used drugs or alcohol, committed prior acts of violence, was a mem-
ber of a gang, was sexually abused, or experienced acute trauma or disadvantage.
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The second finding, however, is that a number of variables which ap-
pear orthogonal to rehabilitation also exert a very strong impact on the pa-
role decision. The odds of being granted parole are thirty-three times lower
if the district attorney opposes, and six times lower if the victim opposes.
Being a Black parole candidate, being before the parole board for the first
time, and being incarcerated in a maximum-security prison each has a signif-
icant and substantial impact on reducing the odds of parole and increases the
likelihood of a higher risk score. Further, having been convicted of a sexual
offense, having served more time than the norm for the conviction, and not
retaining a private attorney have a significant and substantial impact on re-
ducing the odds of parole. None of these variables appear to measure reha-
bilitation, and their combined impact can match or outweigh the impact of
variables that offer some measure of rehabilitation.
To demonstrate the relative impact of these variables, the CRA and
Hearing Result models were used to calculate and compare the probability of
parole for two hypothetical parole candidates who have comparably strong
records of rehabilitation. Call these hypothetical candidates Larry and Sam.
Both Larry and Sam have six disciplinary write-ups but none in over twelve
years, they have earned a GED and taken some college courses, and partici-
pated extensively in general self-help programs, a substance abuse program,
and a gang-focused program. They both have some history of mental illness
and received a low/moderate score on the CRA. Larry is a Black man incar-
cerated at a maximum-security prison who did not retain a private attorney
and who has served more time than average on his conviction. Sam is a
white man in a medium-security prison who retained a private attorney and
has served less time than average on his conviction. Both faced opposition
from the district attorney at the hearing, but only Larry faced opposition
from the victim. The CRA model was used to calculate Sam and Larry’s
respective Psych_resid values, and the Hearing Result model was used to
calculate the predicted likelihood of parole. The Hearing Result predicts that
the likelihood of parole being granted for Sam is 99% at either the initial or
subsequent hearing, but 13% for Larry at an initial hearing and 34% at a
subsequent hearing.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 below use the results of the Hearing Result model to
demonstrate variability in the decision outcomes when the level of rehabili-
tation on the rehabilitation index is held constant but the illegitimate vari-
ables of race, attorney, and prior experience differ. The figures were
generated by plotting each candidate’s likelihood of being granted parole on
the y-axis179 and the rehabilitation level on the x-axis.180 Linear best-fit trend
lines, shaded with a 95% confidence interval, were then respectively drawn
for Black candidates and non-Black candidates in Figure 4; for candidates
179 The likelihood of being granted parole was calculated on the basis of the final Hearing
Result model.
180 The rehabilitation level was calculated based on the rehabilitation regression.
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with retained attorneys and candidates with appointed attorneys in Figure 5;
and for candidates at initial parole hearings and candidates at subsequent
parole hearings in Figure 6. If the illegitimate variables had no impact on the
likelihood of parole among candidates with comparable levels on the reha-
bilitation index, the trend lines and associated confidence intervals would
overlap. The trend lines diverge in each figure.
FIGURE 4: INFLUENCE OF PRIOR EXPERIENCE APPEARING
BEFORE BOARD BY REHABILITATION LEVEL
(LINEAR TREND LINES WITH 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL)
?
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FIGURE 5: INFLUENCE OF RETAINED ATTORNEY ON LIKELIHOOD OF PAROLE
BY REHABILITATION LEVEL
(LINEAR TREND LINES WITH 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL)
?
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FIGURE 6: LIKELIHOOD OF PAROLE AT INITIAL VS. SUBSEQUENT HEARING
BY REHABILITATION LEVEL
(LINEAR TREND LINES WITH 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL)
?
Figure 5 shows that retaining a private attorney tends to improve the
likelihood of parole among candidates with a rehabilitation level of 6.5 or
lower. Figure 6 shows that, at all rehabilitation levels over 1.5, having no
prior experience with the parole board tends to decrease the likelihood of
parole.
Figure 4 shows that the trend lines for Black and non-Black candidates
diverge among candidates in the mid-range of rehabilitation levels, but over-
lap among candidates with either low or high levels on the rehabilitation
index. A candidate with a rehabilitation level of 5.0 would be more likely
than not to be granted parole if he were non-Black, but more likely than not
to be denied parole if he were Black; candidates with rehabilitation levels of
8.0 or more, or 3.0 or less have comparable likelihoods of parole regardless
of race. This pattern is consistent with what has been called the “liberation”
effect; when a decision is not essentially determined by legitimate factors,
decision-makers are more “free” to exercise subjective judgment using race
or other impermissible factors.181
181 See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 142, at 142, 145, 151. A similar divergence pattern in R
racial trend lines was found by the Baldus study relating race, culpability level, and the pre-
dicted probability of a death sentence. Racial disparities did not arise “when the crime was
either extremely aggravated or comparatively free from aggravating circumstances,” but did
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This study’s finding that Black candidates are less likely to be granted
parole is consistent with some prior studies of the impact of race on parole
hearings.182 This finding may support a claim that parole decisions are in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fur-
ther empirical and legal research is necessary here, and reserved for future
work because it is beyond the scope of this single Article.
D. Time-Served Before Being Granted Parole
Thus far, the analysis has considered parole decision outcomes during
the time period of this study, but it has not investigated how much time
candidates tend to serve before being granted parole. Among candidates
granted parole in this sample, the shortest period of time served was ten
years, and the longest period was forty-three years. The thirty-three year
difference here is remarkable. Thirty-three years far exceeds the statutory
minimum sentence for murder in the first-degree in California (twenty-five
years to life). Thirty-three years is also approximately double the amount of
time that any candidate had been alive before being incarcerated.
Some of the difference in this spread of time is attributable to the grav-
ity of the conviction type. As explained above, candidates with graver con-
victions generally must serve a longer period of time before becoming
eligible for the initial parole hearing.183 Figure 7 illustrates the average time-
served by conviction-type among candidates granted and denied parole. Ta-
ble 9 then reports respective differences between the longest period of time-
served and the shortest period of time-served within each conviction-type.
arise when the crime fell in the mid-aggravation range. See also HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 164–67 (1966); MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & DON M. GOTTF-
REDSON, DECISION MAKING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TOWARD THE RATIONAL EXERCISE OF DIS-
CRETION 261 (2d ed. 1988).
182 See, e.g., Beth M. Huebner and Timothy S. Bynum, The Role of Race and Ethnicity in
Parole Decisions, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 907, 926 (2008); Rene´e Gobeil and Ralph C. Serin, Pre-
liminary Evidence of Adaptive Decision Making Techniques Used by Parole Board Members,
8 INT’L J. OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 97; Heinz et al., supra note 11, at 16–17. R
183 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. R
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FIGURE 7: AVERAGE TIME-SERVED BY CONVICTION-TYPE
AND PAROLE DECISION
TABLE 10: SPREAD IN TIME-SERVED AMONG CANDIDATES GRANTED
PAROLE BY CONVICTION-TYPE
Commitment Offense Shortest  Time-Served 
Longest  
Time-Served Difference 
First-degree murder 19 years 43 years 24 years 
Second-degree murder 13 years 28 years 18 years 
Attempted murder 10 years 34 years 15 years 
Sexual offense 19 years 43 years 24 years 
Non-homicide,  
Non-sexual offense 11 years 35 years 24 years 
Figure 7 shows that average time-served does tend to increase with the
gravity of the conviction,184 but Table 10 shows that the spread of time-
served within each conviction-type (twenty-one to twenty-four years) ex-
ceeds the difference between the mean time-served across convictions. The
magnitude of the spread in time-served provides evidence that the cumula-
tive impact of parole decisions over time is both grave and final. Parole
Board decisions can make a difference of decades in punishment, determin-
184 An inverse relationship is found between the gravity of the conviction and the amount
of time-served beyond the statutory minimum period for the conviction-type. Among those
granted parole, candidates convicted of first-degree murder serve, on average, 2.7 years over
the statutory minimum period of incarceration generally imposed for first-degree murder
(twenty-five years). Grantees convicted of second-degree murder serve, on average, 8.7 years
over the statutory minimum period of incarceration for second-degree murder (fifteen years).
Grantees convicted of kidnapping, sexual offenses, or attempted murder tend to serve the most
time over their respective statutory minimum periods of incarceration – approximately thirteen
to fourteen years over the minimum period (seven years).
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ing whether a juvenile will die in prison or have a chance to live as an adult
in society. Second, the comparisons across conviction type show that, in
practice, the Board is exercising more control over the number of years a
person spends in prison than the legislature and the court, which, respec-
tively, set and impose the statutory minimum. In this sense, the back-end
release mechanism is more significant than the initial sentence determina-
tion; the “tail has begun to wag the dog.”185
IV. CASE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA PAROLE HEARINGS:
PROCESS OF DECISION-MAKING
The quantitative evidence presented above demonstrates a risk that pa-
role-release decisions are inadequately responsive to legitimate variables
pertaining to rehabilitation and are unduly responsive to illegitimate vari-
ables. On its own, however, this risk is insufficient to conclude that decision-
making is failing to treat like cases alike. A qualitative analysis is needed to
determine whether the process of decision-making provides sufficient reason
to trust that decision-makers are making decisions consistently despite quan-
titative evidence suggesting the contrary. This section describes the process
of parole-release decision-making and argues that the process does not pro-
vide a strong reason to trust that parole is consistently granted to those who
demonstrated rehabilitation.
A. Traditional Due Process Protections
Parole hearings do not fall under the legal category of criminal proceed-
ings, but are rather categorized as administrative proceedings.186 California
law provides parole candidates with a number of procedural protections,187
but the set of procedural rights constitutionally guaranteed at criminal pro-
ceedings are not required at parole hearings. There is no right to a jury, to
call witnesses, or to cross-examine or confront adverse testimony. There is
no right to a hearing in public; hearings take place in prisons where media
185 In parole systems generally, this phenomenon has been observed, criticized, and cited
as a ground to reform term-to-life sentences. See Edward E. Rhine et al., The Future of Parole
Release: A Ten Point Plan, in MICHAEL TONRY, CRIME AND JUSTICE: REINVENTING AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2017).
186 See LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 31:19 Parole hearings
for life prisoners—Conduct of hearing (“A parole suitability hearing is an administrative pro-
ceeding”); In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 653 (2002) (characterizing Board of Parole
hearings as “administrative agency within the executive branch”), citing Cal. Pen. Code
§§ 3040, 5075 et seq.; see also In re Sturm, 11 Cal. 3d 258, 267 (1974); Greenholtz v. Inmates
of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (characterizing parole-release deci-
sion as administrative decision).
187 See supra notes 87–93 (protections include the right to an in-person hearing, notice of R
that hearing, review of prison file prior to hearing, legal counsel, appointment of legal counsel
if parole candidate is indigent, definitive statement of reasons for parole decision, and tran-
script of hearing).
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and members of the public may observe only if a request is approved by the
Board.188 Victims and victims’ next of kin have a right to be notified about
and attend hearings, but friends, family, or other supporters of the parole
candidate have no right to attend hearings and are prohibited from participat-
ing in the hearing.189
While parole candidates have a right to notice and an in-person hearing
before at least one member of the Board, there is no right to appear before
the full Board or before the Governor who may reverse the decision made at
the hearing.190 Parole candidates have a right to review evidence that is in
their prison file before the hearing,191 but that right is also limited because
the Board may rely on information in a confidential file that cannot be re-
viewed by either the parole candidate or the district attorney.192
The right to an attorney at the parole hearing, and to an appointed attor-
ney if a candidate is indigent, is one of the few procedural rights shared by
criminal defendants and parole candidates. California established a statutory
entitlement to counsel in 1978193 as part of comprehensive changes to the
sentencing and parole system made after research showed significant arbi-
trariness in parole decisions.194 But the right to appointment of counsel is
less robust in practice than in theory. Eighty percent of the study sample was
represented by appointed counsel, and 20% were represented by retained
counsel.195
The appointment and payment of counsel is not done through the court,
as in criminal proceedings, but through the Board. The Board’s fee schedule
compensates attorneys at a rate of no more than $400 total per parole hear-
ing, regardless of the travel distance to the prison, the complexity of the
case, or the length of the hearing (which may be over six hours long).196 No
additional funding is provided for communicating or meeting with the client,
collecting or investigating documents, contacting friends, family, or poten-
188 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §§ 2029.1, 2030.
189 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2029.1
190 See In re Arafiles, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1467, 1480–81 (1992).
191 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.5 (West); In re Olson, 37 Cal. App. 3d 783, 790 (Ct.
App. 1974).
192 See id.; supra note 96 and accompanying text. R
193 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.7 (West 2015).
194 See Garber and Maslach, The Parole Hearing: Decision or Justification?, 1 LAW &
HUMAN BEHAV. 3, 263 (1977); Phillip E. Johnson & Sheldon L. Messinger, California’s Deter-
minate Sentencing Statute: History and Issues, in DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR RE-
GRESSION 261, 263 (1978), https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
2883&context=facpubs, archived at https://perma.cc/6NQK-FZTN.
195 See Appendix, Table A.
196 See In re Poole, 2018 WL 3526684 at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. July 23, 2018) (unpublished)
(ordering an evidentiary hearing to consider whether counsel is inadequate based on declara-
tions from parole hearings and information about the compensation rate); see also Attorney
Invoice, BPH Form 1076, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/BOPH/docs/Invoicing/BPH-1076_Attorney
_Invoice-fillable.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/DH4A-UB5H (showing that attorneys are
compensated $25 for an appointment, $50 for review of the packet of information compiled by
the Board, $75 for review of the Central-File, $75 for a client interview, and $175 for personal
appearance at the parole hearing).
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tial employers, or filing a writ petition to challenge the decision if parole is
denied.197 The attorney is also not compensated for supplementing the record
with mitigating evidence about a client’s background or for obtaining expert
opinions, such as an opinion from an independent expert in psychology or
adolescent development.198
Even the rudimentary task of obtaining and reviewing the trial tran-
script from the underlying conviction is not compensated199 and generally
goes uncompleted.200 One case provides an example of the value of obtaining
and reviewing the trial transcript. In this case, a parole candidate’s version of
the underlying offense was well supported by testimony at trial, but was
inconsistent with facts recorded in police investigation reports upon which
the Board relied.201 When the transcript was not in the record, the Board
denied parole on the ground that it found that the candidate’s version of the
offense was “against the face of reason,” and that he therefore lacked insight
and credibility.202 When the transcript was obtained and introduced at a hear-
ing one year later, the Board did not take issue with the candidate’s credibil-
ity and granted parole.203
The quality of advocacy at parole hearings varies widely among both
appointed and retained attorneys. Examples of zealous advocacy observed in
some transcripts include attorneys raising objections to problematic hearing
procedures, giving a closing argument that brings to bear scientific evidence
about the juvenile brain and explains how each of the “hallmark features of
youth” applies to the client’s case, retaining an expert psychologist to evalu-
ate the client and write an evaluation, and introducing trial transcripts which
demonstrate clear factual errors in the description of the offense relied upon
by the Board. In other cases, attorneys did none of these things. Some attor-
neys affirmatively argued that their clients should not be granted parole. In
one example, an attorney representing the parole candidate stated during
closing arguments, “I think it would be disingenuous of me as his attorney
to ask for parole.”204 In another case, an attorney stated in his closing argu-
ment, “Is he going to participate in antisocial behavior with theft and so
197 See In re Poole, 2018 WL 3526684 at *6.
198 See id.
199 See id.
200 Parole attorneys told the author that the trial transcript is generally not included in the
candidate’s prison file, and when the transcript is absent, the Board takes facts about the crime
from whatever other documents are in the prison file. These documents typically include police
investigation reports, probation reports, and the appellate opinion. See generally California
Board of Parole Hearings, Parole Consideration Transcripts (2014-2015) (on file with author).
201 Author provided legal representation in this case. See California Board of Parole Hear-
ings, Parole Consideration Hearings (February 2016, August 2017) (transcripts on file with
author).
202 See id.
203 See id.
204 See California Board of Parole Hearings, Parole Consideration Hearings (May 2015)
(transcript on file with author).
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forth . . . Who knows . . . I don’t think he’s ready today.”205 In a third case,
the attorney not only argued that his client should not be granted parole but
“would be worth a look at [in] less than ten years.”206
The use of expert opinions is another area in which traditional procedu-
ral protections are curtailed for parole candidates. There is no qualification
procedure for introducing expert reports,207 and California courts have not
recognized a right for parole candidates to confront adverse expert reports
through cross-examination.208 The primary expert opinions used in parole
decisions are the CRA reports completed by the Board’s forensic psycholo-
gists prior to the hearing. In one case, the hearing panel relied on a CRA
report even after acknowledging that the parole candidate had correctly iden-
tified seven factual errors in the CRA—including a false assertion that he
had a prior sexual assault in his record, a statement that he had no GED
despite the presence of a GED certificate in his file, and the wrong name of
the victim.209
The lack of an opportunity to exclude evidence or depose forensic psy-
chologists is also markedly limiting with respect to challenging the reliabil-
ity and legality of the methods psychologists use in the CRAs. The CRAs
use a risk assessment instrument called the Historical-Clinical-Risk Manage-
ment-20, Version 3 (HCR-20-V3)210 which purports to estimate the likeli-
hood of future violence based on factors correlated with violence in studies
on mental health patients and adult offenders.211 The reliability of this instru-
ment as applied to juvenile lifers is unknown; none of the studies used to
design or empirically validate this instrument were conducted on juvenile
205 See California Board of Parole Hearings, Parole Consideration Hearings (February
2015) (transcript on file with author).
206 See id.
207 See In re Buenrostro, No. B264275, 2017 WL 780877, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 28,
2017) (“In determining suitability for parole, the California Code of Regulations provides that
the Board, and therefore the Governor, must consider ‘[a]ll relevant, reliable information’
(§ 2402, subd. (b)) in evaluating whether ‘an inmate continues to pose an unreasonable risk to
public safety.’ (In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 560 (2008)). There is no statement in the Consti-
tution or Penal Code curtailing the Governor’s and Board’s ability to determine what is ‘rele-
vant’ and ‘reliable’ information.”). Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597
(1993).
208 See In re Arafiles, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1467, 1480 (1992) (right to confront adverse wit-
nesses applies to decisions to revoke parole after a prisoner has been released, but has not been
extended to decisions to grant or deny parole).
209 See California Board of Parole Hearings, Parole Consideration Hearings (April 2015)
(transcript on file with author). Since the time period of this study, litigation has led to changes
in the process for appealing errors in the CRA. See Johnson v. Shaffer, No.
212CV1059KJMACP, 2017 WL 4475915, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2017); Isard, supra note
98, at 1234. R
210 See supra note 135. R
211 See Douglas et al., Historical-Clinical-Risk Management-20, Version 3 (HCR-20V3):
Development and Overview, 13 INT’L J. OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 2, 93–108 (2014); see
also Douglas et al., HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme: Overview and Annotated Bib-
liography (2008), http://kdouglas.files.wordpress.com/2006/04/annotate10-24nov2008.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/22E2-7JQX; Isard, supra note 98, at 1244. R
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offenders or people who have served long periods of time in prison.212 The
instrument may actually put juvenile offenders at a disadvantage vis-a`-vis
adult offenders because it uses young age at the time of the crime and a
limited history of employment as factors indicating a relatively higher risk of
future violence.213 These concerns may make the instrument inadmissible
under a state law which mandates that risk assessment instruments used at
youth offender parole hearings must take into account the diminished culpa-
bility of youth and the hallmark features of youth.214 Without the ability to
make motions challenging the admissibility of expert opinion, however,
these concerns go largely unheard.
Finally, California lifer parole decisions are subject to judicial review
under state law.215 A candidate who is denied parole may seek review by
filing a habeas corpus petition; however, there is no right to appointment of
counsel to do so,216 and the cost of hiring an attorney to file a petition is
prohibitive for the vast majority of juvenile lifers.217 Further, the court’s re-
view is “extremely deferential” to the Board, and does not assess the sub-
stantive merits of the decision.218 The court may reverse a decision to deny
parole and send it back to the parole board for a new decision,219 but only if
there is nothing in the record which provides “some evidence,” which has
been interpreted as a “modicum of evidence” of current dangerousness.220
The gravity of the underlying crime cannot “in and of itself” provide some
evidence of current dangerousness.221 The gravity of the crime can, however,
provide evidence of current dangerousness if some other evidence in the
record indicates that the crime remains probative of whether a person is a
212 See Manchak et al., Utility of the Revised Level of Service Inventory (LSI-R) in Predict-
ing Recidivism After Long-Term Incarceration, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 477, 478 (2008). The
author and research assistant investigated samples of all studies that the designers of the HCR-
20 have cited as providing empirical validation for the HCR-20. See Douglas et al., HCR-20
Violence Risk Assessment Scheme, supra note 135. The samples included people who commit-
ted crimes and/or acts of violence as adults. None explicitly included people whose only
crimes were committed as juveniles and who had served a decade or more in prison.
213 See Douglas et al., Historical-Clinical-Risk Management-20, supra note 135, at 98. R
214 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051(f) (West 2017).
215 See In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 547 (2008).
216 See In re Poole, No. A154517, 2018 WL 3526684, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. July 23, 2018),
reh’g denied (Aug. 21, 2018), review denied (Nov. 14, 2018).
217 Conversation with California parole attorney.
218 See In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 210 (Cal. 2002) (judicial review of parole deci-
sions is “extremely deferential and reasonably cannot be compared to the standard of review
involved in undertaking an independent assessment of the merits or in considering whether
substantial evidence supports the findings”).
219 See In re Prather, 234 P.3d 541, 544 (Cal. 2010) (when court grants petition for habeas
corpus and reverses Board decision to deny parole, remedy is for Board to conduct a new
parole hearing).
220 See In re Shaputis II 265 P.3d 253, 267 (Cal. 2011) (proper inquiry for court reviewing
decision to deny parole is to determine whether whole record “discloses some evidence—a
modicum of evidence—supporting the determination that the inmate would pose a danger to
the public if released on parole”).
221 See In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 555 (2008).
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continuing threat to public safety.222 For example, a finding that a parole
candidate lacks sufficient insight into the underlying crime can establish a
rational nexus between the crime and the candidate’s current mental state
which allows the crime to be considered as evidence of current dangerous-
ness.223 Research indicates that, in practice, some appellate courts give the
Board more deference than others.224  But among the courts that hew closely
to the letter of the law stated in the “extremely deferential” standard, deci-
sions to deny parole are reversed only in exceptional cases, where a parole
candidate has a spotless record and the resources to file a strong petition.225
B. Decision-Making Body
The Board’s organizational structure, particularly the fact that most pa-
role decisions are made by one member of the Board, creates a risk of idio-
syncratic decision-making. Aside from the small number of cases reversed
by the full Board or the Governor, the vast majority of the decisions were
made by a single commissioner in consultation with a deputy commis-
sioner.226 The term “Board” is therefore somewhat misleading in describing
the decision-making body at individual parole-release hearings. This small
decision body stands in contrast to parole boards in other states, which have
five or six members making each decision together,227 and in even starker
contrast to a jury of twelve people in criminal cases. Part of the value of a
multi-member decision-making body, whether a jury or multi-member pa-
role board, is that the deliberative process protects against any single indi-
vidual’s opinion being decisive. Placing the decision primarily in one
person’s hands carries a greater risk that decisions will differ based on the
222 See id.; see also In re Shaputis I, 190 P.3d 573, 584 (2008) (aggravated nature of crime
constituted evidence of current dangerousness to uphold where parole candidate was found to
lack insight into a long history of violence).
223 See In re Shaputis I, 190 P.3d at 580.
224 See Charlie Sarosy, Parole Denial Habeas Corpus Petitions: Why the California Su-
preme Court Needs to Provide More Clarity on the Scope of Judicial Review, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 1134, 1171 (2014) (compiling appellate court opinions regarding challenges to parole
denials and finding thirty-six cases in which the court applied the extremely deferential stan-
dard; also finding twenty-one cases in which the court applied a less deferential standard).
225 See generally id. at Table 5 (finding that among the thirty-six cases in which the appel-
late court applied the extremely deferential standard, the court reversed the parole decision in
only four instances).
226 California’s parole statute indicates that the hearing panel is to consist of at least one
commissioner, but that it is the Legislature’s intent that, when there is “no backlog of inmates
awaiting hearings,” the hearings shall be conducted by a panel of three or more members, the
majority of which are commissioners. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041 (West 2017).
227 See, e.g., Alaska, http://www.correct.state.ak.us/Parole/pdf/handbook.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/DS2K-P6PR; Colorado, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/paroleboard/faq-0,
archived at https://perma.cc/95K5-W6VC; Georgia, https://www.schr.org/files/parole_hand
book.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/4W4L-DCG8; Mississippi Miss. Code. Ann. § 47-7-13
(West); Oklahoma, https://www.ok.gov/ppb/Parole_Process/index.html, archived at https://per
ma.cc/E45Z-WDAP.
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idiosyncrasies of one decision-maker to the next.228 Differences in commis-
sioners’ respective grant rates reflect some of this variability: transcripts ana-
lyzed in this study showed that one commissioner granted parole in 14% of
the fourteen hearings she presided over, whereas another commissioner
granted parole in 74% of the twenty-three hearings she presided over. An-
other concern about having a sole member of the Board make these deci-
sions is that this unilateral structure limits the extent to which the decision-
maker is representative of the community. Although the California statute
requires that commissioners reflect the racial, sexual, economic, and geo-
graphic diversity of California, this diversity is not reflected in any given
case because only one member makes the decision alone.229
These concerns could be mitigated by the Board’s decision-review pro-
cess, but the operation of that process in practice is not particularly promis-
ing. After the panel present at the hearing makes a decision, the Board’s
internal Decision Review Unit reviews decisions and may recommend a
modification to the decision.230 If a modification is recommended, the matter
is referred to the full Board, which may rescind or overturn the decision en
banc.231 The matter is referred to the Governor who has the authority to re-
verse the decision in all and only murder cases.232 While the Board and Gov-
ernor have authority to modify the decision in either direction, in this study
set they used this power only to reverse decisions granting parole. In this
study set, an estimated 5% of decisions to grant parole were reversed by the
Board en banc, and 11% of decisions to grant parole were reversed by the
Governor.233 The unidirectional nature of review by both the full Board and
the Governor suggests that the review process functions not as an impartial
check on fairness across decisions, but rather as an additional barrier to be-
ing granted parole.
An additional concern about the structure of the decision-making body
is its susceptibility to political influence. Lifer parole hearings are conducted
by Board commissioners who the Governor appoints for three-year terms,234
and due to the periodic nature of appointment, the Governor can change the
entire composition of the Board within the four-year gubernatorial term. In
addition to appointment power, the Governor can also exert power over the
Board by reversing its decisions to grant parole in murder cases. Governors
have varied considerably in the rate at which they reverse Board decisions;
for example, Governor Davis reversed 97% of the Board’s decisions to grant
228 See generally Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 489 (1984) (sentencing decisions
made by a body of jurors are more reflective of community values than decisions made by a
single judge).
229 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 5075 (West 2018).
230 See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, § 2041(h).
231 See id. The Board may reverse or rescind a decision on the basis of an error of law, an
error of fact, or new information. See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, § 2042.
232 See Cal. Const. art. V, § 8.
233 See supra notes 115 and 116. R
234 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 5075 (West 2018).
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parole, whereas in 2015, Governor Brown reversed 14% of the Board’s deci-
sions to grant parole.235
The sensitivity to political pressure is heightened by the structural bal-
ance of risks in play at parole hearings. Given that public opinion is not
sympathetic to parole candidates (and that parole candidates are often disen-
franchised), there is little to lose in the court of public opinion by denying
parole. On the other hand, politicians, as well as Board members, have a
great deal of political capital to lose by granting parole to a candidate; there
is always a risk that the person will later commit a crime, and if that hap-
pens, public opinion can turn against the decision-makers.236 As California
Supreme Court Justice Moreno has put the point, “The Board’s commission-
ers . . . have little to gain and potentially much to lose by granting parole,
and accordingly, the incentive to give only pro forma consideration to the
parole decision is strong.”237
C. Substantive Legal Standard
The legal standard at parole hearings is shaped primarily by statute and
is further informed by administrative regulations and case law. The parole
statute provides that the Board “shall normally” grant parole after a parole
candidate has served the minimum period of incarceration required by the
sentence,238 unless the Board determines that the candidate “continues to
pose an unreasonable risk to public safety.”239 The Board follows adminis-
trative regulations that set forth, among other things, lists of reasons that
generally support finding a candidate suitable or unsuitable for parole.240  In
interpreting the parole statute, the California Supreme Court has made clear
that while the administrative regulations provide guidance, the ultimate
question is whether the parole candidate poses a current danger to the com-
munity; if the Board finds that the candidate is not currently dangerous, pa-
role must be granted.241 The facts of the crime and any pre-conviction history
prior to the crime cannot, on their own, support a denial of parole.242 Such
235 See Young et al., supra note 59, at 269. R
236 See Alexander K. Mircheff, In Re Dannenberg: California Forgoes Meaningful Judi-
cial Review of Parole Denials, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 907, 939 n.222 (2006), citing Jean Ar-
nold, California’s Secret Judges, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 20, 2000, at A1 (“Since 1988, when ads
featuring Willie Horton, a furloughed Massachusetts convict who wrought havoc on a young
couple, sabotaged the presidential prospects of Michael Dukakis, California governors have
feared that one wrongly paroled felon could wipe out a lifetime of strategic political
planning.”).
237 In re Dannenberg, 104 P.3d 783, 809 (Cal. 2005) (Moreno, J., dissenting) (internal
citations omitted).
238 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041 (a)(2) (West 2017).
239 See In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 560 (Cal. 2008).
240 See CAL. CODE REG., tit. 15, § 2402 (2001).
241 See In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d at 554 (current dangerousness is the “overriding” ques-
tion for the Board).
242 See id. at 563–64.
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facts can, however, support a denial of parole if the parole candidate is found
to lack insight into the crime, or if there is another rational nexus between
the crime and current attitudes or recent conduct.243
Importantly, this legal standard is designed to focus the Board’s atten-
tion on current dangerousness. As an initial matter, this legal standard of
dangerousness is remarkably vague. As discussed infra at Part V.B, the lack
of specificity permits officials to interpret the standard in ways that lead to
inconsistent outcomes across cases.244 Discussion of disciplinary history in
parole hearing transcripts provides a concrete example of how the breadth
and ambiguity in the Board’s governing standard on dangerousness permits
commissioners to differ widely in their assessments. For example, one hear-
ing panel in 2015 asked over ten questions regarding a disciplinary write-up
for possession of a cellphone in 2012.245 It was the candidate’s only discipli-
nary write-up since 1996, and there was no evidence of any write-ups for
violent conduct mentioned in the transcript. The candidate explained that he
used the cellphone to cope with disappointment after being denied parole at
the previous hearing. In the decision to deny parole, the commissioner cited
the disciplinary write-up as a reason for denial, stating: “[Y]ou know when
you can have something minor happen like that and you do what you did,
you become unpredictable. Because the rules and regulations in here, you’re
under 24/7. When you get into the community, it’s not 24/7.”246 In contrast, a
hearing panel in 2014 had a very different response to a person who had a
disciplinary write-up for possession of a cellphone in 2012, and who had a
prior disciplinary write-up in 2011.247 The hearing panel asked two questions
regarding the write-up for possession of a cellphone and granted parole.
In the reasons for decision, the commissioner stated: “You’ve remained dis-
ciplinary-free – it hasn’t been too long, so a little over a year, 2012 . . .
with the cell phone, but of note is that you’ve had no violence-related
violations.”248
A second problem posed by the overarching legal standard of “danger-
ousness” is that it tends to focus the Board on the aim of predicting future
conduct, and, as discussed supra at Part II.B.1, this predictive aim is distinct
from the aim of evaluating whether a candidate has demonstrated rehabilita-
tion. This difference poses a problem with respect to juvenile lifers, but that
243 See In re Shaputis, 190 P.3d 573, 584–85 (Cal. 2008).
244 See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556–57 (2015) (“The prohibition of
vagueness in criminal statutes ‘is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary
notions of fair play and the settled rules of law,’ . . . these principles apply not only to statutes
defining elements of crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences.”); see also Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
245 See California Board of Parole Hearings, Parole Consideration Hearing (March 2015)
(transcript on file with author).
246 Id.
247 See California Board of Parole Hearings, Parole Consideration Hearing (October 2014)
(transcript on file with author).
248 Id.
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problem could theoretically be addressed by the Youth Offender Parole
Law’s mandate that the Board shall “give great weight to” the diminished
culpability of youth, the hallmark features of youth, and to subsequent
growth and maturity.249 This mandate has a potential to act as a safeguard
that focuses the Board’s decision-making on evaluating improvement in be-
havior from childhood to adulthood; that is, on demonstrated rehabilitation.
As explained below, however, the “great weight” mandate does not appear
to be functioning this way in practice.
First, the phrase “great weight” is too vague to act as a reliable safe-
guard. When the California legislature used this phrase in a statute in a dif-
ferent context, the California Supreme Court held that the phrase was, on its
own, too vague to be applied consistently, and set forth a more specific inter-
pretation.250 The Court has yet to specify the meaning of “great weight” in
the context of juvenile lifer parole, but it granted a petition for review that is
likely to address that question in 2019.251
Second, there is an underlying conceptual tension between the Board’s
existing regulations for granting parole and the “great weight” mandate.
Under the Board’s existing regulations, a history of being abused and living
in a criminogenic environment as a child are factors that tend to favor deny-
ing parole.252 The reasoning is that some research on adult offenders shows a
correlation between these factors and violent conduct. The Board treats these
factors as evidence to predict that a person is more likely to commit future
violence, and thus less suitable for parole. In contrast, the law flowing from
Miller is clear that a history of abuse, a criminogenic environment, and neg-
ative peer influence are mitigating factors in considering culpability and the
appropriate sentence for a juvenile.253 Under this law coupled with basic con-
siderations of fairness, evidence of a horrific childhood should not be a rea-
son to deny parole. A person can do nothing to change his childhood history;
it would be non sequitur to say that a person with a horrific childhood has, in
virtue of that childhood, failed to demonstrate rehabilitation as an adult.
249 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c) (2018).
250 See People v. Martin, 42 Cal. 3d 437 (1986); see also People v. Martin, 210 Cal. Rptr.
468, 477 (1985) (Kline, J., dissenting), vacated, 42 Cal. 3d 437 (1986) (explaining if left
unexplained by the court, the formulation of “great weight” is “too vague to be meaningfully
and consistently applied” and its ambiguity is destined to “devitalize . . . the basic concept of
equal justice”).
251 See In re Palmer, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 59, 71 (2019) (unpublished), review granted, In re
Palmer, 433 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2019). The Court of Appeals opinion in that case held that giving
“great weight” means granting parole unless there is substantial evidence of countervailing
considerations and the Board satisfactorily explains that evidence. See In re Palmer, 238 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 59, 74 (2018). Another appellate decision has clarified that giving “great weight” to
the mitigating facts of youth and subsequent growth and maturity means more than providing
“lip service” to these factors. See In re Poole, 24 Cal. App. 5th 965 (2018).
252 See CAL. CODE OF REGS., tit. 15, § 2402 (c).
253 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); see also People v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal.
4th 1354, 1389 (2014).
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This tension between the Board’s regulations and the Miller factors is
unresolved. The result in practice is that in any given case, a member of the
Board may unilaterally decide to use evidence of a horrific childhood as
favoring either a grant or a denial of parole. A history of abuse, trauma, or
other instability in childhood was cited as a reason supporting the denial of
parole in 59% of the Board’s decisions to deny parole. For example, in justi-
fying a parole decision, a commissioner stated: “You were an individual per
Subsection C3 who possessed an unstable and tumultuous social history.
This is evidenced by your relationship with family members, your mother
subjecting you to physical and emotional abuse, [and] her drug and alcohol
addictions. You being subjected to group homes at an early age, foster
homes, you dropping out of school at the tenth grade, living a transient lifes-
tyle [sic].” In another case, however, a commissioner used the same type of
evidence to support a decision to grant parole, stating: “[We saw] the insta-
bility you had in your social history. You had limited control over your envi-
ronment. You could not remove yourself from that environment, obviously,
because you were only 16 years old.”254
In addition, the governing legal standard is vague in how it treats the
Board’s assessment of insight among juvenile lifers. As discussed supra, Part
II.B, insight is a term used by the Board to describe the degree to which a
person has taken responsibility for past criminal conduct and has understood
his own particular causative factors that led to that conduct.255 Insight has
been criticized as a vague and ambiguous concept in the general California
parole context, but its ambiguity is heightened in the juvenile lifer context.
The requirement that a candidate clearly understand and articulate his partic-
ular “causative factors” is in tension with recognition that juvenile’s brains
are not fully developed, so their behavior is more likely to be impulsive and
thus less explicable. In explaining why children do what they do, the expla-
nation may be incomplete without saying that kids are kids—they are often
not thinking about what it is that they are doing.256 To put it simply: for a
child, a decent answer to the question, “What were you thinking?” is often,
“Clearly I wasn’t.”
In some cases, parole commissioners do not fault candidates if they say
there is no complete explanation for their conduct because they were a youth
at the time. In other cases, however, commissioners fault such candidates’
incomplete explanations for behavior as showing a lack of insight, or on
254 California Board of Parole Hearings, Parole Consideration Hearing (May 2015) (tran-
script on file with author).
255 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. R
256 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471–72 (“‘developments in psychology and brain science con-
tinue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds’—for example, in
‘parts of the brain involved in behavior control’ . . . [there are] findings of transient rashness,
proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences”) (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 68
(2010)).
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grounds that their conduct was worse because their motives were trivial.257
For example, one commissioner stated: “we couldn’t say you’re still a current
unreasonable risk of danger today at 42, because you were unable to explain
to us at 13 why you decided to become a criminal street gang member.” In
contrast, another candidate was faulted for lacking insight into why, at age
38, he did not give a complete explanation for why he joined a gang at age
13. The candidate, who had grown up on the streets of South Central Los
Angeles, explained that gang members all around him pressured him to join
and that joining the gang was a foolish thing to do. In denying parole, the
commissioner reasoned that this explanation was insufficient, saying:
“Why? What were the causative factors? What got you to do that? . . .
frankly, sir, I was looking more towards, ‘I was self-centered. I was selfish. I
was only thinking about my own needs, nobody else’s. I was a monster in
my community.’” 258
Given the vagueness and inherent tensions underlying the Board’s guid-
ing standards, they are ill equipped to help the Board make decisions that are
consistent with respect to a measure of rehabilitation. These inadequate stan-
dards, in conjunction with the relatively weak procedural protections and the
structure of the decision-making body, provide little reason to believe that
parole will be consistently granted to those who demonstrate comparable
rehabilitation.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
If the California juvenile lifer parole system continues to operate as it
did during this study period, it is arguably unconstitutional on the three
grounds described below. To be clear, these are all arguments that the system
as a whole is unconstitutional due to evidence of arbitrariness in decision-
making.  In addition to these arguments, individuals may have arguments
that their continued incarceration violates the Eighth Amendment on propor-
tionality grounds.259 Omitted from discussion here is an argument under the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that could be based
on the evidence of racial disparity in parole decisions. As stated supra, this
argument is reserved for future research because its complexity demands
attention beyond the scope of this Article.
257 The Board’s administrative regulations state that the offense tends to favor denying
parole especially when the motive is “inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.”
CAL. CODE OF REGS., tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1)(E). At some hearings, the lack of a motive for the
crime was not cited as a reason tending to favor a denial of parole, but rather as evidence that
the crime resulted from youthful impulsivity. But at other hearings, the same recklessness and
impulsivity at the time of the crime was cited as a reason to deny parole.
258 California Board of Parole Hearings, Parole Consideration Hearing (September 2014)
(transcript on file with author).
259 See, e.g., In re Palmer, 245 Cal. Rptr. 3d 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019).
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A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment, as Applied
The Supreme Court has only once held that a system of punishment
violates the Eighth Amendment if it is applied in an arbitrary and capricious
manner. This holding came in 1972, when the Supreme Court struck down
the death penalty as unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia.260 After explain-
ing the Furman line of cases below, this Part argues that the evidence pro-
vided in this study shows that juvenile lifer parole decisions are as arbitrary
and capricious as death penalty decisions were in Furman. Insofar as the
analogy between death penalty sentences and parole-release decisions is apt,
the California juvenile lifer parole system would violate the Eighth Amend-
ment as applied.
Justice Douglas’s opinion in Furman explained why a punishment that
is applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner violates the Eighth Amend-
ment.261 He showed that the Amendment has roots in English law that pro-
hibited wide variation in fines for the same offenses.262 As Justice Douglas
explained, “The high service rendered by the cruel and unusual punishment
clause is to require legislatures to write penal laws that are evenhanded,
nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that general
laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular
groups.”263 Justice Douglas emphasized that the principle of equal treatment
under law is implicit in the Eighth Amendment; it is cruel and unusual to
apply a penalty to those “whom society is willing to see suffer though it
would not countenance general application of the same penalty across the
board.”264
In Furman, the court was presented with evidence that legitimate fac-
tors could not adequately explain why some defendants received the death
penalty whereas others received non-capital sentences. Justice White high-
lighted the lack of a “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which [death] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”265 Justice
Brennan echoed this conclusion, stating that “[n]o one has yet suggested a
rational basis that could differentiate . . . the few who die from the many
who go to prison.”266 The Justices also relied on evidence that illegitimate
reasons like race and class appeared to influence capital sentencing out-
comes. Justice Douglas discussed a Texas study which found that poor peo-
ple with limited education were over-represented in the class of people who
260 Each of the five justices concurring in the Furman decision wrote a separate opinion;
three justices maintained that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment in its applica-
tion, and two justices reasoned that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment both on
its face and as applied.
261 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 242–43 (Douglas, J., concurring).
262 See id.
263 Id. at 256.
264 Id. at 245.
265 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
266 Id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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were executed, and that, among pairs of co-defendants, there were several
instances in which Black co-defendants were sentenced to death whereas
white co-defendants were given non-capital sentences.267 Justice Marshall
cited the fact that of all people executed across the country since 1930, 1,751
were white and 2,066 were African-American.268
No member of the plurality claimed that empirical evidence offered
proof that death penalty decisions were motivated by illegitimate reasons
like race or class, but they each agreed that the evidence showed a risk that
decisions were arbitrary.269 The next question was whether the gravity of this
risk established an Eighth Amendment violation. The Justices considered the
gravity of the risk in light of the process by which death penalty decisions
were made. They relied on the fact that, at that time in Georgia, jurors were
“wholly unguided by standards” when deciding whether to impose death
sentences.270 Given this decision procedure, the justices reasoned that there
was an unacceptably high risk that death penalty decisions were made arbi-
trarily, and struck down the death penalty sentencing scheme as unconstitu-
tional in application.
In the wake of Furman, Georgia and other states amended their death
penalty statutes to include a number of provisions designed to function as
safeguards against arbitrary decision-making. In Gregg, the Court held that
the safeguards in Georgia’s amended statute allowed the death penalty to be
reinstated at that time.271 The Court did not bestow “permanent approval on
the Georgia system. It simply held that the State’s statutory safeguards were
assumed sufficient to channel discretion without evidence otherwise.”272
That assumption was challenged in McCleskey, in which the defendant relied
upon an empirical study conducted by David Baldus which showed that a
defendant was 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty in Georgia
if the victim was white rather than Black.273 The majority and dissent agreed
that although the Baldus study did not prove that racial bias played a causal
role in any individual case, it did establish a risk that the race of the victim
influenced death penalty decisions.
The majority and dissent in McCleskey vehemently disagreed, however,
on whether the degree of risk shown by the study was acceptable when con-
sidered in light of existing statutory safeguards. In an opinion that several
scholars have criticized as the Court’s worst mistake since Plessy v. Fergu-
son,274 the majority held that the risk of racial bias shown by the study was
267 See id. at 251–52 (Douglas, J., concurring).
268 See id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring).
269 See id. at 368.
270 Id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,
196–208 (1971)).
271 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976).
272 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 338 (1987).
273 See id. at 287.
274 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See, e.g., John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Unholy Parallels Between McCleskey v. Kemp and Plessy v. Ferguson: Why Mc-
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not high enough to violate the Eighth Amendment.275 Emphasizing the ro-
bustness of the procedural protections instituted post-Furman, the majority
held that the Baldus study was not strong enough evidence to shake the
presumption that jurors exercised discretion in a non-biased manner.276 In
contrast, the dissent maintained that the presumption of fairness should be
rebuttable on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence, and that the
Baldus study met that standard.277
The court did not have any statistical evidence when it decided Furman,
but in EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990), David Baldus and
his co-authors provide statistical measures of the extent to which Georgia
death penalty decisions tracked (or failed to track) levels of culpability in the
pre-Furman era as compared to the years following Gregg and preceding
McCleskey [the post-Gregg era].278 The Baldus team coded information
from thousands of murder cases and death penalty decisions, and constructed
a culpability index that measured relative culpability among death penalty
defendants. Then they plotted the actual death penalty decisions along their
constructed index of culpability. Figure 3 in Part V.A, supra, used an analo-
gous technique by constructing a rehabilitation index and plotting actual pa-
role-release decisions along that index.
In the pre-Furman era, the Baldus team found that 61% of death-sen-
tence cases had a lower culpability level than “normal” life-sentenced cases
(i.e. they had culpability levels lower than the ninety-fifth percentile of life-
sentence cases).279 This finding means that the majority of the people who
were sent to death (specifically 61% of them) did not appear to be any more
culpable than people who normally received life sentences.  Whatever was
making the difference between whether a person received life or death, it did
not appear to be culpability. In the post-Gregg era, however, the Baldus
study found that the majority of people sentenced to death did appear to be
more culpable than those who normally received life.  Specifically, 29% of
people sentenced to death had culpability levels lower than the ninety-fifth
percentile of cases in which a life sentence was imposed.280
On this measure, the California juvenile lifer parole system more
closely resembles the pre-Furman Georgia death penalty system than it does
the post-Gregg system. The data in Figure 3 shows that among the full set of
Cleskey (Still) Matters, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 63 (2012); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimina-
tion, Death, and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death
Penalty, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE 211, 236 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. &
Austin Sarat, eds., 2006); Bryan Stevenson, Keynote Address by Mr. Bryan Stevenson, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1699, 170 (2004).
275 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313.
276 See id.
277 See id. at 337–38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
278 See supra note 142. R
279 See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 142, at 80–83. The calculation is based on a set of 292
cases, forty-four of which were given the death penalty.
280 See id. at 91. The calculation is based on a set of 483 cases, 112 of which were given
the death penalty.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\54-2\HLC202.txt unknown Seq: 69 28-JUN-19 13:22
2019] A Stone of Hope 523
426 candidates, 48% of denied candidates had rehabilitation levels at or
above the rehabilitation levels of normal grantees.  Among the more selec-
tive set of 334 candidates who had rehabilitation levels over 1.0, 74% of
denied candidates had rehabilitation levels at or above normal grantees.
To determine whether the evidence of inconsistency here rises to the
level of arbitrary and capricious decision-making under the Eighth Amend-
ment, the process by which parole decisions are made needs to be evaluated
and compared to the process by which death penalty decisions are made.
Parole-release decisions at juvenile lifer parole hearings are made without
clear standards and without most of the procedural protections available at a
death penalty trial. As discussed supra, parole hearings are conducted be-
hind closed doors, witnesses cannot be called, and decisions are made by
one commissioner and a deputy rather than a jury. The process for making
parole-release decisions does not—as it did in McCleskey—provide confi-
dence that decisions are non-arbitrary in spite of the pattern of arbitrariness
observed in quantitative analysis of outcomes. On the contrary, as in
Furman, the process of decision-making here seems to confirm the pattern of
arbitrariness in outcomes. Accordingly, there is a strong argument that juve-
nile lifer parole decisions in California are arbitrary and capricious as ap-
plied under the Eighth Amendment. The remedy for such a violation would
be to establish clear standards to govern juvenile lifer parole decisions, as
well as to improve procedural protections. These remedies, discussed in Part
VI would also address the other constitutional deficiencies under the Four-
teenth Amendment as described below.
B. Void for Vagueness
A criminal statute violates the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due pro-
cess if it is written in so vague a manner that “it fails to give ordinary people
fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or [is] so standardless that it invites
arbitrary enforcement.”281 Courts have generally invoked this constitutional
protection, referred to as the void-for-vagueness doctrine, in striking statutes
that either define the elements of crimes or set sentences in vague terms.282
While the parole statute at issue in California is not technically a statute that
imposes a sentence, it functionally operates in that manner because it deter-
mines whether a person will serve less than twenty years in prison or more
than forty years in prison.283 A functional rather than formalistic reading of
the statute would therefore subject it to scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment
void for vagueness doctrine. Regardless of whether Fifth Amendment scru-
281 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556–57 (2015) (citing Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983)).
282 Id. at 2557.
283 See supra Table 10: Spread in Time-Served Among Candidates Granted Parole by
Conviction-Type.
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tiny applies, the statute would be subject to scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause.284
The Court has explained that a core value underlying the void for
vagueness doctrine, under either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, is to
prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by ensuring that laws pro-
vide explicit standards to those who apply them. “A vague law impermissi-
bly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application.”285 Given that parole board mem-
bers effectively decide whether a person will serve under twenty years rather
than upwards of four decades in prison, “parole board members” should be
included in the list alongside police, judges, and juries.
The study above provides evidence that the length of time a person
spends in prison, or whether the person is ever released from prison, is not
determined by explicit standards that are applied in the same way across
cases. Rather, release is determined by individual Board member’s assess-
ments under a vague “current dangerousness” standard, which is compli-
cated by an equally vague requirement to give “great weight” to the
mitigating factors of youth. The breadth of the term “dangerousness” as
used by the Board stands in contrast to the more narrowly specified meaning
of dangerousness in other parts of California law. Other parts of California
law define dangerousness as a substantial risk of committing violence or
causing physical harm to one’s self or others; under that definition, uncer-
tainty about whether a person will comply with rules is not “dangerous-
ness.”286 As discussed supra at Part IV.C, one Board member may find a
parole candidate dangerous only if he poses a threat of violence to others,
284 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 107 (1972) (anti-picketing ordinance
void for vagueness under Fourteenth Amendment).
285 Id. at 108–09.
286 In Conservatorship of Hofferber, 28 Cal. 3d 161, 176 (1980), the California Supreme
Court recognized a common thread in the meaning of “dangerousness” across various Califor-
nia statutes: that dangerousness involved a risk of harming others. The Court recognized this
meaning across a wide variety of statutes: “§1800 [extended commitment of Youth Authority
inmate ‘physically dangerous to the public’ because of ‘mental or physical deficiency, disorder,
or abnormality’]; §5304 [90-day civil commitment of one who has attempted or inflicted phys-
ical harm ‘and who, as a result of mental disorder, presents an imminent threat of substantial
physical harm to others’]; §6300 [MDSO defined as one whose ‘mental defect, disease, or
disorder’ predisposes him to sexual offense ‘to such a degree that he is dangerous to the health
and safety of others’]; §6316.2 [extended commitment of MDSO whose mentally disordered
propensity for sex offenses presents a ‘substantial danger of bodily harm to others’]; §6500
[commitment of mentally retarded person who is a ‘danger to himself or others’].” Reviewing
these various specifications of dangerousness, the Court decided to adopt a definition of dan-
gerousness in Hofferber that required finding that a person “represents a substantial danger of
physical harm to others.” Id. at 176–77. Further, while not using the term “danger,” Proposi-
tion 47 defines “an unreasonable risk to public safety” as an unreasonable risk of committing
“eight types of particularly serious or violent felonies, known colloquially as ‘super strikes.’”
But see People v. Valencia, 3 Cal. 5th 347, 354 (2017) (affirming “unreasonable risk to public
safety” as standard judges are to use in deciding petitions for resentencing under Proposition
36).
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whereas in another hearing a Board member may find a candidate dangerous
because of a lack of predictability about whether a candidate will comply
with all the technical rules of parole.
As discussed supra at Part III, the study offers evidence that, in the
absence of clear standards, there is a substantial risk that officials are engag-
ing in arbitrary and discriminatory decision-making. Of critical importance
here is the fact that Black candidates face significantly lower prospects of
parole when disciplinary history and participation in programs are held con-
stant,287 and when a regression is run that accounts for fifteen other vari-
ables.288 In addition, candidates who lack funds to hire private attorneys face
lower prospects of parole, and there is reason to believe that this impact is
magnified among those with cognitive deficits or less than a high-school
level of education.289  And at a higher level of abstraction, the people who
are far more likely to have received life sentences as juveniles in the first
place, and therefore be subject to the discretion of the parole board, are peo-
ple of color who were growing up as children in the country’s most deeply
impoverished neighborhoods.290
We would do well to remember here the words of Justice Douglas in
holding that vagrancy laws were void for vagueness: “[Vagrancy statutes]
are nets making easy the roundup of so-called undesirables. But the rule of
law implies equality and justice in its application . . . . The rule of law,
evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well to the
rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together.”291  Here it appears
that law, unevenly applied, is not glue that is holding society together, but is
instead contributing to a barrier that keeps those deemed undesirable apart.
C. Procedural Due Process
Following its jurisprudence established in Greenholtz, the Supreme
Court has held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to California’s parole statute, but that it requires only minimal protec-
tions that are already offered at California parole hearings (an in-person
hearing and a statement of reasons).292 The amount of process that is consti-
tutionally required in juvenile lifer parole decisions, however, should be
higher than the baseline articulated in Greenholtz.293
287 See supra Table 1, Table 2.
288 See supra Table 8.
289 See supra Table 4, Figure 5.
290 See MEHTA, supra note 5 at 21–24. R
291 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972).
292 See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011).
293 See Matthew Drecun, Cruel and Unusual Parole, 95 TEX. L. REV. 707, 733 (2017)
(arguing that procedural protections should be more robust at parole hearings for people who
were juveniles at the time of the crime).
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To determine what procedural protections are needed under the due pro-
cess clause, courts use the Mathews v. Eldridge three-part balancing test.294
The test looks to the nature of the private interest at stake, the extent to
which procedures can reduce the risk of error in decisions, and the public
interest at stake. On the basis of the first factor, the liberty interest among
juvenile lifers is more pressing than that of the petitioners in Greenholtz
because release for juvenile lifers entails not only liberty from prison, but
their very first and only opportunity to live as an adult in society—including
the opportunity to vote, to own property, to work for a living wage, to live
with a partner, and to have children. Further, in Greenholtz, prisoners before
the parole board were seeking early release from sentences that were valid
regardless of the availability or structure of parole-release. In contrast,
whether or not juvenile life sentences are constitutional depends directly
on the availability of release on parole. Juvenile lifers are not seeking the
privilege of early release, but are expecting fulfillment of the Eighth Amend-
ment’s promise that they will be released if they demonstrate rehabilita-
tion.295 In this sense, the private interest at stake at juvenile lifer hearings is
not only an interest in liberty, but an interest in not being subjected to pro-
longed unconstitutional punishment.296
In addition to considering the gravity of this liberty interest, the Ma-
thews test also requires weighing the public’s interest and the likelihood that
procedures would reduce the risk of error in decision-making. A problem
arises, as it did in Greenholtz, in assessing the risk of error:  how does a
court determine “error” in any given parole decision when the standards for
granting parole are so broad and amorphous?
First, the proposal for reform advanced below is not that parole deci-
sions should remain ungoverned by clear standards but nevertheless be sub-
ject to robust procedural protections. Rather, the argument is that the study
shows a need for clear standards to be established at juvenile lifer parole
294 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (“[I]dentification of the specific
dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the pri-
vate interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”)
295 See Russell & Denholtz, supra note 3; Hawkins v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. R
Supervision, 30 N.Y.S. 3d 397, 400–01 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); Atwell v. State of Florida, 197
So. 3d 1040, 1050 (Fla. 2016); Hayden v. Keller, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1009 (E.D.N.C.
2015); Greiman v. Hodges, 79 F. Supp. 3d 933, 940, 944 (S.D. Iowa 2015).
296 At stake in juvenile lifer parole hearings is also compliance with the Eighth Amend-
ment. If a rehabilitated juvenile lifer is denied, the denial means both a loss of expected liberty
as well as continued incarceration that violates the Eighth Amendment. In this way, parole
decisions are subject not only to due process scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, but
also to what has been called “super due process” scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. See
Russell, supra note 4, at 416–17.
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hearings.297 When those standards are in place, more robust procedural pro-
tections will be called for under a traditional application of the Mathews
inquiry.298
Second, even without a particularized standard of rehabilitation, the
study above has certainly provided evidence of a risk of error in decisions.
The risk is that decisions are being influenced by factors such as race and
ability to hire a private attorney that are unrelated to rehabilitation. The risk
is also that decisions are based on false information. For example, candidates
who are denied based on confidential information have no idea whether the
information in the confidential file is true or false. Transcripts showed evi-
dence of parole board members relying on statements in police reports that
were flatly contradicted by sworn trial testimony,299 on CRA reports that
contain multiple factual errors,300 and which rely on a risk assessment tool
that has not been validated on a population of people whose criminal history
is limited to crimes as juveniles.301 The procedural protections described be-
low would reduce the risk of these types of errors.
VI. A STONE OF HOPE: REFORMING THE PAROLE PROCESS
This section outlines three types of reforms that the legislature or the
parole board itself could take to improve consistency in parole decision-
making.  Three basic types of reforms are proposed below: cabining discre-
tion, improving the exercise of discretion, and establishing oversight over
discretion. These proposals draw upon the study presented above, the history
of parole reform in other jurisdictions, and scholarship on how other admin-
istrative agencies have improved consistency in decision-making. Notably,
the reforms are not mutually exclusive; a legislature, or the parole board,
could adopt one, some, or all of the reforms. Further, these reforms need not
297 A potential objection might be that rehabilitation is such an amorphous concept that it
is in fact impossible to establish particularized standards that a parole board could apply in an
objective way. The objection may be correct in that perfect standards are likely impossible, but
in Justice Brennan’s words, “[t]he impossibility of perfect standards [does not] justif[y] mak-
ing no attempt whatsoever to control lawless action.”  Legislatures and courts have con-
structed objective standards of correctness in areas where the underlying concepts are no less
complex than rehabilitation: culpability, causation, and intent, to name just a few. These stan-
dards are constructed not because the underlying concepts have a neatly discernable structure
that legislators and judges can aptly capture, but because standards are needed to assure even-
handed treatment from one party to the next.
298 See Kimberly Thomas & Paul Reingold, From Grace to Grids: Rethinking Due Pro-
cess Protections for Parole, 107 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 213 (2017) (arguing that the mini-
mal procedural protections required in Greenholtz would be insufficient under the Due Process
Clause in jurisdictions that have since adopted more clearly objective standards for parole-
release decisions).
299 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. R
300 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. R
301 See generally California Board of Parole Hearings, Parole Consideration Transcripts
(2014-2015) (on file with author).
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be limited to juvenile lifer parole decisions, but could extend to parole-re-
lease decisions generally.
A. Cabin Discretion
The first and most expansive technique for reform is to cabin the sheer
amount of discretion that agency adjudicators wield. Cabining discretion
was the primary mode of reform that many parole boards took in response to
hard-hitting criticism in the 1970s.302 Evidence at the time indicated that pa-
role board decisions were arbitrary in the sense that they were either irra-
tional (based on no criteria), or were influenced by racial or class bias.303 The
federal Parole Board initially responded to this criticism by adopting a
Guideline Table which determined how much time a person should serve in
prison before being released on parole; the amount of time was based on the
seriousness of the offense and a “salient factor score” (which was in turn
based on the age, criminal history, and static data points about parole candi-
dates that were statistically correlated with successful completion of pa-
role).304 The parole board was required to release people from prison during
the timeframes set in the Guideline Table, and could depart from those
timeframes based on stated aggravating or mitigating factors which included
institutional misconduct, participation in rehabilitation programs, and the un-
derlying offense.305 After several years, the federal parole system was abol-
ished in favor of adopting a determinate sentencing scheme, but several
states continue to operate their parole systems with this type of guideline
structure.
Applying this approach in the context of juvenile lifer parole decisions,
however, is more challenging than it may appear. The federal parole guide-
line system operated in the context of a sentencing scheme in which judges
set a minimum and a maximum period of time and allowed parole to be
granted at any point within that range.306 In cases where the gravity of the
crime was at its peak and the sentence permitted incarceration for the dura-
tion of natural life, the Guidelines were notably silent; they stated no period
302 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. R
303 See supra note 11; Rhine et al., supra note 12; Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner R
Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIM. & JUST. 479, 491 (1999); Johnson & Messinger, supra
note 194. R
304 See Goldberger, et al., Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84
YALE L.J. 810 (1975) (“[a] primary purpose of instituting the Guidelines was to structure
discretion and thereby reduce inequality of treatment”). Some states, such as New York, began
adopting similar guideline frameworks in the late 1970s. See, e.g., VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE,
FINAL REPORT ON PAROLE DECISION-MAKING PROJECT SUBMITTED TO NYS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, Section VI (1978) (describing study of parole-release decisions in
context of newly adopted preliminary guideline framework).
305 Goldberger et al., supra note 304, at 837.
306 Id. at 887.
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of time at which release should be granted.307 The context of life with the
possibility of parole sentences present a different type of question for a pa-
role board—because natural life until death is accepted as the maximum
justified sentence, the question is not just when to release, but whether to
release at all.
Three proposals follow for cabining parole-board discretion in the con-
text of life with the possibility of parole sentences. The proposals all have a
similar structure in that they would all establish a presumptive-maximum
parole-release date. That is, a point in time at which the sentence does not
technically expire, but a very strong presumption of release from prison
takes hold. The parole board would retain broad discretion to grant or deny
parole prior to the presumptive-maximum date, but when a person reaches
the presumptive-maximum, the parole board would have extremely limited
discretion to deny release. For example, once a person has reached the pre-
sumptive maximum, the parole board would be required to grant release un-
less there is clear and convincing evidence that the person poses a threat of
grave physical injury to others that cannot be managed in a non-custodial
setting. Instituting a presumptive maximum would be particularly advanta-
geous in addressing the problem observed in Part III.D, that the parole board
currently exercises more power over how much time is served than the legis-
lature, the judge, or the jury. The three proposals below offer different meth-
ods for setting the presumptive maximum.
The first suggestion is to set the presumptive maximum based on an
individual’s completion of clear and measurable milestones for rehabilita-
tion. For example, the presumptive maximum could be defined as the point
at which an individual has completed some defined number and type of re-
habilitation programs. Or it could be defined as the point at which an indi-
vidual has completed programs and has served some baseline number of
months without a disciplinary write-up.  This suggestion seems most apt in
the context of juvenile lifer parole decisions where the law directs release
based upon a demonstration of rehabilitation.308 In setting presumptive re-
lease dates on the basis of rehabilitation milestones, care must be taken to
structure them in a way that does not favor any one racial group over an-
other. For example, if Latinx candidates were found to be disproportionately
incarcerated in maximum-security facilities that tend to have less access to
rehabilitation programs, then to define milestones on the basis of program
completion would intentionally perpetuate racially disparate treatment. The
milestones would need to be altered to take those disparities into account,
unless or until the disparities are eliminated in the underlying prison
environment.309
307 See PIERCE O’DONNELL, MICHAEL J. CHURGIN & DENNIS E. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST
AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 24 (1977).
308 See supra at Part I.
309 For example, in this study set, if rehabilitation milestones were defined as having a low
score on a risk assessment, Black candidates would be at a marked disadvantage. Whereas
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A concern with setting presumptive maximum dates based on rehabili-
tation milestones is that the method may not restrict discretion, but rather
relocate it from the parole board into the hands of correctional officers.
Given the control that these officers exercise over disciplinary reports and
access to rehabilitation programs, they may have substantial influence over
whether a given candidate is able to complete the milestones.310 To ensure
fairness at this level, heightened procedural protections would be needed at
disciplinary hearings, and in decisions about whether to allow or deny access
to programs. Further, constant monitoring of outcomes would be needed to
discern whether racial or other illegitimate disparities emerge over time.
A second proposal is to set the presumptive maximum based solely on
the minimum parole eligibility date. For example, the presumptive maximum
could be the point at which a person has served in excess of 110% of their
minimum time-served. Or, the presumptive maximum could be set as equal
to the minimum parole-release eligibility dates.311 An advantage of this ap-
proach is its uniformity, but a disadvantage is that in a state where minimum
eligibility dates are mandated by statute, the approach relies heavily on both
the quality of those statutes and prosecutors who have discretion to charge
different crimes that carry different mandatory minimum sentences. In some
cases, minimum parole eligibility dates may be exceedingly harsh given the
facts of a particular crime, the person’s culpability, or individual mitigating
factors. This concern is particularly acute among juveniles who have been
sentenced to long mandatory-minimum terms without any consideration to
their diminished culpability at sentencing. As described supra at Part VI
some of the cases observed in the set of transcripts underscored this concern.
A third proposal is to set the presumptive maximum at the sentencing
hearing based on an individualized proportionality judgment about the grav-
ity of a crime in a given case.312 Trial judges are better situated than a parole
48% of non-Black candidates received a low score on the risk assessment, only 31% of Black
candidates received a low score on the risk assessment. If however, milestones were defined as
having the following combination of variables—at least three years without a disciplinary
write-up, participation in at least four different types of rehabilitation programing, and comple-
tion of a GED or other high school equivalency—then it is not apparent that any racial group
would be clearly disadvantaged. The racial distribution within the set of candidates who meet
these criteria (they are the 286 individuals considered in Table 6) mirrors the racial distribution
of the full sample; no one racial group is substantially over- or under-represented. If the Board
were to have granted parole to all candidates whose records of behavior met these “rehabilita-
tion milestones,” the process would have been highly responsive to demonstrated rehabilita-
tion and racial disparity would have been markedly reduced.
310 Cf. Heinz et al., supra note 11, at 18 (“One might well question whether it is desirable R
for the Parole Board’s discretion to be delegated to quite junior employees of the Department
of Corrections, some of whom may be poorly qualified, and who make their decisions at a low
level of visibility without any sort of mandatory, regularized procedures.”)
311 Taking a different approach, the Sentencing Project’s Campaign to End Life Sentences
advocates for a twenty-year maximum across the board. See CAMPAIGN TO END LIFE IMPRIS-
ONMENT, https://endlifeimprisonment.org/, archived at https://perma.cc/Q4NG-US5L (last vis-
ited June 16, 2019).
312 Cf. In re Butler, 4 Cal. 5th 728, 732 (2018). Prior to legislative change in 2014 and
2015, the California Board of Parole Hearings set “base terms” that were intended to provide
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board (or the legislature) to make proportionality judgments about the crime
because judges have greater expertise in proportionality analysis and are
more proximate to the facts of the crime. David Ball has convincingly ar-
gued that if parole-release decisions have anything to do with proportionality
judgments about the crime, the Sixth Amendment requires the right to have a
jury find facts that are relied upon in making such judgments.313 Building on
this insight, a system could be devised in which juries or judges, with the
fact-finding help of juries, set presumptive-maximums. A principled ap-
proach would be to allow juries or judges to set the presumptive-maximum
parole date either above or beyond the legislated minimum period for parole-
eligibility. If such an approach were adopted, considerable attention would
be needed to monitor and manage the use of discretion in this context; al-
though judges and juries make decisions in the context of more robust proce-
dural protections than parole boards, they are certainly not immune from
wielding discretion in an arbitrary fashion.
B. Improve the Exercise of Discretion
Almost all of the suggestions to cabin discretion described above would
leave the parole board with broad discretion for release decisions among
those who have not yet reached the presumptive maximum. The reforms
described below would improve the board’s ability to exercise discretion
fairly in such cases.
Perhaps the most immediate way to improve exercise of discretion is to
clarify the legal standard that the parole board is expected to apply. As dis-
cussed supra at Part IV.C, the current statutory standard is vague and the
administrative regulations listing suitability factors are in deep tension with
the statutory requirement to consider the hallmark features of youth as miti-
gating factors.  Once the standard is clarified, the adoption of a structured
decision-making framework could also be useful. Such a framework would
require board members to proceed through a number of steps and rate candi-
dates on the basis of various factors before coming to a decision.314
“uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude.” The purpose of the base term
was to indicate a point in time when the prisoner had served his or her proportionate sentence,
and could on that ground petition a court to find that additional punishment would be dispro-
portionate. In practice, the base terms did not function in this way because the Board did not
set the term until after a person had been found suitable for parole.
313 See Ball, supra note 60, at 934. R
314 Research on parole boards in Kansas, Ohio, and Connecticut shows that frequent train-
ing and feedback would be needed to assist decision-makers in applying the framework in a
consistent fashion. See Ralph Serin and Renee Gobeil, Analysis of the Use of the Structured
Decisionmaking Framework in Three States, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE NATIONAL INSTI-
TUTE OF CORRECTIONS (September 2014), https://info.nicic.gov/nicrp/system/files/028408.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/4NWK-4HS7.
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Increased procedural protections could also improve the quality of ad-
vocacy and the accuracy of information considered at parole hearings.315 The
examples of inadequate legal representation described supra at Part IV.A,
highlight the need to increase resources available for appointed counsel at
parole hearings. Additional procedural protections could include providing
funds for independent experts,316 allowing witnesses317 and cross-examina-
tion, recognizing a right to confrontation and a right to holding the hearing
in a public forum, conducting hearings annually, and precluding reliance on
confidential information. Several states already provide some of these
rights.318
Increasing the parole board’s independence from the Governor’s office
could help it exercise discretion in a way that is less swayed by the political
tide. Rescinding the Governor’s authority to reverse parole decisions would
be an important first step in this regard. In addition, a policy could require
that some parole board members be appointed by state entities other than the
Governor. For example, in South Dakota, the Governor appoints three parole
board members, the attorney general appoints three parole board members,
and the supreme court appoints three members.319 Further bi-partisanship
could be encouraged by a requirement that appointments be made by both
the majority leader and the minority leader in the state senate and state house
of representatives. Alternatively, the board could consist of administrative
law judges.
Additional reforms could reduce the influence of idiosyncratic deci-
sion-making. For example, a policy could require that three or more mem-
bers of the Board be present at every hearing,320 and that they bring expertise
from a variety of different professional backgrounds. A different approach
would be to create a procedure akin to jury selection by which a different
board is formed in each case to reflect the community into which the candi-
date would potentially be entering. Another option might be to institute a
315 Some have argued that nothing short of the full panoply of criminal procedural protec-
tions are needed. Taking such an approach would essentially transform the parole process into
second-looking sentencing proceedings, which is what the Model Penal Code on sentencing
advises. See Russell, supra note 4, at 430; MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §§ 6.11A(h), R
305.6.
316 In Massachusetts, for example, a Superior Court is authorized to allow payment for an
expert witness to assist juvenile lifer parole candidates where an expert is needed to “explain
the effects of the individual’s neurobiological immaturity and other personal circumstances at
the time of the crime, and how this information relates to the individual’s present capacity and
future risk of reoffending.” Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 12
(2015)
317 In Wyoming, for example, prison staff can provide in-person testimony about a parole
candidate’s growth over time. See JORGE RENAUD, GRADING THE PAROLE RELEASE SYSTEMS OF
ALL 50 STATES (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/grading_parole.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/PA3M-GERN.
318 See Russell & Denholtz, supra note 3, at 1133–34. R
319 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 24-13-1.
320 For example, a three-member panel is required at juvenile lifer parole hearings in Loui-
siana. See Russell & Denholtz, supra note 3, at 1133. R
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system of peer-to-peer evaluation, which has been shown to reduce inconsis-
tency in other contexts of discretionary agency decision-making.321 For ex-
ample, at the end of each month, the board could analyze its decisions and
find sets of cases in which candidates were similarly situated on a variety of
pertinent variables but received different decision-outcomes. The parole
board members who participated in those decisions could then compare dif-
ferences in how they asked questions in the hearing, how they weighed vari-
ous pieces of information in making their decision, and whether the
differences in decisions were justified or not.
C. Establish Oversight and Accountability
over the Exercise of Discretion
Research on decision-making in the context of the United States Social
Security Administration has shown that robust judicial review of agency ad-
judications can help to identify errors in individual cases, clarify legal stan-
dards, and also provide “problem-oriented” oversight that can identify
entrenched problems within agency administration.322 If judicial review is to
provide a meaningful check on parole board discretion, at least two reforms
would be needed. First, appointment of counsel to file for judicial review
would be needed in order to make review available to the majority of parole
candidates who are indigent and lack developed skills in self-representation.
Second, the standard of review would need to be less deferential to the pa-
role board than the current standard, which requires the court to uphold a
denial of parole wherever the record contains “any modicum of evidence”
of current dangerousness.323 Changing this “any modicum of evidence” stan-
dard to the “substantial evidence” standard that is used in the Social Secur-
ity context would be a step in the right direction.324 In January 2019, the
California Supreme Court granted review in a case that presents the question
of whether a heightened standard of judicial review is required in review of
juvenile lifer parole decisions.325
The conjunction of California law and the Eighth Amendment arguably
require de novo judicial review of juvenile lifer parole decisions. California
law requires that agency decisions which affect a fundamental and vested
321 See Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An Experiment of Experimentalism, 69
STAN. L. REV. 1, 13 (2017) (evidence from randomized controlled trial on food safety inspec-
tions shows that “peer review can reduce the arbitrariness of decisionmaking”).
322 See, e.g., Jonah B. Gelbach & David Marcus, Rethinking Judicial Review of High Vol-
ume Agency Adjudication, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (2018).
323 Cf. Charlie Sarosy, Parole Denial Habeas Corpus Petitions: Why the California Su-
preme Court Needs to Provide More Clarity on the Scope of Judicial Review, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 1134, 1184 (2014) (arguing for a standard of review that is less deferential to the parole
board).
324 See, e.g., Morton Denlow, Substantial Evidence Review in Social Security Cases as an
Issue of Fact, 28 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 29, 35 (2008).
325 See In re Palmer, 433 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2019).
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right are reviewed by the court using a de novo standard.326 In 1988, the
California Supreme Court held that this de novo standard does not apply to
parole-release decisions because the interest in parole-release is not funda-
mental and vested.327 This holding, however, would not control in the con-
text of juvenile lifer parole decisions given the recent development of Eighth
Amendment caselaw, discussed supra at Part I. Parole-release is a funda-
mental and vested right for a person who is serving a life sentence for a
juvenile crime and who has demonstrated rehabilitation as an adult. Where
such an individual has in fact demonstrated rehabilitation as an adult, the
decision to deny parole and subject her to continued incarceration violates
the Eighth Amendment. The decision about whether she has in fact demon-
strated rehabilitation is therefore a decision that impacts a fundamental and
vested right, namely the constitutional right against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. Under state law, the decision should therefore be reviewed by a
court de novo.328
Even under a de novo standard, however, judicial review is limited be-
cause it is not equipped to identify system-wide deficiencies that are not
apparent in any individual case, nor is it equipped to identify deficiencies in
processes that precede decisions. For example, if rehabilitation programs
were not reasonably available to some candidates throughout their period of
incarceration, or if members of one racial group were more likely to be writ-
ten up for prison disciplinary violations, these issues would be unlikely to
appear on the face of a challenge to an individual parole decision. A holistic
review of the system, however, could bring such issues to light if they do
exist. Qualitative and quantitative review of decisions by an independent
agency could be useful in investigating these types of systemic issues.329 For
example, a policy could require the parole board to record specific data
points about each case (similar to the data points recorded by coding tran-
scripts), and the California State Auditor330 or the Office of the Inspector
General331 could be charged with assessing patterns in the data, making qual-
itative observations at hearings, and issuing public reports with an eye to
326 See Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143 (1971).
327 See In re Powell, 45 Cal. 3d 894, 903 (1988).
328 See also Russell, supra note 4, at 427 (“Allowing appellate review of a parole board’s R
finding of unsuitability is critical to enforcing Graham’s meaningful opportunity requirement
because it would allow reversal of decisions that were not made in a meaningful or accurate
manner.”).
329 See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cue´llar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 227, 240–49 (2006) (describing limits of judicial review of administrative agencies
and recommending oversight by independent agencies); Kathleen G. Noonan, Charles F. Sabel
& William H. Simon, Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from
Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523, 564 (2009) (describing how qualitative
review of a random sample of cases by teams of agency officials and outsiders has improved
quality of discretionary decision-making in child welfare context).
330 What Is the Audit Process?, CALIFORNIA STATE AUDITOR, https://www.auditor.ca.gov/
aboutus/audit_process, archived at https://perma.cc/Z3MQ-P7L5 (last visited Mar. 10, 2019).
331 Office of the Inspector General, OIG.CA.gov, https://www.oig.ca.gov/, archived at
https://perma.cc/P38Z-7XR4 (last visited Mar. 10, 2019).
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uncovering potential inequities and proposing reforms.  An additional bene-
fit would be that such an agency could also gather and analyze post-release
data to identify community resources and in-prison programs that are condu-
cive to helping people become contributing members of society upon
release.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the above measures are designed to improve the consistency
of decisions with respect to rehabilitation, they will not address all concerns
about the constitutionality of life sentences imposed on the basis of juvenile
convictions. The study here has focused on identifying and proposing a rem-
edy to just one way in which these sentences may fail to be constitutional. In
concluding, I briefly summarize a few of the other pressing concerns about
these sentences which, although beyond the scope of this Article, call for
future research and potential litigation.
First, this study did not consider the question of whether a sentence of
life with the possibility of parole is disproportionate when imposed upon a
juvenile in the first place. Parole hearing transcripts revealed a number of
cases in which a parole candidate had received a mandatory sentence of life
with the possibility of parole on the basis of a conviction that would not
appear to warrant such a sentence, and which a judge likely would not have
imposed if the judge had been authorized to impose an alternative sentence
on the basis of the diminished culpability of juveniles. As an example, one
of the parole candidates in this sample was serving a life sentence for a
kidnapping conviction based on the following facts: while high on drugs at
age 16, the parole candidate had forced an elderly woman into a car, made
her drive down the street to a supermarket to cash a check, and then got
scared and ran away when the woman went into the supermarket.332 This
individual was denied parole primarily on the basis of his record of conduct
in prison, but there is a strong moral argument that serving time in an adult
prison, let alone a life sentence in adult prison, is disproportionate to his
culpability and offense.333 The Board, however, could not consider that argu-
ment because, unlike a judge at sentencing or re-sentencing, it does not have
the authority or expertise to make determinations of culpability or
proportionality.334
Cases such as these suggest that even if the parole process is reformed
to provide a meaningful opportunity for release, that opportunity should not
absolve the judiciary of its responsibility to review whether mandatory
sentences imposed on juveniles are disproportionate to a given individual’s
culpability. Some state court opinions have accordingly held that the oppor-
332 See California Board of Parole Hearings, Parole Consideration Hearing (January 2015)
(transcript on file with author).
333 Cf. People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 489 (1983).
334 Cf. In re Palmer, 245 Cal. Rptr. 3d 708, 712, 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019)
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tunity for release on parole does not render moot a claim for re-sentencing
on the basis of a juvenile’s diminished culpability.335 The California Supreme
Court, however, has held that “a meaningful opportunity to obtain release”
renders moot a juvenile’s claim that a mandatory sentence of life with the
possibility of parole is necessarily unconstitutional.336 To be clear, however,
a California court may still vacate a sentence as unconstitutional if a person
is repeatedly denied parole and serves an excessive period of time that is
disproportionate to the severity of the offense and the individual’s
culpability.337
A second pressing concern which this study has not addressed is that
juvenile parole candidates may lack adequate access to quality rehabilitation
programs which are critical to demonstrating rehabilitation. Transcripts dis-
cussed numerous occasions in which critical programs did not exist in facili-
ties; where programs did exist, they were often unavailable to candidates
who were frequently transferred from one prison to another and, with each
transfer, were placed at the bottom of long waitlists. Many programs dis-
cussed in transcripts were run via correspondence or by prisoners them-
selves; only 20% of candidates in this sample had participated in a program
with a professional therapist, despite the fact that most candidates had exper-
ienced trauma as children. Two-thirds of the candidates who reported sexual
abuse as children did not report having any therapy during their years of
incarceration. These facts simply scratch the surface, and more research is
needed to both assess the problem of inadequate rehabilitation programs and
to develop solutions.338
For this reason and others, the above proposal to reform parole-release
decision-making is offered not as a solution, but as a “stone of hope.” Part
of that hope is believing that creative solutions can be found, that further
research can help diagnose problems, and that law and policy will move
toward fairness in sentencing, prison programming, and parole.
335 The Mississippi Supreme Court considered the question of the proper remedy for de
facto life without parole cases in Parker v. State, 119 So. 3d 987, 999 (Miss. 2013). The state’s
attorney general, and the dissenting justices, urged that juveniles with de facto life without
parole should simply be made eligible for parole after serving 10 years in prison. Emphasizing
that the legislature has vested sentencing authority in the trial court, the majority refused the
proposal to “create a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence . . . [doing so] would be to
remove the consideration from the sentencing authority, circumventing the Miller mandate of
individualized sentencing for a minor convicted of murder.” Id. See also State v. Ragland, 836
N.W.2d 107, 119 (Iowa 2013) (executive commutation of the youth offender’s sentence “to a
term of years did not affect the mandatory nature of the sentence or cure the absence of a
process of individualized sentencing considerations mandated under Miller”); State v. Lyle,
854 N.W.2d 378, 404 (Iowa 2014) (holding mandatory minimum sentences as applied to
juveniles unconstitutional under the state constitution).
336 See People v. Franklin, 63 Cal. 4th 261, 286 (2016).
337 See In re Palmer, 245 Cal. Rptr. 3d 708, 717 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019).
338 One promising proposal is to make trauma-informed therapy available to all juvenile
lifers. The California legislature is currently considering a pilot program that would do so. See
Assembly Bill 620 “Prisoners: Trauma-Focused Programming” (introduced Feb. 14, 2017).
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Table A: Descriptive Statistics with Hearing Results 
 Total % of 
Sample 
Denied Granted % 
Granted 
       
Total 426 100% 250 176  41% 
       
Race/Ethnicity of parole candidate 
Black [Race_black] 151  35% 104  47  31% 
Latinx 135  32%  70  65  48% 
Other  61  14%  29  32  52% 
White  79  19%  47  32  41% 
Pearson chi2(3) = 12.2114 Pr = 0.007      
NOTE: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation categorizes each person into one 
of the following racial/ethnic groups: Black, Hispanic, white, and other (“other” includes Chinese, 
Vietnamese, Filipino, American Indian, and Laotian). “Latinx” is used here in lieu of “Hispanic.” 
       
Current age [Age_current] 
20-29   7   2%   5   2  29% 
30-39 156  37%  82  74  47% 
40-49 193  45% 120  73  38% 
50-59  68  16%  42  26  38% 
60+   2   0%   1   1  50% 
Pearson chi2(4) = 4.1779 Pr = 0.382      
Mean = 42.18; Stdev = 6.56; Median = 41      
       
Comprehensive risk assessment score [Psych] 
Low [0] 180  42%  47 133  74% 
Low/moderate [1]  17   4%   9   8  47% 
Moderate [2] 193  45% 158  35  18% 
Moderate/high [3]   3   1%   3   0   0% 
High [4]  33   8%  33   0   0% 
Pearson chi2(4) = 147.1212 Pr = 0.000      
       
Time since last disciplinary write-up [Clean_time] 
0 to 2 years [0]  90  21%  84   6  7% 
3 to 5 years [1] 103  24%  74  29 28% 
6 to 11 years [2] 131  31%  63  68 52% 
12 years or more [3] 102  24%  29  73 72% 
Pearson chi2(3) = 96.4885 Pr = 0.000      
NOTE: Difference between the hearing year and the year of the last write-up for a serious rules 
violation (“115”). If there were zero write-ups, the total number of years served is used. The 
distribution of the number of years is skewed right, and categorical variables (0, 1, 2, 3) were 
calculated by dividing the sample into quartiles. 
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Table A: Descriptive Statistics with Hearing Results 
 Total % of 
Sample 
Denied Granted % 
Granted 
       
Total disciplinary write-ups [Total_disc] 
0 to 3 [0] 103  24%  38  65  63% 
4 to 7 [1] 107  25%  57  50  47% 
8 to 14 [2] 107  25%  73  34  32% 
15 or more [3] 109  26%  82  27  25% 
Pearson chi2(3) = 37.7887 Pr = 0.000      
NOTE: Sum of all serious rules violation (“115”s) within the candidate’s entire period of 
incarceration. The distribution of the total number of write-ups is skewed right, and categorical 
variables (0, 1, 2, 3) were calculated by dividing the sample into quartiles. 
       
General rehabilitation programming [Prog_gen] 
Minimal [0]  50  12%  48   2   4% 
Moderate [1] 266  62% 160 106  40% 
Extensive [2] 110  26%  42  68  62% 
Pearson chi2(2) = 48.0225 Pr = 0.000      
NOTE: Calculated by taking the sum of extent of program participation in the following categories: 
vocation, victim awareness, anger management, religious, philanthropic, youth-focused, cognitive 
therapeutic, arts or sports, and general self-help. Within each category, a candidate’s extent of 
participation was measured as 0 (none), 1 (minimum), 2 (modoreate), 3 (extensive). The sums for 
extent of participation in programs across these categories was normally distributed. Categorical 
variables were then assigned as follows: 0 (sum is one standard deviation below the mean); 1 (sum 
within one standard deviation of the mean); 2 (sum is one standard deviation above the mean). 
       
Rehabilitation program focused on substance abuse [Prog_sub] 
No [0]  78  18%  74   4   5% 
Yes [1] 348  82% 176 172  49% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 51.5681 Pr = 0.000      
NOTE: Participation in any program that focuses on substance abuse, such as Alcoholics/Narcotics 
Anonymous, CDCR’s Substance Abuse Treatment program (SAP), Al-Anon, Celebrate Recovery, 
and White Bison (designed for Native-Americans). Participation was counted as “No” if candidate 
did a 12 Step program, and failed to answer a question about one of the 12 Steps. 
       
Rehabilitation program focused on gangs [Prog_gang] 
No [0] 231  54% 158  73  32% 
Yes [1] 195  46%  92 103  53% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 19.6356 Pr = 0.000      
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Table A: Descriptive Statistics with Hearing Results 
 Total % of 
Sample 
Denied Granted % 
Granted 
       
Education level attained [Edu] 
No GED or HS degree [0]  45  11%  36   9  20% 
GED or HS degree [1] 196 46% 128  68  35% 
GED/HS and college courses [2] 128 30%  68  60  47% 
GED/HS and college degree [3]  57  13%  18  39  68% 
Pearson chi2(3) = 30.8816 Pr = 0.000      
       
Incarcerated in maximum security conditions [Prison_max] 
No [0] 339  80% 178 161  47% 
Yes [1]  87  20%  72  15  17% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 26.1314 Pr = 0.000      
NOTE: “Maximum security” indicates Level IV housing level. If housing level unknown, 
designated as “maximum security” if security Level IV or SHU housing. See footnote 167. 
       
History of mental illness [Hx_mental_ill] 
No [0] 332  78% 181 151  45% 
Yes [1]  94  22%  69  25  27% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 10.7773 Pr = 0.001      
NOTE: Includes past or present diagnosis of any of the following: schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, 
depression, major mental disorder not otherwise specified, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress 
disorder. 
       
Initial or subsequent parole hearing [Initial] 
Subsequent [0] 340  80% 184 156  46% 
Initial [1]  86  20%  66  20  23% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 14.4934 Pr = 0.000      
       
Served more time than norm relative to crime [Time_over] 
No [0] 203  48% 106  97  48% 
Yes, equal or more time [1] 223  52% 144  79  35% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 6.6927 Pr = 0.010      
       
Retained attorney [Retained] 
No [0] 341  80% 218 123  36% 
Yes [1]  85  20%  32  53  62% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 19.3850 Pr = 0.000      
NOTE: Where retained is coded as “No,” parole candidates were represented by attorneys on list of 
panel attorneys appointed by the Board during study period (and in one case parole candidate 
proceeded pro se). 
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Table A: Descriptive Statistics with Hearing Results 
 Total % of 
Sample 
Denied Granted % 
Granted 
       
Opposition from district attorney [Da_opp] 
No [0]  46  11%   6  40  87% 
Yes [1] 380  89% 244 136  36% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 44.3077 Pr = 0.000      
       
Opposition from victim or victim next of kin [Vic_opp] 
No [0] 356  84% 210 146  41% 
Yes [1]  70  16%  40  30  43% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0822 Pr = 0.774      
       
Confirmed job offer [Job_offer] 
No [0] 187  44% 120  67  36% 
Yes [1] 239  56% 130 109  46% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 4.1370 Pr = 0.042      
       
Arranged residence in transitional living facility [Res_trans] 
No [0]  88  21%  68  20  23% 
Yes [1] 338  79% 182 156  46% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 15.8042 Pr = 0.000      
       
Arranged residence with family or friends [Res_fam] 
No [0] 115  27%  70  45  39% 
Yes [1] 311  73% 180 131  42% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.3099 Pr = 0.578      
       
Age at time of crime [Agecrime] 
14   3   1%   0   3 100% 
15  19   4%  13   6  32% 
16 189  44% 106  83  44% 
17 215  50% 131  84  39% 
Pearson chi2(3) = 5.9782 Pr = 0.113      
       
Childhood history of drug or alcohol abuse [Youth_drugsalc] 
No [0]  57  13%  27  30  53% 
Yes [1] 369  87% 223 146  40% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 3.4761 Pr = 0.062      
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Table A: Descriptive Statistics with Hearing Results 
 Total % of 
Sample 
Denied Granted % 
Granted 
       
Childhood history of violence prior to offense [Youth_priorv] 
No [0] 113 27%  59  54  48% 
Yes [1] 313  73% 191 122  39% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 2.6578 Pr = 0.103      
NOTE: Includes any violent conduct regardless of whether there was an adjudication. 
       
Childhood history of street gang activity or affiliation [Youth_gang] 
No [0] 145  34%  87  58  40% 
Yes [1] 281  66% 163 118  42% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.1567 Pr = 0.692      
       
Childhood history of acute trauma and/or disadvantage [Youth_unstable] 
No [0] 180  42% 101  79  44% 
Yes [1] 246  58% 149  97  39% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.8520 Pr = 0.356      
NOTE: Indicates whether three or more of the following applied: victim of physical abuse at home, 
victim of verbal or emotional abuse at home, witness to violence at home, witness to violence in 
community outside of home, direct victim of crime or violence outside home environment, family 
or friends direct victims of crime or violence, substance abuse in home, homelessness, dropped out 
of school, suicide attempts, foster care, neglected by caretakers, uncategorized disadvantage or 
trauma. 
       
Sexually abused as a child [Youth_sex] 
No [0] 360  85% 216 144  40% 
Yes [1]  66  15%  34  32  48% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 1.6561 Pr = 0.198      
       
Controlling offense [Crime_max] 
Non-murder, non-sexual offense [0]  19   4%  14   5  26% 
Sexual offense [1]  15   4%  13   2  13% 
Attempted murder [2]  41  10%  24  17  41% 
Murder in 2nd degree [3] 174  41%  97  77  44% 
Murder in 1st degree [4] 177  42% 102  75  42% 
Pearson chi2(4) = 7.3085 Pr = 0.120      
       
Conviction included murder in first degree [Crime_mur1] 
No [0] 249  58% 148 101  41% 
Yes [1] 177  42% 102  75  42% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.1399 Pr = 0.708      
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Table A: Descriptive Statistics with Hearing Results 
 Total % of 
Sample 
Denied Granted % 
Granted 
       
Conviction included some sexual offense [Crime_sex] 
No [0] 405 95% 232 173 43% 
Yes [1] 21 5% 18 3 14% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 6.6557 Pr = 0.010      
       
Offense committed with others [Crime_peer] 
No [0] 107 25% 61 46 43% 
Yes [1] 319 75% 189 130 41% 
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.1656 Pr = 0.684      
NOTE: Indicates whether candidate had co-defendant(s) or crime partner(s), committed the crime 
on behalf of a gang, or was directly influenced by others in the commission of the crime. 
 
 
 
Table B: Regression for Rehabilitation Index 
 Coeff. (Std. Err.)   
Clean_time 1.154**  
 -0.136  
Progscore 1.572**  
 0.2640124  
Edu .491**  
 0.154  
Constant -4.846**  
 0.510  
Pseudo R-square 0.297  
N 426  
**p<0.05   
    
NOTE: The Progscore variable differs from the Prog_gen variable in Table A. Progscore is 
calculated by taking the sum of extent of participation in programs in all categories: substance 
abuse, gang, vocation, victim awareness, anger management, religious, philanthropic, youth-
focused, cognitive therapeutic, arts or sports, and general self- help.Within each category, a 
candidate’s extent of participation was measured as 0 (none), 1 (minimum), 2 (moderate), 3 
(extensive). The sums for extent of participation in programs across these categories were normally 
distributed. Categorical variables were then assigned as follows: 0 (sum is one standard deviation 
below the mean); 1 (sum within one standard deviation of the mean); 2 (sum is one standard 
deviation above the mean). 
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Table C: Odds Ratios for Hearing Result Model
  
 Hearing_Result Model
(Odds Ratio; Std. Error)
Race_black 0.372** 
 -0.154 
Prog_gen 6.304** 
 -2.498 
Prog_sub 40.88** 
 -32.25 
Prog_gang 2.075* 
 -0.811 
Edu 1.379 
 -0.317 
Clean_time 10.59** 
 -3.135 
Total_disc 1.168 
 -0.22 
Hx_mental_ill 0.68 
 -0.334 
Initial 0.145** 
 -0.0805 
Pris_max 0.210** 
 -0.125 
Time_over 0.237** 
 -0.101 
Crime_sex 0.0914** 
 -0.104 
Retained 3.446** 
 -1.559 
Da_opp 0.0304** 
 -0.027 
Vic_opp 0.180** 
 -0.0933 
Psych_resid 0.186** 
 -0.0454 
Constant 0.002** 
 0.002 
Pseudo R-square 0.633 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05  
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Table D: Robustness Checks with Added Youth Variables 
 Youth_drugsalc Youth_Priorv Youth_gang Youth_unstable Youth_sex Age_crime Youth_all† 
Race_black -0.989** -0.883** -0.973** -0.994** -0.981** -0.982** -0.901** 
 -0.41 -0.42 -0.42 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.43 
Prog_gen 1.803** 1.853** 1.837** 1.833** 1.819** 1.871** 1.852** 
 -0.39 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.41 
Prog_sub 3.727** 3.741** 3.714** 3.738** 3.711** 3.768** 3.881** 
 -0.79 -0.79 -0.79 -0.8 -0.79 -0.8 -0.81 
Prog_gang 0.727* 0.838** 0.778* 0.728* 0.745* 0.744* 0.831* 
 -0.39 -0.4 -0.42 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39 -0.43 
Edu 0.326 0.326 0.308 0.323 0.317 0.315 0.314 
 -0.23 -0.23 -0.24 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.24 
Clean_time 2.338** 2.403** 2.355** 2.359** 2.344** 2.370** 2.394** 
 -0.29 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.29 -0.3 -0.31 
Total_disc 0.159 0.164 0.155 0.153 0.157 0.149 0.18 
 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 
Hx_mental_ill -0.378 -0.495 -0.401 -0.385 -0.427 -0.383 -0.491 
 -0.49 -0.5 -0.5 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.51 
Initial -1.877** -1.964** -1.937** -1.914** -1.917** -1.937** -1.965** 
 -0.55 -0.56 -0.56 -0.56 -0.56 -0.55 -0.56 
Pris_max -1.497** -1.553** -1.535** -1.555** -1.580** -1.586** -1.593** 
 -0.59 -0.59 -0.59 -0.59 -0.6 -0.59 -0.61 
Time_over -1.433** -1.506** -1.462** -1.454** -1.428** -1.429** -1.514** 
 -0.43 -0.44 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43 -0.44 
Crime_sex -2.387** -2.298** -2.419** -2.377** -2.494** -2.463** -2.368** 
 -1.13 -1.11 -1.15 -1.12 -1.14 -1.15 -1.15 
Retained 1.209** 1.224** 1.239** 1.242** 1.237** 1.256** 1.257** 
 -0.45 -0.46 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.46 
Da_opp -3.468** -3.574** -3.497** -3.498** -3.492** -3.411** -3.520** 
 -0.88 -0.89 -0.89 -0.89 -0.89 -0.89 -0.9 
Vic_opp -1.667** -1.757** -1.709** -1.716** -1.713** -1.730** -1.768** 
 -0.52 -0.52 -0.52 -0.52 -0.52 -0.52 -0.53 
Psych_resid -1.661** -1.703** -1.683** -1.685** -1.683** -1.691** -1.716** 
 -0.24 -0.25 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.25 -0.25 
Added variable -0.278 -0.546 -0.120 -0.058 0.335 -0.111 NA 
 -0.58 -0.43 -0.450 -0.38 -0.49 -0.31 NA 
Constant -6.120** -6.094** -6.295** -6.357** -6.391** -4.745 -3.851 
 -1.47 -1.42 -1.430 -1.43 -1.41 -5.06 -5.1 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05; N=417; †Youth_all includes all youth variables in this table as dependent variables
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Table E: Robustness Checks with Added Crime and Other Variables 
 Crime_peer Crime_mur1 Age_current Bump Cog_deficit 
Race_black -0.995** -0.992** -0.986** -0.973** -1.003** 
 -0.41 -0.41 -0.42 -0.41 -0.42 
Prog_gen 1.834** 1.837** 1.903** 1.817** 1.882** 
 -0.4 -0.4 -0.41 -0.4 -0.4 
Prog_sub 3.731** 3.704** 3.820** 3.688** 3.645** 
 -0.79 -0.79 -0.81 -0.79 -0.79 
Prog_gang 0.743* 0.741* 0.702* 0.724* 0.734* 
 -0.39 -0.4 -0.4 -0.39 -0.39 
Edu 0.321 0.321 0.336 0.328 0.237 
 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.24 
Clean_time 2.362** 2.357** 2.387** 2.357** 2.449** 
 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.31 
Total_disc 0.167 0.153 0.191 0.161 0.157 
 -0.2 -0.19 -0.2 -0.19 -0.19 
Hx_mental_ill -0.394 -0.381 -0.387 -0.401 -0.261 
 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.5 
Initial -1.925** -1.937** -2.011** -1.742** -2.040** 
 -0.56 -0.56 -0.57 -0.61 -0.57 
Pris_max -1.569** -1.559** -1.601** -1.576** -1.661** 
 -0.6 -0.59 -0.6 -0.59 -0.6 
Time_over -1.450** -1.438** -1.249** -1.426** -1.467** 
 -0.43 -0.43 -0.54 -0.43 -0.44 
Crime_sex -2.407** -2.378** -2.369** -2.239* -2.591** 
 -1.14 -1.14 -1.16 -1.18 -1.16 
Retained 1.236** 1.235** 1.283** 1.259** 1.202** 
 -0.45 -0.45 -0.46 -0.46 -0.45 
Da_opp -3.504** -3.499** -3.413** -3.500** -3.460** 
 -0.89 -0.89 -0.89 -0.89 -0.88 
Vic_opp -1.707** -1.714** -1.700** -1.707** -1.819** 
 -0.52 -0.52 -0.52 -0.52 -0.53 
Psych_resid -1.684** -1.682** -1.718** -1.686** -1.717** 
 -0.24 -0.24 -0.25 -0.24 -0.25 
Added variable -0.105 0.048 -0.026 -0.694 -1.256** 
 -0.44 -0.38 -0.040 1.23 -0.51 
Constant -6.329** -6.390** -5.772** -6.362** -6.186** 
 -1.43 -1.41 -1.910 -1.41 -1.41 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05; N=417 
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Table F: Robustness Checks with Changes to Variable Definitions 
 A (Prog) B (Prog) C (Prog) D (Disc) E (Disc) F (CRA) G (CRA) 
Race_black -1.015** -1.065** -0.889** -0.877** -0.862** -0.685* -0.745** 
 -0.42 -0.4 -0.38 -0.39 -0.4 -0.41 -0.35 
Prog_gen 1.841** 0.408** 2.185** 1.667** 1.712** 1.318** 1.236** 
 -0.4 -0.07 -0.41 -0.37 -0.38 -0.38 -0.31 
Prog_sub 3.285** 3.617** 3.587** 2.811** 2.283** 
 -1 -0.77 -0.77 -0.74 -0.6 
Prog_gang 0.758* 0.698* 0.706* 0.527 0.603* 
 -0.4 -0.38 -0.39 -0.39 -0.33 
Edu 0.338 0.390* 0.527** 0.175 0.233 0.166 0.239 
 -0.23 -0.23 -0.22 -0.23 -0.24 -0.23 -0.2 
Clean_time 2.368** 2.275** 2.175** 1.970** 2.876** 1.852** 1.683** 
 -0.3 -0.28 -0.27 -0.26 -0.38 -0.26 -0.21 
Total_disc 0.176 0.29 0.153 0.24 0.192 0.646** 0.091 
 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18 -0.17 -0.21 -0.21 -0.16 
Hx_mental_ill -0.354 -0.465 -0.452 -0.523 -0.546 -0.086 -0.291 
 -0.49 -0.49 -0.47 -0.48 -0.49 -0.49 -0.4 
Initial -1.968** -1.893** -1.834** -1.872** -1.898** -1.235** -1.586** 
 -0.56 -0.54 -0.51 -0.55 -0.55 -0.54 -0.45 
Pris_max -1.647** -1.513** -1.568** -1.320** -1.311** -1.021* -1.340** 
 -0.6 -0.58 -0.57 -0.58 -0.59 -0.59 -0.52 
Time_over -1.424** -1.473** -1.473** -1.274** -1.318** -1.614** -1.032** 
 -0.43 -0.42 -0.4 -0.41 -0.43 -0.43 -0.36 
Crime_sex -2.436** -1.823 -2.219** -2.452** -2.521** -2.058* -1.11 
 -1.13 -1.15 -1.05 -1.03 -1.02 -1.12 -0.98 
Retained 1.232** 1.093** 1.014** 1.080** 1.096** 1.237** 0.962** 
 -0.45 -0.43 -0.42 -0.44 -0.45 -0.45 -0.4 
Da_opp -3.514** -3.671** -3.573** -2.924** -3.162** -3.493** -2.629** 
 -0.89 -0.86 -0.81 -0.79 -0.85 -0.89 -0.66 
Vic_opp -1.724** -1.350** -1.365** -1.720** -1.755** -1.713** -0.629 
 -0.52 -0.49 -0.47 -0.5 -0.51 -0.52 -0.41 
Psych_resid -1.700** -1.591** -1.525** -1.510** -1.547**  
 -0.25 -0.23 -0.220 -0.23 -0.23  
Added variable -4.018** -1.683**  
 -1.08 -0.24  
Constant -6.024** -5.562** -2.900** -8.050** -7.682** -2.880** -4.057** 
 -1.52 -1.26 -0.990 -1.53 -1.52 -1.31 -1.1 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05 
A: Prog_sub is measured as participation in any substance abuse program regardless of how 12 Step question is 
answered. 12step_f is added as an independent variable measuring failure to answer the 12 Step question. 
B: Prog_gen is measured as the raw sum of participation in all categories of rehabilitation programming 
(including substance abuse and gang program). Prog_sub and prog_gang are not used as independent variables. 
C: Similar to B, except Prog_gen is converted to a score based on whether a candidate’s raw sum is one stdev 
below mean (0), within one stdev of mean (1), or one stdev above the mean (2). 
D: Clean_time is measured as the square root of the number of years since the last write-up for a serious 
disciplinary violation. Total_disc is measured as the square root of the total number of write-ups. 
E: Clean_time is measured as the log of the number of years since the last write-up for a serious disciplinary 
violation. Total_disc is measured as the log of the total number of write-ups. 
F: Psych_resid is not used. The raw CRA score is added as an independent variable. 
G: Neither the Psych_resid variable nor the CRA variable are used. 
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Table G: Robustness Checks with Changes to Sample 
 
A (Outliers 
Included) B (Murder) C (Random) D (Random) E (Random) 
Race_black -0.503 -1.187** -1.313** -1.174** -0.622 
 -0.35 -0.48 -0.49 -0.52 -0.49 
Prog_gen 1.161** 2.278** 1.689** 2.675** 1.977** 
 -0.31 -0.47 -0.45 -0.56 -0.48 
Prog_sub 3.057** 3.722** 2.708** 4.432** 3.761** 
 -0.67 -0.85 -0.91 -0.98 -0.94 
Prog_gang 0.581* 0.717 0.42 0.322 0.895** 
 -0.33 -0.44 -0.45 -0.49 -0.45 
Edu 0.355* 0.344 0.502* 0.379 0.479* 
 -0.2 -0.26 -0.28 -0.28 -0.27 
Clean_time 1.589** 2.451** 2.388** 2.736** 2.314** 
 -0.21 -0.34 -0.35 -0.41 -0.33 
Total_disc 0.044 0.301 0.221 -0.038 0.156 
 -0.17 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.23 
Hx_mental_ill -0.654 -0.401 -0.361 -0.136 -0.276 
 -0.42 -0.59 -0.54 -0.66 -0.58 
Initial -1.255** -2.079** -1.777** -2.027** -1.669** 
 -0.45 -0.69 -0.63 -0.79 -0.62 
Pris_max -1.048** -1.492** -1.978** -2.009** -1.526** 
 -0.51 -0.7 -0.68 -0.79 -0.74 
Time_over -0.925** -1.690** -1.348** -1.559** -1.355** 
 -0.36 -0.5 -0.49 -0.53 -0.52 
Crime_sex -1.925** -0.939 -4.514** -3.020** -4.100** 
 -0.96 -1.68 -1.84 -1.31 -1.81 
Retained 0.930** 1.205** 1.384** 1.709** 1.098** 
 -0.38 -0.52 -0.51 -0.63 -0.51 
Da_opp -2.657** -3.606** -4.365** -4.197** -2.575** 
 -0.74 -1.12 -1.11 -1.03 -0.92 
Vic_opp -1.280** -1.627** -1.743** -2.892** -1.429** 
-0.44 -0.56 -0.58 -0.76 -0.59  
Psych_resid -1.213** -1.866** -1.668** -1.958** -1.648** 
 -0.19 -0.29 -0.27 -0.33 -0.28 
Constant -4.567** -7.025** -4.774** -7.760** -7.963** 
 -1.19 -1.74 -1.600 -1.75 -1.77 
Pseudo R-square 0.5332 0.6489 0.6285 0.6668 0.6307 
N 426 342 313 313 313 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05 
A: All nine outliers included in sample. Outliers are observations in which parole was granted but 
the model predicted that the likelihood of being granted parole was <5%, and observations in 
which the parole was denied but the model predicted that the likelihood of being granted parole was 
>95%. 
B: Sample includes only observations where there was a conviction of first or second degree 
murder. 
C-E: Sample includes a random sample of 75% of the 426 observations. Three different random 
samples were taken. 
